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ABSTRACT:American Federal Indian law is often mistakenly assumed to be a
gender-neutral discipline. Although Native women suffer disproportionately
from numerous maladies, Indian law practitioners rarely engage with questions
of gender discrimination or intersectional oppression. Several Canadian
scholars have begun to explicate “indigenous feminist legal theory.” This is the
first Article in the United States to consider how such a theory might inform
the practice of Federal Indian law and tribal law.
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INTRODUCTION
I began writing this Article just six weeks after the historic November 2018
midterm elections. On the evening of November 6, the world of American
politics saw the election of the first-ever Native
1
women to Congress—Deb
Haaland (Laguna Pueblo) of New Mexico and Sharice Davids (Ho-Chunk) of
Kansas.
2
Native women have been subject to the laws of the United States for
hundreds of years with absolutely no voice—indeed, no presence—in the halls
of Congress. That same evening, Peggy Flanagan (White Earth Ojibwe) of
Minnesota became the first Native woman to be elected to serve as lieutenant
governor of a state. Many other Native women won seats in state legislatures
across the country. Native women are also emerging in other types of high
visibility political and legal positions. For example, Tobi Young (Chickasaw)
became the first Native person to clerk for the United States Supreme Court when
Justice Neil Gorsuch appointed her in 2018.
3
We are entering a new era of
political visibility of contemporary Native women.
It is within the context of this moment that I assess the field of Indian law
and tribal law. This Article considers whether the discipline is keeping up with
the times with regard to gender consciousness and lasting equity for Native
women and Native Two-Spirit (LGBTQ+) people.
4
I also situate this Article in
the context of the #MeToo movement, as several Native women have come
forward with their own experiences of sexual abuse and harassment in the Indian
law workplace.
This inquiry is also prompted by the numerous issues of inequity that Native
women continue to experience in 2019. It is becoming common knowledge that
Native women experience extremely high rates of violent crime, including
1. In this Article, I choose to use the word “Native” to mean American Indian and Alaska Native
people in the United States. I use “indigenous” to speak more generally about Native people in other
countries (including Canada).
2. Julian Brave NoiseCat, “They’re Gonna Rock It”: The First Day Native Women Served on
Capitol Hill, THE NATION (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/haaland-davids-congress-
joy-native-representation/ [https://perma.cc/2XWV-6UFR].
3. Tony Mauro, Gorsuch Hires Native American Law Clerk, Likely First in SCOTUS History,
NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 14 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/04/14/gorsuch-hires-native-
american-law-clerk-likely-first-in-scotus-history/?slreturn=20190117173747 [https://perma.cc/VL5T-
PHXJ].
4. Cherokee scholar Qwo-Li Driskill explains, “The term Two-Spirit was chosen as an intertribal
term to be used in English as a way to communicate numerous tribal traditions and social categories of
gender outside dominant European binaries.” Qwo-Li Driskill, Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques:
Building Alliances between Native and Queer Studies, 16 GLQ: A J. LESBIAN GAY STUD. 69, 72 (2010).
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domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and murder.
5
The federal
government’s own statistics reveal that the vast majority—over 80 percent—of
Native people in the United States have experienced violent victimization.
6
In
fact, where there has been progress in Federal Indian law, it has largely turned
on the issue of high rates of domestic violence and sexual assault.
7
The rates of
violence are an extension of the historical mistreatment and dehumanization of
Native women. These practices have continued well into the twenty-first century
in the form of hypersexualized images of Native women, often associated with
“sexy” Indian Halloween costumes and movies like Disney’s Pocahontas.
8
But there are other areas of gender inequity that deserve attention.
9
For
example, Native women experience the highest poverty rate in the United
States.
10
While Native people in general experience high poverty rates in the
United States, Native men are less likely to experience poverty than Native
women.
11
Further, in 2018, the American Association of University Women
released a report concluding that Native women overall only make fifty-eight
percent of a white man’s earnings.
12
Many Native women are unable to access comprehensive reproductive
healthcare, including adequate prenatal care.
13
Other reproductive disparities
experienced by Native women include higher rates of unintended pregnancies
14
5. ANDRE B. ROSAY, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVEWOMEN AND
MEN: 2010 FINDINGS FROM THENATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUALVIOLENCE SURVEY (2016),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249736.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL5T-PHXJ].
6. Id. at 2 (concluding that 84.3 percent of American Indian and Alaska Native women and 81.6
percent of American Indian and Alaska Native men have experienced violence).
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., CUTCHA RISLING BALDY, WE ARE DANCING FOR YOU: NATIVE FEMINISMS & THE
REVITALIZATION OF WOMEN’S COMING-OF-AGE CEREMONIES 32 (2018) (“Throughout history, Native
women have been portrayed as either Pocahontas or the squaw. Either Native women are assisting in the
colonization of their people, or they are dirty and disregarded as overtly sexual, stupid, and lazy. Native
women have also been left out of historical scholarship and treated as peripheral to their nations, cultures,
and societies rather than shown as integral or as serving in leadership positions.”).
9. JENNIE R. JOE& FRANCINE C. GACHUPIN, HEALTH AND SOCIAL ISSUES OFNATIVE AMERICAN
WOMEN viii (2012) (noting that “[American Indian and Alaska Native] women face extraordinary
challenges in all spheres of life: economic, health, social, and education.”).




12. AM. ASS’N OF U. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP (2018),
https://www.aauw.org/resource/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/GTP6-
YUZH].
13. Greta B. Raglan et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Preterm Birth Among American Indian
and Alaska Native Women, 20 MATERNAL& CHILD HEALTH J. 16, 19 (2016).
14. URBAN INDIAN HEALTH INSTITUTE, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF URBAN AMERICAN INDIAN
AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN: EXAMINING UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, CONTRACEPTION, SEXUAL
HISTORY AND BEHAVIOR, AND NON-VOLUNTARY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE 7 (2010),
https://mchb.hrsa.gov/research/documents/finalreports/forquera_r40_mc_08954_final_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4ZE-M5YZ] (concluding that, “Urban AI/AN had higher rates of unintended
pregnancies and higher rates of mistimed pregnancies than NH-whites”).
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and higher rates of pre-term births.
15
As a result, in some states, the Native infant
mortality rates are up to three times greater than that of whites.
16
Native women
also lack adequate access to abortion services, in large part due to the Hyde
Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funding for abortions except in
the narrow circumstances.
17
Health disparities persist beyond reproductive care. According to the federal
government’s own statistics, Native women are more likely than white women
to suffer from obesity, diabetes, hypertension, liver disease, kidney disease, HIV
and hepatitis.
18
Native women are also far more likely than white women to
suffer from mental health problems, including substance abuse disorders, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal ideation.
19
The suicide rate for Native
women and girls between 15 and 24 is six times that of all races combined.
20
In this Article, I argue that attorneys and legal scholars should intentionally
think about gender in the context of Federal Indian law and tribal law to assess
whether there are areas for closer consideration and attention. I am primarily
interested in whether we can better address gender inequities in the lives of
Native women, including gendered violence. As part of this analysis, I explore
how attorneys and legal scholars can—and do—support the interests of Native
women in their work.
21
As a self-identified Native feminist who is also an
attorney, I am interested in asking hard questions about the shortcoming of the
Indian Bar to adequately address the needs of Native women and Two-Spirit
people.
How do feminism and Indian law “meet”? What are the cross-sections of
efforts to promote gender equity and the continued resilient existence of tribal
nations? In order to answer these questions, I begin by defining the word
“feminism” itself. There are multiple strands of schools of feminist thought—
some entirely inconsistent with one another. Therefore, more scholars are now
15. See, e.g., Raglan, supra note 13, at 16.
16. See, e.g., Ramona A. Danielson et al., Disparities in Risk Factors and Birth Outcomes Among
American Indians in North Dakota, 22 MATERNAL& CHILD HEALTH J. 1519 (2018).
17. Dep’t of Labor, Health and Hum. Servs., and Educ. and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78, §§ 509-510, 111 Stat. 1467 (1997) [hereinafter Hyde Amendment].
18. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WOMEN’S HEALTH USA 2011 (2011),
https://mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa11/hstat/hssp/pages/235aianw.html [https://perma.cc/8M7S-P5VH].
19. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MENTAL HEALTH DISPARITIES: AMERICAN INDIANS
ANDALASKA 2 (2017).
20. Sally C. Curtin & Holly Hedegaard, Suicide Rates for Females and Males by Race and Ethnicity:
United States, 1999 and 2017, at 2 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/suicide/rates_1999_
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM4A-T9HR].
21. I mean to cast a wide net in terms of the audience for this Article. The practice of Indian law
takes many forms, including working for non-profit organizations, government organizations (federal,
state, or tribal), or private practice, for-profit lobbying arms and trade organizations. I mean for this Article
to be inclusive of all attorneys who practice Indian law—including non-Native practitioners. I believe as
a collective, we have a responsibility to our profession to be mindful of the ways that gender and sexuality
intersect with our work.
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speaking of plural feminisms rather than a monolithic feminism.
22
For the
purposes of this Article, I consider feminisms to be legal and social responses to
entrenched patriarchy. This simplified definition is, on the one hand, reductive,
but on the other, a useful framework because it is broad enough to encompass
different types and styles of patriarchy, along with different types and styles of
responses. Patriarchy comes in different forms and can be modified to include
terms like “hetero-patriarchy” and “settler colonial patriarchy,” which are both
relevant for Native women.
23
The thrust of most feminist movements is to
overturn sexist andmisogynist laws and practices through legal and social action,
which, again, can take many forms.
More specifically, in this Article, I approach Indian law using the lens of
indigenous feminisms. I intentionally choose to use the fraught “f” word in this
analysis, even though mainstream feminist movements and Native women have
not always had an easy relationship. Indeed, mainstream feminism has
historically failed Native women by ignoring or marginalizing issues like
sovereignty and self-determination. Moreover, despite the fact that many early
white American feminists were influenced by Native women,
24
early American
feminists were sometimes the instigators and supporters of horrific Federal
Indian law policies, including the boarding school era and child removal.
25
Thus,
it makes sense that many indigenous women categorically reject the label of
“feminist” because of its Western, colonial connotations, even while supporting
Native women’s rights.
26
Some Native women who reject the term “feminism”
point out that patriarchy is a foreign concept to traditional tribal cultures.
27
If
feminism is a response to patriarchy, Native women have perhaps not needed it.
22. See, e.g., Gina Miranda Samuels & Fariyal Ross-Sheriff, Identity, Oppression, and Power:
Feminisms and Intersectionality Theory, 23 AFFIL. J. WOMEN SOC. WORK 5, 6 (2008) (noting that “[u]se
of the term feminisms in the plural to represent this diversity is an acknowledgment of these [scholarly]
efforts.”).
23. Settler colonialism is “a unique brand of colonialism in which colonizers took up permanent
and intimate residence among the Native people they exploited and resources they extracted rather than
occupying temporary posts.” KATRINA JAGODINSKY, LEGAL CODES AND TALKING TREES: INDIGENOUS
WOMEN’S SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SONORAN AND PUGET SOUND BORDERLANDS, 1854-1946, at 4 (2016).
24. See Sally Roesch Wagner, The Indigenous Roots of United States Feminism, in FEMINIST
POLITICS, ACTIVISM AND VISION: LOCAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES 267–284 (Luciana Ricciutelli,
Angela Miles, & Margaret H. McFadden eds., 2004) (describing how early suffrage activists like Matilda
Joclyn Gage were influenced by observations of women of the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) confederacy).
25. See generally MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE MOTHER TO A DARK RACE: SETTLER
COLONIALISM, MATERNALISM, AND THE REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE AMERICANWEST
ANDAUSTRALIA, 1880-1940 (2009);MARGARETD. JACOBS, ENGENDEREDENCOUNTERS: FEMINISMAND
PUEBLO CULTURES, 1879-1934 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Haunani-Kay Trask, Feminism and Indigenous Hawaiian Nationalism, 21 SIGNS 906,
909 (1996) (“I recognized that a practicing feminism hampered organizing among my people in rural
communities. Given our nationalist context, feminism appeared as just another haole intrusion into a
besieged Hawaiian world. Any exclusive focus on women neglected the historical oppression of all
Hawaiians and the large force field of imperialism.”).
27. See, e.g., Laura Tohe, There Is No Word for Feminism in My Language, 15 WICAZO SA REV.
103, 104 (2000) (exploring the power of female lineage in Diné culture and noting the fact that the Diné
language does not have a word for “feminism”).
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Still, I am intentionally choosing to use the term “feminisms” because it
carries profound implications for structural change that I see as a critical
intervention in the lives of twenty-first century Native women. Though
patriarchy may have been a European import, it now exists in the lives of Native
people through forced assimilation and cultural hegemony.
But it wasn’t until the late twentieth century that Native women started
writing about contemporary feminism in any sustained fashion. Paula Gunn
Allen’s 1982 book The Sacred Hoop opened up multiple conversations among
academic and activist circles about whether certain feminist principles are
inherent within tribal cultures.
28
More self-identified indigenous feminists have
joined the academy in the past two decades, developing a corpus of writings,
including multiple anthologies focused on the way that indigenous feminists
analyze political, legal, and social problems.
29
Native feminists often deploy and explore the concept of “intersectionality,”
a term coined by Black legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989.
30
Intersectional feminist theory understands that gender oppression is inextricably
linked to other forms of oppression, such as race and class. In other words,
experiences of gendered oppression may be substantively different depending on
one’s position in society. By conceptualizing Native gender oppression as
inextricably linked to settler colonialism and Western imperialism, Native
feminists have begun to explicate the unique ways in which Native women
experience patriarchy, including the problem of sexism perpetrated by Native
men.
However, as Emily Snyder notes, there has been little, if any, sustained focus
on how indigenous feminism can inform legal theory and practice.
31
As a result
of this gap, in 2014 Snyder published what may be the first North American law
journal article to begin articulating contemporary indigenous feminist legal
theory. In “Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory,” published in the Canadian
Journal of Women and the Law, Snyder identifies an underdeveloped
intersection of three theoretical fields: feminist legal theory, Indigenous feminist
theory, and Indigenous legal theory.
32
By exploring this intersection, she
ultimately concludes that Indigenous feminist legal theory (IFLT) is “an
28. PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED HOOP: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN INDIAN
TRADITIONS (1982).
29. See, e.g., CRITICALLY SOVEREIGN: INDIGENOUSGENDER, SEXUALITY,AND FEMINIST STUDIES
(Joanne Barker ed., 2017); INDIGENOUSWOMEN AND FEMINISM: POLITICS, ACTIVISM, CULTURE (Cheryl
Suzack et al. eds., 2010); MAKING SPACE FOR INDIGENOUS FEMINISM (Joyce Green ed., 2007).
30. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 140 (1989).
31. Emily Snyder, Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory, 26 CAN. J. WOMEN& L. 365, 366 (2014)
(“[T]here are few scholars accounting for . . . gendered realities in relation to Indigenous laws, and . . .
the insights and contributions from their research have yet to be widely embraced.”).
32. Id. at 367.
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important analytic tool that is intersectional, attentive to power, anti-colonial,
anti-essentialist, multi-juridical, and embraces a spirit of critique that challenges
static notions of tradition, identity, gender, sex and sexuality.”
33
Whereas
mainstream American feminist legal theory has existed for decades,
34
IFLT is a
relatively new theory, largely explicated by Canadian scholars of indigenous
law, including Snyder, Val Napoleon, and John Borrows.
35
In this Article, I apply
IFLT to American Federal Indian law and tribal law as a way to explore how and
why Native women experience law and oppression in the United States.
To do so, I explore the substance and practice of Indian law through an IFLT
lens. Because IFLT uses an intersectional framework, it offers a way to
synthesize how and why Native women suffer multiple different kinds of
oppression simultaneously. Native women in the United States experience
structural discrimination in the forms of at least four ideologies: sexism, settler
colonialism, classism, and racism. Two-Spirit Native people also suffer from
insidious forms of homophobia and transphobia. IFLT allows us to see these
intersections and begin to think of practical, creative solutions to intersecting
oppressions. IFLT also allows us to view tribal sovereignty and gender equity as
closely linked. Native women’s liberation is a key component of lasting change
in Indian country.
36
I take to heart Snyder’s explication of IFLT as “a spirit of
critique that challenges static notions of tradition, identity, gender, sex and
sexuality” and offer these critiques in the spirit of improving the lives of Native
women and Two-Spirit people. Because IFLT is in its nascent stages of
development, I hope that this Article will continue a necessary conversation
about the efficacy of feminism in the context of Indian law.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I explore how gender
oppression is expressed in the context of Federal Indian law, often assumed to
be a gender-neutral legal discipline. The only significant “gender” case in
Federal Indian law is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
37
In fact, the very few
articles written by feminists about Indian law are almost invariably written about
the famous 1978 patrilineal descent case.
38
However, there are gendered
33. Snyder, supra note 31, at 401.
34. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 17 (3d ed.
2013) (discussing the emergence of feminist legal theory in the United States during the 1970s).
35. See, e.g., Emily Snyder, et. al.,Gender and Violence: Drawing on Indigenous Legal Resources,
48 U.B.C. L. REV. 593 (2015).
36. Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as “(a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”
37. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
38. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987); Francine R.
Skenandore, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 347 (2002).
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implications in a variety of other contexts in Federal Indian law and policy. I will
explore some of those implications and proffer possibilities for sustaining a
gender-conscious response. I also consider ways to increase the visibility and
profile of Native women in the federal courts by crafting gender-conscious
arguments.
In Part II, I consider how gender intersects with tribal legal systems. I am
interested in ensuring that Native women are visible within tribal court systems,
with the understanding that each tribal nation must approach gendered problems
within the context of its own culture and history. In this Part, I also explore the
possible remedies that can emerge from the development and reform of tribal
statutes and policies. As I often say to my students, there is no reason that tribal
codes in the United States cannot have the strongest protections for women, far
exceeding those found in state and federal laws. Unfortunately, due to centuries
of assimilation, many tribal justice systems adopted American legal “norms,”
such as sexism. Some tribal legal systems, though, have managed to maintain
some connection to pre-colonial gender equity principles. For this Part, I
gathered several published tribal appellate court opinions that consider a
question about tribal law and gender. I use these as examples for how tribal
attorneys and judges have recognized gendered claims that are grounded in
traditional tenets or principles. I also offer some examples of ways in which tribal
courts have reinforced patriarchy.
My Article closes with Part III, which is a reflection on the experiences of
Native women law students, professors, attorneys and legal scholars. This Part
contributes to an ongoing dialogue about sexism faced by Native women
attorneys and scholars. I believe the Indian Bar can do a great deal to ensure that
Native women and Two-Spirit (LGBTQ+) attorneys in the workplace receive
pay equity and respect from co-workers. I ultimately conclude that a gender-
conscious Indian law paradigm serves common goals of tribal sovereignty and
self-determination.
I. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
In this Part, I offer some thoughts on how IFLT can inform the thinking and
practice of Federal Indian law.
39
Although issues of gender and sexuality arise
every day in the lives of tribal people, much of Federal Indian law, both historical
and contemporary, has usually proceeded as if it were gender-neutral, even
though problematic results were often heavily gendered. Early Federal Indian
law was established and cultivated by a patriarchal government that was
39. By Federal Indian law, I mean to include both federal case law as well as statutory and
regulatory codes.
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preceded by colonial systems that emanated from patriarchal countries.
40
American law was based on the common law tradition of England, which largely
treated women as property or chattel of their husbands.
41
Thus, at the founding
of the United States, American women had little, if any, legal or political
power.
42
And it was within this historic patriarchal paradigm that Federal Indian
law was developed and fostered. In fact, it was not until the twentieth century
that any real progress was made toward government and cultural reform for any
women in the United States.
Patriarchy influenced the development of Federal Indian law in a variety of
ways beyond the scope of this Article.
43
For example, some of the earliest formal
legal relations between tribal nations and the federal government were marked
with a significant absence and erasure of Native women’s political power. One
of the challenges faced by early Indian leaders was that European governments
almost invariably declined to treat or even negotiate with Native women.
44
Thus,
Native women’s perspectives rarely found their way into treaty language.
45
Moreover, this tendency to treat only with Native men became part of the
hegemonic introduction of patriarchy. As Native men were treated as more
powerful in the eyes of Europeans, some internalized the Western concept of
natural superiority of men and began to deny Native women their rightful role as
equal participants in social and political spheres.
46
To the extent that federal
officials encouraged or mandated that tribal nations adopt Christianity, this also
introduced patriarchal logics that conceptualize men as heads of the household
and women as subservient to men.
Formal government assimilation and forced “civilization” policies, which
reached their height in the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, were also
grounded in patriarchal logics.
47
For almost a century, the government forced
40. See generally OLWEN HUFTON, THE PROSPECT BEFORE HER: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN
WESTERN EUROPE, 1500-1800 (1995) (exploring how few legal rights European women had).
41. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CH. 15 (Of Husband
and Wife).
42. JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 4 (1991)
(“[T]he Founding Fathers believed in the necessity of limiting legal equality primarily to white, male
property owners.”).
43. I highly recommend the work of Bethany Berger who has painstakingly chronicled the variety
of different gendered issues that were embedded in historic Indian law. See Bethany R. Berger, After
Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1997); Bethany R.
Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KANSAS J. L. PUB. POL’Y 103 (2004).
44. Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KANSAS J. L. PUB.
POL’Y 103, 105-106 (2004); see also BALDY, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that “When Westerners came to
negotiate, however, they did not invite or involve women . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Shirley R Bysiewicz & Ruth E. Van de Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian
Woman, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 255, 266 (1975) (“The truly democratic nature of Dakota society was
never comprehended, and the role of Dakota women in that process was completely ignored.”).
46. See Joyce Green, Taking Account of Aboriginal Feminism, inMAKINGSPACE FOR INDIGENOUS
FEMINISM 20–32, 22-23 (Joyce Green ed., 2007).
47. See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit Against the
Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 45, 49
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thousands of Native children to attend government or church-run boarding
schools to formally indoctrinate them into “white” Christian culture.
48
Patriarchal control and gender hierarchy were institutionalized in these schools.
49
Native boys were taught to farm and weld, whereas Native girls were trained as
domestic servants, developing skills in sewing and baking.
50
Native
anthropologist K. Tsianina Lomawaima explains, “the underlying federal agenda
. . . was to train Indian girls in subservience and submission to authority.”
51
In
addition to enforcing Western gender roles, these boarding schools almost
universally utilized corporal punishment as the primary means of discipline, and
school officials inflicted horrific abuse upon many Native children.
52
Given the
high rates of physical and sexual abuse that occurred during the boarding school
era, we might even consider thatWestern gender hierarchies were literally beaten
into the children.
53
Even though gendered hegemony has been central to the colonial project,
gendered consciousness is largely absent from Federal Indian law today. Berger
notes that the words “women,” “wives,” and “mothers” were not even indexed
in Felix Cohen’s famous treatise on Federal Indian Law.
54
In fact, one of the only
clear connections between Native women and Federal Indian law comes from
(2006) (“To Europeans, ownership of land and other property, Christianity, a nuclear family in which the
man made all the decisions and children were strictly and harshly disciplined and were taught the value
of hard work so that they could acquire more land and material goods, were life’s guiding principles.
These principles shaped the devastation wrought by European settlers on America’s indigenous people.”).
48. See, e.g., id. at 46; Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing
Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 149, 153 (2007);
Linda J Lacey, The White Man’s Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK.
L. REV. 327, 357-359 (1986); Teresa Evans-Campbell et al., Indian Boarding School Experience,
Substance Use, and Mental Health among Urban Two-Spirit American Indian/Alaska Natives, 38 AM. J.
DRUGALCOHOLABUSE 421, 422 (2012).
49. See Eric Margolis, Looking at Discipline, Looking at Labor: Photographic Representations of
Indian Boarding Schools, 19 VIS. STUD. 54, 55 (2004) (explaining that the long-term goal of boarding
schools was “to exterminate the indigenous culture and replace it with the disciplines, habits, language,
religion and practices of the dominant one.”).
50. Id. at 65 (“[J]ob training was heavily gendered. Boys were trained for farming or industrial
occupations . . . girls for domestic service.”).
51. K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Domesticity in the Federal Indian Schools: The Power of Authority
Over Mind and Body, 20 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 227, 229 (1993).
52. See Robert A. Trennert, Corporal Punishment and the Politics of Indian Reform, 29 HIST.
EDUC. Q. 595, 595 (1989) (explaining that “corporal punishment was seen as a useful tool in promoting
the discipline necessary for assimilation…the infliction of pain by means of spanking, whipping, and even
beating was justified.”).
53. At a Phoenix boarding school, for example, “matrons regularly used male employees to whip
unruly Indian girls.” Id. at 600.
54. Berger, After Pocahontas, supra note 43, at 2-3. Even today, the only references to gender in
the current iteration of Cohen’s handbook come from twenty-first century efforts to draw attention to the
high rate of victimization experienced by Native women, such as the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA). A word search for “women” in the current 2017 version of the Handbook yields several results,
almost all connected to VAWA. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2017).
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the seminal 1978 case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
55
Many consider this case
to be one of the most significant Indian law cases of the last century.
56
In Santa Clara, Julia Martinez brought a federal lawsuit alleging gender
discrimination by her tribe, the Santa Clara Pueblo.
57
At that time, the Pueblo
had a strict patrilineal citizenship law. Because Ms. Martinez married a Navajo
man, her children were not eligible for enrollment in the Pueblo, leading to
numerous hardships for her family.
58
The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, and the Court was able to sidestep the question of gender discrimination
by holding that the Pueblo (like all tribal governments) was immune from such
suits.
59
Therefore, the substantive question of gender discrimination is left to the
tribal nations. As Tweedy argues, the 1978 decision “led to a widespread,
monolithic impression that tribes were not protective of the rights of women.”
60
While the case is largely lauded a “victory” for tribal nations,
61
some observers
have raised concern that the decision is now being used by tribal nations to shield
discriminatory laws from oversight.
62
Odawa legal scholar Wenona T. Singel
writes, “Many have criticized the harm inflicted on individuals by tribes and have
questioned whether tribal sovereignty’s legal affirmation was achieved on the
backs of women and other oppressed individuals within tribal communities.”
63
This framework requires a feminist analysis—indeed, a Native feminist analysis
to unpack.
Indigenous feminist legal theory, though, takes us far beyond the contours
of Santa Clara and patrilineal descent laws, and illuminates the discovery of
other gendered issues facing our communities that often are eclipsed in gender-
neutral conversations about tribal resiliency and tribal sovereignty. IFLT
encourages us to think critically about how Federal Indian law has developed
with regard to gender, something that has not been done in mainstream feminist
legal theory. Bringing an indigenous lens to mainstream feminist jurisprudence
is necessary; merely being feminist in and of itself does not necessarily mean
that one understands the historical legacy and nuances of colonization and
contemporary Indian law. Many of my feminist friends, for example, are
55. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
56. JOANNE BARKER, NATIVE ACTS: LAW, RECOGNITION, AND CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY 100
(2011) (“The literature that has addressed the importance of the Martinez decision is exhaustive.”).
57. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 51.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id. at 59 (“[W]e conclude that suits against the tribe under ICRA are barred by its sovereign
immunity from suit.”).
60. Ann E. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 392, 394
(2010).
61. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGSL.J. 579, 614 (2008)
(the case is one of the “major wins for tribal interests.”).
62. Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
567, 585 (2012) (“[F]ederal judges have openly expressed concern that tribal immunity from federal court
review leaves tribes free to engage in acts that are deeply troubling on the level of fundamental substantive
justice.”).
63. Id. at 586.
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surprised to hear that Ruth Bader Ginsburg has ruled against tribal interests in
several monumental cases.
64
While mainstream feminist theories center a
universal “woman” in legal analysis, indigenous feminist theories center a
“Native” woman as the focal point for analysis. In the following section, I
explain how centering Native women leads to different types of practice
strategies and interventions.
A. Feminist Interventions in Federal Indian Law
Because Federal Indian law on its surface often appears to be gender-neutral,
we must be creative in thinking about how to bring gender back into Federal
Indian law conversations. Here, I consider how IFLT can inform the praxis and
practice of Indian law. For the past five years, I have worked with Cherokee
attorney and playwright Mary Kathryn Nagle
65
to file gender-conscious amicus
briefs in major Supreme Court Indian law cases. We initially conceived of this
project as an intervention for the 2016 case Dollar General v. Mississippi
Choctaw
66
(described infra at Section I.A.1) but have filed similar briefs in three
other cases. This is a concerted effort to re-introduce gender as a necessary
element of consideration in Indian law cases.
67
We saw the need to consider the
impact of Federal Indian law on the lives of Native women and their children in
ways that conventional jurisprudence could miss. By providing a gendered
intervention, we believe that federal courts can grasp a larger picture of what is
at stake than is otherwise possible with a gender-neutral approach. In other
words, by arguing on behalf of women we enlarge the lens through which judges
can view the case.
68
We are hopeful that these gender-conscious briefs are of
interest to at least some of the Justices and may be able to influence votes on key
questions of sovereignty and self-determination.
The primary client for these amicus briefs has been the National Indigenous
Women’s Resource Center (NIWRC), a national non-profit organization
dedicated to addressing domestic violence and sexual assault in tribal
communities.
69
Over 100 local and regional anti-violence coalitions (including
64. See Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003,1004 (2009) (noting that “several of her opinions
have garnered considerable (and justified) criticism from Indian law scholars and tribal leaders . . . .”).
65. Ms. Nagle serves as counsel of record in these briefs.
66. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
67. A similar brief had been filed by other attorneys in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2007).
68. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 5
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) (“Feminist consciousness
broadens and widens the lens through which we view law and helps the decision maker overcome the
natural tendency to see things the same way or do things ‘the way they’ve always been done.’”).
69. Organizational History, NAT’L INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ni
wrc.org/content/organizational-history [http://perma.cc/Z5NM-YMMG] (“[NIWRC is] dedicated to
reclaiming the sovereignty of Native nations and safeguarding Native women and their children.”).
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non-Native organizations) have also signed on to these briefs.
70
The following
Section summarizes the three briefs we have filed, along with an assessment of
their efficacy.
1. Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw
In Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw,
71
the Court considered whether
non-Indian businesses could be subject to tribal civil jurisdiction. At its core,
however, the case was about a young child who had been sexually victimized by
a non-Indian,
72
a story that ultimately was eclipsed by the dry, mechanical
question of civil adjudicatory authority.
Many Native women’s organizations were quite concerned about the stakes
in Dollar General because the case concerned sexual abuse.
73
The facts reveal
an all-too-common theme in Indian country: a non-Indian commits acts of sexual
violence and escapes tribal criminal jurisdiction. Since the 1978 Supreme Court
decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish,
74
tribal justice systems had been prohibited
from prosecuting non-Indians—for any crime, no matter how heinous or
insidious. According to the National Institute of Justice, most Native victims
report that they have had a least one perpetrator who is non-Native.
75
The facts
in Dollar General date back to 2003, when the white manager of a reservation-
based Dollar General retail establishment molested a 13-year-old Choctaw boy
who had been temporarily placed with the store though a Youth Opportunity
Program.
76
Even though the victim reported the abuse—a rarity in itself—the
tribal government had no power to prosecute the perpetrator since he was non-
Indian. The question of whether the company could be vicariously liable for the
harm, though, raised different legal questions, since Oliphant did not directly
address civil jurisdiction.
Seeking justice, the child’s parents filed a civil lawsuit in Mississippi
Choctaw tribal court against the perpetrator’s employer, the Dollar General
Corporation, which immediately objected to tribal court jurisdiction based on the
same principles elucidated in Oliphant.
77
Even though Dollar General had a
70. The Dollar General amicus brief included 104 additional organizations beyond NIWRC. Brief
of Amici Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and Additional Advocacy Organizations
for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondents at 1, Dollar General Corp. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496) [hereinafter NIWRC Brief,
Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw].
71. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
72. Doglencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014).
73. Andrew Bard Epstein, Dollar General Takes Its Case Against Indigenous Sovereignty to the
Supreme Court, THE NATION, (Dec. 7, 2015) https://www.thenation.com/article/dollar-general-takes-its-
case-against-indigenous-sovereignty-to-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/8Q3B-NPXQ].
74. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
75. ROSAY, supra note 5, at 18-19.
76. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014).
77. Id. at 169-70.
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contractual relationship with the Choctaw tribe and even though they operated a
retail store on the reservation, they argued that the tribal court had no jurisdiction
over them in this kind of civil tort case.
78
Dollar General appealed the case to the
tribal supreme court, then into federal district court and the Fifth Circuit, and lost
their argument at every juncture (although the case against the manager himself
was dismissed). When the case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,
NIWRC expressed interest in filing a brief on behalf of Indian country victims.
As we began strategizing about the purpose of the amicus brief, it became
clear that our primary goal was to encourage the Justices to consider the long-
term ramifications of their decision on victims of abuse. We decided to focus on
gender-conscious public policy arguments since the merits briefs were,
necessarily, heavily focused on Supreme Court precedents and canons of Indian
law. There simply wouldn’t be enough space in the merits briefs to include the
policy arguments we wanted the Court to consider.
Thus, we took the opportunity to argue that a finding against the tribe would
lead to the re-victimization of victims of violent crimes on Indian land, since
they would not be able to seek justice in tribal court for the violent and abusive
actions of non-Indians.
79
Using statistical data and congressional findings, the
brief established that Native women and children are at extremely high risk for
violence. This in turn led us to argue that there are limited remedies for this
violence, and that the ability to sue a non-Native for violence was crucial to the
well-being of Native people.
80
We also raised what we believed was a novel argument about the
“consensual relations” test established in Montana v. United States (1981).
81
Under this Montana test, “a tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.”
82
Dollar General argued that this test should not allow suits
against nonmembers for common law tort actions, because it does not fit under
the categories of taxation or licensing and that nonmembers must offer “clear
and unequivocal consent” to adjudicatory jurisdiction.
83
The Choctaw tribe
countered that the test includes the phrase “or other means” which should be read
to include adjudicative authority over matters that arise as part of the consensual
relationship.
84
In the NIWRC brief, we considered Dollar General’s arguments
in light of sexual abuse, arguing that Dollar General’s position
78. Id.
79. NIWRC Brief, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, supra note 70.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 5-7.
82. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
83. Brief for the Petitioners at 18, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)
(No. 13-1496).
84. Brief for Respondents at 16, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)
(No. 13-1496).
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would create an untenable situation where tribal courts would have to
inquire as to whether a non-Indian perpetrator clearly and unequivocally
expressed his consent to tribal jurisdiction before he sexually assaulted
or abused a Native woman or child. Not only is the scenario implausible,
it is unconscionable. Native women and children do not consent to being
assaulted on tribal lands, yet this proffered revision of Montana’s
consensual relationships would render their profound lack of consent a
legal nullity.
85
We urged the Court to find in favor of the Mississippi Choctaw Nation so
that other victims would be able to hold offenders accountable in tribal civil
courts. While the brief itself did not use the term “feminist,” the brief was
informed by IFLT, since it considered the twin oppressions of sexism and settler
colonialism in its reasoning. Many Native women from around the country came
to the Supreme Court the day of the oral argument and staged a prayerful
demonstration to further amplify the importance of the case, which significantly
raised the profile of the case for tribal leaders.
86
The oral argument itself focused
largely on Federal Indian law precedent, but there were two references to
concerns about victims. After Dollar General admitted that they would have to
acquiesce to tribal civil jurisdiction regarding business or commercial matters,
Justice Kagan asked, “[i]t’s a bit of an odd argument, isn’t it, Mr. Goldstein, that
there’s less of a sovereign interest in protecting your own citizens than in
enforcing your licensing laws?”
87
Later, during the Choctaw arguments, counsel
Neal Katyal referenced the NIWRCbrief, stating, “[t]he Domestic Violence brief
gives other reasons why in general people want to bring suits in tribal courts
because it’s a more familiar process and one closer, geographically, to them.”
88
Six months later, we learned that the Court had deadlocked at a vote of 4-4
and no opinion was rendered, essentially upholding the Fifth Circuit’s favorable
decision for the tribal government but establishing no nationwide precedent.
89
It
was the longest pending case of the 2015 term. The tie-vote can be fairly
characterized as “victory” or, perhaps more accurately, a “close call,” since it
was clear that four justices were willing to strip tribal nations of civil jurisdiction
85. NIWRC Brief, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, supra note 70, at 6.
86. Rebecca Nagle, Native Women Protest Sexual Violence Case at the Supreme Court, BITCH
MEDIA (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/native-women-take-fight-against-sexual-
violence-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/73PB-R2GB].
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159
(2016) (No. 13-1496).
88. Id.
89. Justice Scalia had passed away during the Court’s term, on February 13, 2016, and left the
Court with eight justices for a period of time.
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over non-Indians.
90
Unfortunately, the absence of a written opinion in this case
means that we do not know if the NIWRC brief held any weight or importance
for the Court. The next case, however, offered reasons to be more optimistic.
2. United States v. Bryant
In the same term as Dollar General, we also filed a brief in United States v.
Bryant.
91
This case tested the constitutionality of the federal habitual offender
statute, which allows for federal criminal justice authority over people who have
two or more convictions in tribal court.
92
Bryant, the Native defendant, was a
serial domestic violence offender with multiple tribal court convictions for
increasingly disturbing violent behavior against women. Importantly, the
maximum imprisonment sentence that tribal nations were able to impose at that
time was one year, pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).
93
The habitual offender statute was passed as part of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA)
94
in 2005, and was intended to address the problem of short tribal
jail sentences for abusers by providing for federal criminal jurisdiction after two
predicate cases.
95
Once charged in federal court under the habitual offender
statute, Bryant argued that his tribal court convictions were uncounseled and thus
should not have been considered as a trigger for federal prosecution.
96
Even
though he had court-appointed counsel in federal court, he argued that the
habitual offender statute itself was unconstitutional because it relied on
uncounseled tribal court convictions.
Given that the case turned on a fact pattern involving a dangerous serial
abuser, NIWRC again filed a brief on behalf of Native victims.
97
Since the merits
briefs needed to focus squarely on Sixth Amendment arguments, the NIWRC
brief could enlarge the scope of consideration to include victims of crime.
98
Nagle and I crafted the brief using some of the same statistics we had cited in the
Dollar General brief, again proffering that Native women were at heightened
risk for abuse and were in need of special consideration.
99
We argued that the
federal habitual offender statute was one of the only ways that serial abusers on
90. Sarah Deer & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Return to Worcester: Dollar General and the Restoration
of Tribal Jurisdiction to Protect Women and Children, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 179 (2018) (offering an
optimistic assessment of the tie vote).
91. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
93. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
94. Pub. L. 109-162, tit. IX, § 909 (2006).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
96. 136 S. Ct. at 1952.
97. Brief of Amici Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and Additional
Advocacy Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Petitioner, United
States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (No. 15-420).
98. Id. The entire brief was framed around the central theme of victim safety.
99. Id. at 13-14.
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reservations could be held accountable. Since tribal courts are limited to a
maximum penalty of three years per offense (only one year at the time of
Bryant’s offenses), abusers such as Bryant were in and out of tribal jail on a
regular basis. Thus, the only way to remove him from the community for the
long term would be for the federal government to prosecute him pursuant to the
habitual offender statute. Ideally, of course, tribal nations would not be limited
in their ability to impose an appropriate carceral sentence on a violent offender,
but until that limitation is eliminated, this kind of federal prosecution may mean
the difference between life and death of Native women on tribal lands. We also
advanced tribal sovereignty arguments by linking the safety and well-being of
Native women to the strength and prosperity of tribal nations.
100
Because Bryant concerned a law that was passed as part of the Violence
Against Women Act, it is somewhat surprising that violence against Native
women was only mentioned near the end of the oral arguments, when counsel
for the United States remarked that Bryant “kept battering women in Indian
country and contributed to that epidemic of domestic violence.”
101
The bulk of
the oral arguments focused on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Indian
Civil Rights Act, and the relevant Supreme Court precedent on those
questions.
102
However, unlike Dollar General, which lingered in the Court for over six
months, the Court issued its opinion in Bryant in less than two months. Bryant
was a unanimous decision (8-0) in favor of upholding the federal statute, with
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authoring the majority opinion.
103
In this case, it is
clear that the NIWRC brief was, at the very least, consulted in the construction
of the decision.
104
Not only did Ginsburg mention some of the statistics included
in the NIWRC brief, but there are also several parallels between the structure of
the NIWRC brief and the Ginsburg opinion.
105
This opinion suggested to us that
Justice Ginsburg had found the brief informative and relevant.
106
100. Id. at 24.
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (No. 15-
420).
102. Id.
103. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). Justice Thomas authored a concurring
opinion. 136 S. Ct. at 1967.
104. Bethany R. Berger,Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska
v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General…And Beyond, 2017 ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1930 (2017).
105. Ginsburg quoted two statements of Senator John McCain that we had also used in the brief.
Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959, 1961.Moreover, she referenced some of the same precedent we cited, including
Crow Dog and the Indian Civil Rights Act as well as statistical data we used in the brief. Id. at 1961. She
also cited to work published by Sarah Deer. Id. at 1960.
106. Not all Native feminists or tribal sovereignty advocates are in favor of the outcome in Bryant.
The over-incarceration of Native people is a serious problem, and to the extent that Bryant is about
increased federal punitive control over Native people, there is not consensus on the question of the habitual
offender statute. Tribal and federal public defenders have raised concerns about the ramifications of the
Bryant decision for the right to counsel in tribal court. See, e.g., Barbara L. Creel & John P. LaVelle, High
Court Denies Rights of Natives, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 26, 2016), https://www.abqjournal.com/798285/
high-court-denies-rights-of-natives.html [https://perma.cc/6S2W-LZYM].
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3. Carpenter v. Murphy
Hopeful that the Court was receptive to gender-conscious arguments,
NIWRC filed a third amicus brief in late 2018 in Carpenter v. Murphy,
107
a case
argued in November 2018 but not decided in the 2018-2019 term. The Court has
ordered that re-arguments take place in the next term, and the case remains
undecided as of the publication of this Article. Because the case centers on the
jurisdiction over a grisly homicide, it may seem curious that we filed a brief
siding with the arguments of the defendant. From the outside, Murphy asks a
seemingly gender-neutral question of whether or not there is still a Creek
reservation in Oklahoma. But because of the implications for the safety of Native
women, NIWRC again participated as an amicus.
108
The case began in 1999, when Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a citizen of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation (MCN), murdered George Jacobs, another citizen of
the MCN on a tract of land that was originally within the exterior borders of the
reservation described in the 1866 treaty between the MCN and the United States
government.
109
The state of Oklahoma prosecuted the case, and Murphy was
convicted and sentenced to death.
110
Several years later, Murphy filed a habeas
petition in federal court, arguing, among other things, that since his crime
occurred on an Indian reservation—a quintessential type of “Indian country”—
the state’s prosecution was unlawful.
It’s important to understand that, with some significant exceptions, the
federal government and tribal government, and not the state government, share
concurrent jurisdiction over a murder committed by an Indian on an Indian
reservation.
111
Murphy argued that he had been tried and convicted in the wrong
court—that since his crime occurred on an Indian reservation, the federal
government should have prosecuted him. The state’s main response was that the
reservation no longer existed, and thus state jurisdiction was lawful. Not
surprisingly, the merits briefs (and most of the amicus briefs) focused on the
federal precedent, the long, sordid history of Oklahoma statehood, and the
callous but failed efforts to extinguish the MCN altogether. Although the legal
question before the court is relatively simple (“Does the reservation still exist?”),
the legal arguments required extensive historical research to uncover Congress’s
intended boundaries of the reservation. Although it is not a party to the case, the
decision will obviously have great ramifications for the MCN. Once the case
107. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018).
108. Brief of Amici Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and Additional
Advocacy Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondent,
Carpenter v. Murphy (2018) (No. 17-1107) [hereinafter NIWRC Brief, Carpenter v. Murphy].
109. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 904-905 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Mr. Murphy and the State agree
that the offense in this case occurred within the Creek Reservation if Congress has not disestablished it.”).
110. Id.
111. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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reached the circuit level, the MCN was granted leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae.
The NIWRC brief, unlike the others, brought the interests of Native women
to the discussion.
112
We argued that the existing definition of “Indian Country”
should not be changed, because it is important that tribal governments exercise
expansive territorial jurisdiction to protect women and children from violence.
As part of this argument, we noted that in passing VAWA 2013 (explained infra
at Section I.B), Congress had recently restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians who are charged with certain domestic violence crimes. We argued
that when Congress passed that law, it clearly demarcated that this jurisdiction
would apply to “Indian country” and that Congress could not have anticipated
that the Supreme Court would suddenly change the rules for what constituted
“Indian country.”
113
We supported the arguments raised by Murphy and other
amici that reservation disestablishment could only be achieved through clear
congressional intent, which had not happened in this case.
The outcome in theMurphy case matters to Native women. If the Court rules
that the MCN reservation is still recognized by the United States, it will reaffirm
that MCN has the power to police and prosecute crimes committed anywhere
within the reservation, providing more safety and security to Native women who
rely on their tribal government to respond to domestic violence and sexual
assault. By bringing these concerns to the discussion, we hope that the Justices
will be sympathetic to arguments from tribal nations that can maximize their
potential to protect tribal citizens from harm. UnlikeDollar General and Bryant,
however, the initial oral arguments did not reveal any particular interest in how
victims might experience the ramifications of the decision. There is also the
possibility of another tie, as Justice Gorsuch has recused himself from the
consideration of the case.
114
It is premature to claim that briefs informed by IFLT will have a significant
impact on the Court, but this certainly is not a reason to abandon the efforts.
ProfessorMatthew L.M. Fletcher analyzed the efficacy of amicus briefs in Indian
law cases in a 2012 article, concluding that “the best amicus briefs in Indian law
cases offer some specialized and useful bits of information to the Supreme Court,
information not otherwise available.”
115
The key is finding the synergy between
the interests of Native women and the interests of tribal governments. The
NIWRC briefs also achieve some of the goals of IFLT by linking the rights of
tribal nations to the empowerment of Native women. As similar arguments are
offered in future cases (both in the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court), we
112. NIWRC Brief, Carpenter v. Murphy, supra note 108.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Justice Gorsuch was serving as a judge on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and took part in
the en banc consideration for a re-hearing in the case.
115. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Utility of Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court’s Indian Cases, 2
AM. INDIAN L.J. 38, 51 (2013).
20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
may begin to develop future strategies about how to convey support for tribal
sovereignty through a gendered lens.
B. Federal Statutory Reform
Besides litigation in federal courts, many attorneys work on federal law
reform on behalf of tribal nations or tribal interests, and arguments informed by
IFLT can be informative here as well. From 1900 to 2015, tribal interests lost
76.5 percent of the time at the Supreme Court.
116
Some argue that efforts to
protect tribal interests might be better served by focusing on Congress as
opposed to the courts.
117
Certainly since Native women began working on the Violence Against
Women Act, originally passed in 1994, there has been an infusion of Native
women’s voices into Federal Indian legislation, culminating with the passage of
the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA)
118
and the 2013 reauthorization
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA 2013),
119
both of which restored
crucial aspects of tribal sovereignty.
TLOA and VAWA 2013 were omnibus bills containing a wealth of
directives and funding sources to deal with crime in Indian country. They made
two significant changes to tribal criminal jurisdiction. In TLOA, the ICRA was
revised to allow tribal nations that meet certain benchmarks to sentence offenders
to up to three years per offense rather than the previous one-year maximum. In
VAWA 2013, Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
but only for the crimes of domestic violence, dating violence, or criminal
violation of a protection order, and only if the tribal nation has complied with
various federal requirements.
120
While the achievements may seem modest,
neither federal law would exist without the activism of Native women, including
attorneys, who articulated the need for these restorations of tribal authority.
We can expect to see continued momentum on Congressional actions to
address violence against Native women, particularly because of heightened
visibility of the “Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women” movements that
are emerging across the United States. The first two Native women in Congress
are also speaking out and sponsoring legislation intended to address the crisis of
116. Berger, supra note 104, at 1907.
117. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 COLO. L. REV. 77, 81 (2015) (“[M]any
scholars, tribal leaders, and advocates have recently suggested that Congress may be more responsive than
the courts to Indian interests and have turned to legislative strategies for pursuing and protecting tribal
interests, especially tribal self-determination and jurisdiction.”).
118. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
119. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
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violence against Native women.
121
I am cautiously optimistic that continued
engagement with law reform, informed by IFLT, will continue to yield positive
results.
122
In additional to pursuing new legislation like TLOA and VAWA, advocates
should also work toward the enforcement of existing Federal Indian law. In truth,
much of the substance of TLOA and VAWA are directives to federal agencies
to improve the way they implement existing laws and develop policy. For
example, TLOA requires the Department of Justice to release a yearly report that
summarizes federal prosecution activities in Indian country.
123
Indian law
practitioners, along with tribal leaders, must be vigilant to ensure that the
provisions are being implemented in ways that improve Native lives. Federal
legal reform in Congress is not guaranteed to achieve change on the ground
without sustained oversight. For example, a 2017 Office of the Inspector General
report concluded that significant goals of TLOA had not been achieved even
though the Obama administration had claimed that the law was a success.
124
It is
not enough to pass a law—we must ensure its enforcement.
C. Future Areas for Reform
Thus far, the efforts to bring gender-consciousness to Federal Indian law
have focused on criminal justice reform. But there are other gendered issues that
deserve renewed attention, including reproductive justice and environmental
law. I offer a few thoughts on how IFLT might inform efforts in these arenas.
Here, I focus on reproductive justice and environmental justice, though these are
only two examples of areas where IFLT could be informative.
Native women have struggled mightily for reproductive justice over the
course of the twentieth century. Allegations that the federal government, via the
Indian Health Service (IHS), forcibly sterilized Native women or sterilized them
without informed consent have been widely documented, with a focus on mid-
121. See, e.g., The Not Invisible Act of 2019, H.R. 2438; Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2019, H.R. 1585; SURVIVE Act of 2019, H.R. 1351; Studying the
Missing and Murdered Indian Crisis Act of 2019, H.R. 2029; The Native Youth and Tribal Officer
Protection Act of 2019, H.R. 958.
122. Again, it is important to acknowledge that there is not clear consensus even among Native
feminists as to the best way to resolve gender-based violence committed against Native women. Some
have raised valid concerns that laws like VAWA and TLOA promote the further assimilation of tribal
courts by requiring them to comply with new federal standards, and that the “law and order” model may
not be the best way to achieve justice for Native victims of gender-based violence. See, e.g., Kimberly
Robertson, The “Law and Order” of Violence Against Native Women: A Native Feminist Analysis of the
Tribal Law and Order Act, 5 DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & SOC’Y 1 (2016).
123. Section 211, Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
124. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2010, at i (2017),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1801.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VH5-WSC3].
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to-late twentieth century practices.
125
There has been no true reckoning or
accountability for this history. Native women have also been targets of
aggressive birth control policies, including the use of Depo-Provera and
Norplant, long-acting contraceptives that can pose dangers to many women.
126
Indeed, it seems that the unofficial policy of the federal government has been to
stop Native women from reproducing. As noted in the early passages of this
Article, Native women today experience significantly higher rates of pre-term
births and infant mortality, and are less likely to access pre-natal care during
pregnancy.
127
Changes to federal laws and policies could be informed by IFLT,
and perhaps there will be a need for litigation at some point to ensure that Native
women have access to the resources necessary to bring healthy lives into the
world.
The inverse of this battle is more controversial—namely, that Native women
lack access to abortion services when they need to terminate pregnancies, due to
the prohibition on using federal dollars to fund abortion services.
128
To be sure,
abortion is as contentious within Native communities as it is within the rest of
the United States, particularly given the fraught history of sterilization abuse and
widespread child removal that has taken place in our communities.
129
Nonetheless, as a Native feminist who supports the right to abortion, I believe
we must do more to support the full range of reproductive choices and options
to Native women. IHS, as a federally funded agency, cannot provide abortion
services for Native women (with limited exceptions for life of the woman, rape,
and incest) because the so-called “Hyde Amendment” prohibits the use of federal
funding for abortion services. The Hyde Amendment was first passed in 1976,
and was upheld in Harris v. McRae in 1980.
130
However, no arguments were
proffered in McRae for Native women.
131
Moreover, there is no comprehensive
contemporary movement to repeal the Hyde Amendment in the Native legal
community, despite evidence that Hyde Amendment, by prohibiting abortion,
puts Native women’s lives and bodies at risk. The Native American Women’s
Health Education and Resource Center (NAWHERC), a Native owned-and-
125. See, e.g., Brint Dillingham, Indian Women and IHS Sterilization Practices, 3 AM. INDIAN J.
27 (1977); Jane Lawrence, The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women,
24 AM. INDIANQ. 400 (2000); Linda Robyn, Sterilization of American Indian Women Revisited: Another
Attempt to Solve the “Indian Problem,” in CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 39-53
(Marianne O. Nielsen & Karen Jarratt-Snider eds., 2018).
126. JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 119 (2004).
127. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
128. This law is known as the “Hyde Amendment.” Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926.
129. See, e.g., Carly Thomsen, From Refusing Stigmatization toward Celebration: New Directions
for Reproductive Justice Activism, 39 FEM. STUD. 149, 151-53 (2013) (chronicling the story of Cecilia
Fire Thunder, the first contemporary female president of the Oglala Lakota Nation, who was impeached
because of her support for abortion rights).
130. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
131. A word search of the amicus briefs and the transcript of oral arguments yielded no mention
of Native women, tribal governments, or Indian Health Service.
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operated non-profit organization near the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation in
South Dakota has been one of the only Native women’s entities to address
reproductive justice in a sustained fashion.
132
They have raised national concerns
about the lack of access to sexual assault forensic exams and Plan B within the
Indian Health Service systems. They remain one of the only Native organizations
that regularly call for a repeal of the Hyde Amendment. The mainstream efforts
to repeal the Hyde Amendment are spearheaded by a nonprofit organization
called All Above All, and there are several mentions of Native women in the
materials on their webpage.
133
IFLT is also a useful framework for thinking about environmental law.
Gender intersects with issues of environmental protection in several ways.
Native women have unique vested interests in tribal environmental law and have
been at the forefront of major activism efforts such as the Idle No More
movement in Canada and the NoDAPL efforts at Standing Rock.
134
There is a
gendered nature to environmental degradation for many tribal cultures, which
perceive the earth as feminine.
135
In a practical sense, the oil extraction projects
of major corporations have wrought unique health issues for Native women who
have discovered, for example, toxins in their breast milk.
136
In addition,
extractive projects such as fracking have wreaked havoc on the safety of Native
women and children through the creation of “man camps”—temporary housing
encampments for non-Native pipeline workers that are set up in or adjacent to
tribal lands.
137
These “man camps” have resulted in untold tragedy in many tribal
132. Reproductive Justice Program, NATIVE AM. WOMEN’S HEALTH EDUC. RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.nativeshop.org/programs/reproductive-justice.html [https://perma.cc/P9AF-SPJM].
133. Search Results for “Native”, ALL ABOVE ALL, https://allaboveall.org/?s=Native
[https://perma.cc/NLD9-FH4T] (showing that a search for “Native” on the website yielded over a dozen
hits).
134. See, e.g., Kim TallBear, Badass (Indigenous) Women Caretake Relations: #NoDAPL,
#IdleNoMore, #BlackLivesMatter, Cultural Anthropology, SOC’Y FOR CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
(2016), https://culanth.org/fieldsights/badass-indigenous-women-caretake-relations-no-dapl-idle-no-mo
re-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/7KWW-LDY4] (“Women of the Oceti Sakowin, or the Seven
Council Fires, are at the center of the movement at Standing Rock, widely dubbed #NoDAPL.”); Meredith
Privott, An Ethos of Responsibility and Indigenous Women Water Protectors in the #NoDAPLMovement,
43 AM. INDIANQ. 74, 76 (2019) (“[T]he voices of Indigenous women water protectors (of Standing Rock
and beyond) figure prominently, as women water protectors undeniably played a central role in shaping
and forwarding this movement.”).
135. Sarah Deer & Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Raping Indian Country, 38 COLUM. J. GEND. &
L. (forthcoming 2019) (“Because many tribal cultures ascribe important feminine qualities to the land, the
mistreatment of “mother earth” carries important gendered consequences.”).
136. See, e.g., Bruce E. Johansen, The Inuit’s Struggle with Dioxins and Other Organic Pollutants,
26 AM. INDIAN Q. 479, 479 (2002) (“Thus the Arctic, which seems so clean on the surface, has become
one of the most contaminated places on Earth—a place where Inuit mothers think twice before breast-
feeding their babies because high levels of dioxins and other industrial chemicals are being detected in
their breast milk”); Janice Wormworth, Toxins and Tradition: The Impact of Food-Chain Contamination
on the Inuit of Northern Quebec, 152 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1237, 1237 (1995) (“The levels of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) he found [in Indigenous mothers’ breast milk] were five times greater
than those among Caucasian women living in southern Quebec.”).
137. See, e.g., Kathleen Finn et al., Responsible Resource Development and Prevention of Sex
Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women and Children on the Fort Berthold Reservation, 40 HARV. J.L.
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communities because of the high rates of sexual violence and sex trafficking that
accompany them.
138
Thus far, an opportunity has not presented itself for bringing a gender-
conscious argument to bear in the environmental context, but that most certainly
will change in the coming years as more becomes known as to how environment
degradation has unique gendered outcomes.
II. TRIBAL LAW
In this section, I analyze an IFLT approach to tribal law (as opposed to
Federal Indian law). To determine how to bring feminism into conversation with
tribal-centric law, we must consider how contemporary Native nations are
situated with regard to gender and sexuality, a nearly impossible task when
considering the diversity of tribal cultures. While many tribal nations emanate
from cultures that are matrilineal and matrilocal, it is clear that some tribal
nations operate with patriarchal principles that are products of long-term
assimilation with American systems, as discussed earlier in this Article. We
cannot assume that tribal justice systems have adequately addressed colonial
patriarchy.
Historically, tribal nations that wished to operate legal systems that would
be recognized by the federal government were nearly always encouraged to build
a tribal court based on Western legal principles, to the detriment of traditional
tribal dispute processes.
139
As some tribal legal systems became assimilated, they
adopted the trappings of Western law and order, a system that is grounded in
gender hierarchy.
140
Thus, attorneys who practice within the confines of tribal
law also must be thoughtful about the extent to which assimilated court systems
have ignored gender as a central component of analysis. Because most tribal
legal systems have been heavily influenced by American culture, we see the
same challenges with assumptions about gender-neutral laws. Assimilated legal
systems adopted much of the framework and philosophy of the American
systems of governance, including exact language in many cases.
141
And, of
&GENDER 1, 2 (2017) (“[T]he influx of well-paid male oil and gas workers, living in temporary housing
often referred to as “man camps,” has coincided with a disturbing increase in sex trafficking of Native
women.”).
138. Id. at 2-3.
139. Kiowa legal scholar Kirke Kickingbird remarks that “European colonists . . . were unwilling
or unable to leave the Indian systems of justice intact. The result was a continuing erosion of Indian control
over their own institutions.” Kirke Kickingbird, In Our Image…After Our Likeness: The Drive for
Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 AM. CRIM. LAW REV. 675, 680 (1976).
140. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 68, at 4 (“[W]hat passes for neutral law making and
objective legal reasoning is often bound up in traditional assumptions and power hierarchies.”).
141. Many contemporary tribal courts are outgrowths of the first courts established on reservations
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs during the late nineteenth century—courts that were designed to assimilate
Native people into a western, Anglo-American legal system. See Julia M Bedell, The Fairness of Tribal
Court Juries and Non-Indian Defendants, 41 AM. INDIAN LAW REV. 253, 257-258 (2017).
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course, the early American legal system is hardly the starting point for a
government interested in gender equity in society. In that sense, re-infusing
gender and sexuality into our tribal legal systems moves us closer to a
decolonizing approach to tribal legal matters.
In this Part, I argue that issues of gender and sexuality can and should be
considered in the context of tribal court litigation and tribal statutory
development. Ann Tweedy’s excellent 2010 article, Sex Discrimination Under
Tribal Law, takes a comprehensive look at sex discrimination prohibitions in
tribal constitutions, statutes, cases, and policies.
142
It is important to note that the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) currently allows tribal governments and courts
to make gender differentiations under certain circumstances. ICRA imposes
certain language from the federal constitution onto tribal governments, including
the following passage, which mirrors language from the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[No Indian tribe shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law.”
143
Under most readings of Federal Indian law, tribal courts are
free to interpret that equal protection and due process language in ways that may
differ from the interpretation of the federal Constitution by the federal judiciary.
Still, many tribal courts do not deviate significantly from federal constitutional
law in interpreting ICRA language.
In federal courts, of course, the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not applied to gender discrimination until the late twentieth
century, and gender discrimination has never seen more than “intermediate
scrutiny”—a concept that is not altogether clear given the few gender
discrimination cases that reach the highest Court. In United States v. Virginia,
perhaps the most “feminist” decision ever issued by the Supreme Court, Justice
Ginsburg stopped short of requiring “strict scrutiny” in gender distinction cases,
writing that gender classifications must be given “heightened scrutiny.”
144
Many tribal codes indicate that custom and tradition are viable laws,
145
yet
we do not often see much engagement with culture and tradition, at least in the
appellate courts of tribes that publish their opinions. There are vital lessons
embedded within many tribal legal concepts, and gender can play a role in many
different types of cases.
142. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law, supra note 60.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996).
145. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225,
248 (1994).
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A. Gender in Tribal Court Litigation
For the past several years, I have collected an assortment of tribal court
opinions that engage with gender as a legal category. Because most tribal
appellate cases are not readily accessible,
146
these cases are not necessarily
representative of how all tribal courts consider gender. I am currently working
with an inventory of approximately twenty tribal court cases that engage with
gender in a meaningful way, including in dicta, in an effort to widen the scope.
I gathered this corpus of decisions by performing keyword searches in various
tribal court databases, including gendered words such as “woman” and
“matrilineal” and selecting cases where tribal judges and justices had to consider
the role of gender in their analyses.
This collection includes both district level opinions as well as appellate level
opinions. Almost all of the decisions are cases of first impression, meaning that
there is not a corpus of cases where the tribal court had already considered
gendered issues in this context. I describe some of these decisions below, not to
explicate any particular patterns but rather as a sample of different ways in which
tribal law and gender intersect. It should also be noted that these cases are not
binding authority on the development of laws for other tribal nations (although
they could be cited to as persuasive authority for other tribal courts, if relevant).
1. Hepler v. Perkins
Hepler v. Perkins
147
is a relatively early case that arose out of southeastern
Alaska. In resolving a custody dispute between a non-Indian father and a Tlingit
mother, the tribal court referred a question of customary law to a Court of Elders,
who returned this statement on matrilineal clanmembership. “Children of female
members of a clan are children of the clan regardless of where or under what
circumstances they may be found. Clan membership does not wash off, nor can
such membership be removed by any force, or any distance, or over time. Clan
membership continues even in death, and in re-birth it is renewed.”
148
By codifying this statement into case law, matrilineal clanship is seen as the
traditional principle that informed the tribal court’s decision that the Sitka Tribe
has jurisdiction over the children of female family members regardless of where
they reside.
146. See Bonnie Shucha,Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be: The (Un)Availablity of Tribal
Law, 106 LAW. LIBR. J. 199, 199 (2014) (“For a majority of the 566 federally recognized tribes in the
United States today, no law has been published.”).
147. 13 Indian L. Rep. 6011 (Sitka Cmty. Ass’n Tr. Ct., Apr. 7, 1986).
148. Id. at 6016.
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2. Naize v. Naize
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court is perhaps the most well-known tribal
court for drawing upon customary principles in deciding contemporary legal
cases.
149
Here, I explore two cases that concern gender roles. The first, Naize v.
Naize,
150
is a 1997 divorce case. The appeal considered spousal maintenance
ordered by the trial court. The former husband had been ordered to pay his very
ill former spouse $200 per month for three years.
151
The tribal court had also
ordered him to provide a truckload of wood and coal during the winter months
for an indefinite period.
152
While there was no spousal maintenance explicitly called for in the Navajo
statutory code, the Court determined that Navajo courts can look to “traditional
Navajo teachings” that one should not “throw their family away” to justify the
order of spousal maintenance. The Court reasoned that
traditional Navajo society is matrilineal and matrilocal, which obligates
a man upon marriage to move to his wife’s residence. The property the
couple bring to the marriage mingle and through their joint labors create
a stable and permanent home for themselves and their children. The
wife’s immediate and extended family benefit directly and indirectly, in
numerous ways, from the marriage. If the marriage does not survive,
customary law directs the man to leave with his personal possessions
(including his horse and riding gear, clothes, and religious items) and
the rest of the marital property stays with the wife and children at their
residence for their support and maintenance.
153
With this understanding, the Court upheld the award of monetary payments after
analyzing the significant hardships faced by the wife.
154
Interestingly, the Court
went on to strike down the order of indefinite supply of winter wood and coal,
stating that another tradition of Navajo people is that there must be finality in
divorce cases so that harmony can be restored.
155
3. Riggs v. Attakai
In Riggs v. Estate of Attakai,
156
the Navajo Court was called upon to
determine the appropriate party to hold a leasing permit for sheep grazing, and it
149. See generally RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJOCOMMON LAW (2009).
150. 1 Am. Tribal Law 445 (1997).
151. Id. at 447.
152. Id. at 447.
153. Id. at 449.
154. Id. at 449-50.
155. Id. at 450.
156. 7 Am. Tribal Law 534, No. SC-CV-39-04, 2007 WL 5886339 (Navajo June 13, 2007).
28 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
ultimately codified matrilineal land tenure in its decision.
157
After exploring a
gender-neutral five-factor test for awarding grazing permits that was established
by a 1991 Navajo case, the Riggs Court held that the five-factor test should be
applied
consistent with the Navajo Fundamental Law which defines the role and
authority of Diné women in our society. Traditionally, women are
central to the home and land base. They are the vein of the clan line. The
clan line typically maintains a land base upon which the clan lives, uses
the land for grazing and agricultural purposes and maintains the land for
medicinal and ceremonial purposes.
158
Again, it should be noted that this a case of a Navajo court interpreting
Navajo law, and perhaps another tribal court would analyze the question
differently in light of different tribal traditional practice. But we should also
notice what the Court is doing here—it is pushing back against the patriarchal
history of westernized jurisprudence by clearly laying out the importance of
Navajo women to tribal culture. This doctrine may become relevant in a future
case that considers protections for Native women and girls.
4. The Bigfire Cases
The Supreme Court of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska consolidated a
series of criminal cases implicating gender and equal protection in 1998.
159
The
Winnebago Tribe prosecuted three male teenagers under a gender-neutral
statutory rape tribal statute provision that stated that “any person who subjects
an unemancipated minor to sexual penetration is guilty of sexual assault in the
second degree.” Two of the males were 17 and their female victims were 12. In
the third case, the male was 15 and the female victim was 13. The defendants
alleged that the victims consented to the sexual penetration and raised equal
protection arguments because the underage females were not prosecuted.
160
The
defendants relied on federal case law to support their position.
The legal question presented by these cases was whether it is impermissible
to prosecute only boys and not girls under the sexual assault statute. The
Winnebago court engaged with custom and tradition to side with the prosecution.
The Court begins by referencing the work of an ethnologist who published the
following tribal teaching in 1923, which says:
157. Id. at 536. (“Navajos maintain and carry on the custom that the maternal clan maintains
traditional grazing and farming areas.”).
158. Id. at 536.
159. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Hugh Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6229, 6229 (Winn. Sup. Ct.
1998).
160. Id. at 6230.
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My son, never abuse your wife. The women are sacred. If you abuse
your wife and make her life miserable, you will die early. Our
grandmother, the earth, is a woman, and in mistreating your wife you
will be mistreating her. Most assuredly will you be abusing our
grandmother if you act thus. And as it is she that is taking care of us you
will really be killing yourself by such behavior.
161
The Court then explains how this traditional teaching can inform the legal
analysis, noting that:
This quotation nicely summarizes Ho-Chunk thinking on gender
relationships. Gender differences constitute a natural part of life. Indeed,
the Earth, the Grandmother who gives life, is female. Thus, gender role
differentiation and gender differences in legal or customary treatment
related to those roles are natural and expected. In Ho-Chunk culture,
therefore, gender differences or disparities in treatment do not signal
hierarchy, lack of respect or invidious discrimination, but, rather, are a
respected and natural part of life. They are, indeed, part of the way that
the Winnebago world view brings meaning to life.
162
In considering these traditional tenets about gender in the Ho-Chunk culture,
the Court applies strict scrutiny to gender discrimination and ultimately
concludes that the Tribe had a compelling interest for gender discrimination in
this case.
5. Casteel v. Cherokee Nation
Not all tribal court engagement with gendered questions is necessarily
positive. Casteel v. Cherokee Nation
163
is the only tribal appellate case I have
discovered where there is clear indication that a litigant made an intentional and
direct feminist argument to a tribal judiciary. It was rejected soundly. The case
itself involved the termination of an employee for sexual harassment. The
Cherokee Judicial Appeals Tribunal
164
determined that the Tribe failed to meet
its burden of proof—that is, they did not establish a pattern of behavior necessary
to terminate the employment.
However, it is apparent that the attorney for the Cherokee Nation (a woman)
objected to the fact that the judicial panel was comprised of three men, a notion
that was soundly rejected by the Tribunal, which stated:
161. Id. at 6232 (citing PAULRADIN, THEWINNEBAGO TRIBE 122 (1923)).
162. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6232.
163. Casteel v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. Trib. 147 (1996).
164. Today, this is known as the Cherokee Supreme Court.
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We further reject the statement made by . . . counsel for the Cherokee
Nation . . . that this Court, being composed of three male judges, is
incapable of applying the reasonable person standard in this case. Bias,
no matter how well meaning, has no place in the courtroom. [The
attorney] is hereby admonished to be more respectful when addressing
this Court in the future.
165
Although I do not have access to the transcript of the oral arguments and
thus cannot assess exactly what the attorney argued, it is clear that this particular
tribal court was opposed to considering how the gender makeup of the court
might influence its decision. This case serves as a reminder that arguments
informed by IFLT may not be successful in tribal court, and as a reminder that
we must not romanticize the idea of bringing gendered issues to tribal court.
B. Tribal Statutory Development
In this Section, I consider several ways that IFLT can inform the
development of contemporary gender-conscious tribal statutory law. This
Section of the Article is perhaps the most daunting, because as an advocate for
tribal political and legal independence, I do not seek to tell tribal nations how to
govern themselves. Instead, I am interested in encouraging tribal leaders to
consult with the women and Two-Spirit people of their nations before passing
laws that may affect or endanger them.
I encourage tribal attorneys and legislators to consult with local women
before passing laws that criminalize their behavior. For example, some tribal
nations have passed laws which allow tribal prosecutors to file criminal child
abuse or neglect charges against pregnant women who use drugs or alcohol
during pregnancy.
166
There is ample room for debate on the efficacy of this
policy, and certainly sound minds can disagree, but my concern is whether the
women of those particular communities have had a chance to weigh in on
something as significant as criminalizing behavior during pregnancy. If possible,
tribal legislatures and tribal litigants should consult female elders and leaders in
the community about the best way to respond to the crisis of infants born with
drugs in their system or other related concerns. Ideally, these female elders
would be able to offer insight as to how traditional principles and tenets inform
contemporary practices. Perhaps tribal nations could consider developing local
165. 5 Okla. Trib. at 3.
166. See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice Sec. 4-1204 (Child Neglect); White
Mountain Apache Criminal Code, Sec. 2.82 (Endangering an Unborn Child); Reno-Sparks Indian
Community Law and Order Code, Sec. 4-5-310 (Fetal Endangerment); Shoalwater Bay Tribe Code of
Laws, Sec. 2.02.09 (Endangering a Fetus).
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women’s task forces, which would be able to assess the needs of women in the
community so that the tribal nation’s legislature can be better informed.
Gendered issues arise in a variety of different ways in tribal codes. Tribal
nations could have the best laws in the world when it comes to addressing
sexism. Tribal governments may wish to revisit their laws on divorce, custody,
extended family, sexual violence, juvenile justice—all places where Native
conceptions of gender might be relevant. Tribal nations can ensure, through
statutory reform, that women and LGBTQ+ employees have expansive remedies
for discriminatory treatment. Tribal governments might consider developing
stricter laws and policies on sex trafficking, the establishment of “man camps,”
and other efforts to enhance the safety of the communities. Even in those cases
where the tribal nation is not allowed to prosecute non-Indians, tribal
governments could amplify civil remedies for victims, including expansive
protection orders and civil tort remedies. Tribal governments could set training
requirements for first responders and other tribal officials that may come into
contact with victims of gender-based violence. They may also strengthen
employment protections for victims of violence who might miss work due to the
physical, psychological, and legal barriers. There is no limit to the way that
sovereign nations can imagine and explicate a system that seeks to end gendered
oppression.
III. GENDER EQUITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION&PRACTICE
If IFLT is to have “legs” and begin to be used as a tool in both Federal Indian
law and tribal law, we need to cultivate a new generation of attorneys, scholars,
and activists who can begin the development of a unique approach to
jurisprudence when it comes to tribal governments. Unfortunately, Native
women have been absent from the legal academy and nearly absent from legal
scholarship in the United States. The earliest law review article about Native
women I have found in my research was published in the American Indian Law
Review in 1975.
167
The first law review article about violence against Native
women was not published until 1993.
168
Even in 2019, there are still only a
handful of law review articles that focus on Native women. Whereas there has
been an explosion of Native feminist interventions in other scholarly disciplines
such as history, sociology and indigenous studies,
169
there is very little Native
feminist intervention in the law.
167. Bysiewicz & Van De Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian Woman, supra note 45.
168. James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho’ Sokee’ – Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence
Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407 (1993).
169. Several interdisciplinary anthologies about Native feminisms have been published in the last
10 years. See, e.g., INDIGENOUS WOMEN AND FEMINISM, supra note 29; CRITICALLY SOVEREIGN, supra
note 29.
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To cultivate future feminist interventions in Indian law, I contend that we
must do more to recruit and support Native women law students, and, ultimately,
more Native women law professors. While Native men can certainly advance the
cause of Native women, it is important that feminist interventions are backed by
Native women attorneys who feel confident about advancing legal arguments on
behalf of other Native women. There are very few Native women lawyers in the
United States, and only a handful of Native women teaching in law schools.
170
This must change if we are to see significant shifts in the way that Native women
can inform and influence the practice of Indian law in the United States. I believe
that IFLT should begin to be taught in the law school curriculum, including in
Indian law, feminist jurisprudence, and critical legal studies.
Unfortunately, Native women attorneys also experience racism and sexism
in the legal workplace—both in the private and public sectors. For the past 20
years, I have heard anecdotal stories from other Native women attorneys about
discrimination and abuse in the workplace. But there was no way of estimating
the prevalence of discrimination because, until 2015, there was no
comprehensive study of Native attorneys in the United States that asked such
questions. The National Native American Bar Association (NNABA)
commissioned such a study and published the results in 2015.
171
Over 500
attorneys responded to the study, and the results were illuminating. The study
reveals that Native women attorneys suffer an unacceptable rate of gender-
related discrimination in the profession. For example, nearly 38 percent of Native
women respondents said they have experienced demeaning comments or
harassment based on gender in the workplace.
172
Thirty-five percent reported that
they had been discriminated based on gender
173
and nearly thirty percent reported
that they had been denied appropriate compensation due to gender.
174
Of those
Nativewomenwho had left the legal profession, 33 percent did so in part because
of gender bias.
175
The study also revealed that Native women were mistreated by
Native men in the legal workplace, revealing that the problem goes beyond non-
Indian discrimination.
176
Native women working for the federal government have also suffered from
discrimination. A 2017 survey of Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employees
170. According to one article, as of 2008 there were only 21 Native American women in legal
academia in the United States. Meera E Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia, 29
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 352, 357 (2014).
171. NATIONAL NATIVE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PURSUIT OF INCLUSION: AN IN-
DEPTH EXPLORATION OF THE EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES OF NATIVE AMERICAN ATTORNEYS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2015), http://www.nativeamericanbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2015-
02-11-final-NNABA_report_pp6.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HZ6-EZBP].
172. Id. at 36.
173. Id. at 36.
174. Id. at 37.
175. Id. at 39.
176. Id. at 32.
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showed 40 percent had experienced some form of harassment—primarily racial
and sexual—in their workplaces in the past 12 months.
177
In fact, BIA suffers
from the highest rate of harassment within the Department of Interior.
178
The
perpetrators were typically older males.
179
In the past two years, several prominent officials within the BIA have been
investigated for sexual harassment. One BIA supervisor in the Southwest
regional office repeatedly sexually harassed women—one subordinate said that
he “pulled down the front of her shirt to ask if she was wearing a bra” and another
subordinate reported that he “put his hand up her skirt.”
180
Managers were
informed about his behavior but did not act immediately.
181
In April 2018, BIA
Director Bryan Rice resigned abruptly after reports surfaced that he had harassed
and bullied women subordinates.
182
The problems with sexist culture in the
federal government are not limited to the BIA. During theObama administration,
William Mendoza, who was the director of the White House Initiative on
American Indian and Alaska Native Education, resigned after pleading guilty to
attempted voyeurism after video footage showed him taking “up skirt” photos
on the Washington, D.C. Metro.
183
A series of recent investigative reports on sexual harassment in the lives of
Native women uncovered a plethora of stories about the behavior of Native men
in high profile positions.
184
While not specific to the attorney experience, these
177. CFI GROUP, SUPPLEMENTAL STATISTICAL REPORT: BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (BIA)
WORK ENVIRONMENT SURVEY 2 (2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/bia_wes_
supplemental_statistical_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE9J-72B5].
178. Landmark Study Finds High Rate of Workplace Harassment at Bureau of Indian Affairs,
INDIANZ.COM (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/12/14/landmark-study-finds-high-
rate-of-workpl.asp [https://perma.cc/YD8A-S94E].
179. Anna V. Smith, Harassment pervades the Bureau of Indian Affairs, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/issues/50.6/tribal-affairs-harassment-pervades-interiors-bureau-of-
indian-affairs [https://perma.cc/9RPH-3MH8].
180. Wills Robinson, “Predator” Interior Department Official Told a Subordinate He “Wanted to
Get Naked and Show Her What It’s Like to be with a “Real Man” and Told Another She Wasn’t Too Old
to be “Spanked Over His Knee,”DAILYMAIL (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
6484087/Interior-Department-official-accused-predator-harassed-subordinates.html [https://perma.cc/8F
38-RC7B].
181. Id. See also Insufficient Actions by BIA Management and Human Resource Officials in
Response to Sexual Harassment Reports, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.doioig.gov/reports/insufficient-actions-bia-management-and-human-resource-officials-
response-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/V46N-V9FE].
182. Bureau of Indian Affairs Director Resigned After Harassment Claim: Report, DAILY BEAST
(May 2, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/bureau-of-indian-affairs-director-resigned-after-harass
ment-claim-report [https://perma.cc/MPE7-WBHU?type=image]. See also Anna V. Smith, Bureau of
Indian Affairs Director Resigned, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/
tribal-affairs-bureau-of-indian-affairs-director-resigns [https://perma.cc/RY9Z-CMV6].
183. Wills Robinson, Surveillance Footage Shows One of President Obama’s Senior Officials
Following a Woman around DC Metro Station and Taking a Picture Up her Skirt with His Cell Phone,
DAILY MAIL (July 27, 2018), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5997025/Obama-advisor-
William-Mendoza-seen-taking-picture-womans-skirt-DC-Metro.html [https://perma.cc/C4RX-F7VN].
184. Mary Annette Pember, #MeToo in Indian Country; ‘We Don’t Talk About this Enough,’
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 28, 2019), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/metoo-in-
indian-country-we-don-t-talk-about-this-enough-oXkstdPmDk2-zSXoDXZSZQ/ [https://perma.cc/XX
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stories indicate that many Native women experience unacceptable rates of
harassment in the workplace, often perpetrated by powerful and respected men
in their communities. These survivors of harassment interviewed for the series
of articles “shared an overwhelming fear about losing their jobs, the chances for
future employment, housing, social services for themselves and their families as
well as the love, respect and support from close knit Native communities.”
185
These levels of sexism, harassment, and assault cannot continue to be part
of the lives of Native women attorneys and government workers. In the era of
the #MeToo movement, the Indian Bar must do better to address a culture of
toxic masculinity that seems to have permeated some of the most important
workplaces in Indian law today.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused primarily on sex and sexism as a key intervention
in IFLT, but we also must remember that issues of sexuality and gender identity
are also impacted by legal hegemony and settler colonialism. Because these
issues deserve full attention, in future pieces, I will strive to consider how
homophobia and other forms of discrimination against Two-Spirit people can be
addressed through IFLT.
The safety and well-being of tribal nations depends on the safety and well-
being of Native women. Patriarchy and settler colonialism have taken their toll
on the lives of Native people and IFLT can offer new, innovative ways of
thinking about gender liberation in the context of tribal sovereignty. In theDollar
General brief, Mary Kathryn Nagle and I used the following traditional quotation
from the Cheyenne to open our argument. I use it now in closing.
“The Nation shall be strong so long as the hearts of the women are not on
the ground.”
V5-R4N6]; Mary Annette Pember, #MeToo What Happens When Native Women Come Forward with
Harassment Complaints, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 29, 2019), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountry
today/news/metoo-what-happens-when-native-women-come-forward-with-harassment-complaints-
6W2mE2aNgE6bJw4m84nHTg/ [https://perma.cc/8GYK-7YPG]; Mary Annette Pember, #MeToo. Toxic
Masculinity; Addressing a Terrible Truth, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 30, 2019),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/metoo-toxic-masculinity-addressing-a-terrible-truth-
RuptdDeOa0atVczu7G-WCA/ [https://perma.cc/C9LH-LWZ9].
185. Pember, #Metoo in Indian Country, supra note 184.
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ABSTRACT: 2019 marks 400 years since the first Africans were brought to the
Virginia colony as captives, and deemed not human beings but rather the
property of others. Black women have endured reproductive oppression since
our arrival in the United States. This Article argues that current methods of
reproductive oppression attempt to restore the State’s property interest in the
bodies of Black women—specifically the basic rights of use and exclusion—
once secured by enslavement. This Article seeks to identify some of the ways
that current restrictions on women’s reproductive liberty mimic systems that
once formally commodified Black women’s sexuality and reproductive labor. It
concludes, however, that a Reproductive Justice framework can help remove
these property interests in Black women’s bodies and return them to their rightful
“owners.”
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INTRODUCTION
The Reproductive Justice (RJ) movement arose in recent decades in
response to a pro-choice movement concerned primarily with preventing births
and terminating unwanted pregnancies.
1
This focus ignored the very real threats
to Black
2
women’s reproductive autonomy seen since our arrival on America’s
shores. These include barriers to becoming pregnant, having healthy pregnancies
and births, and raising children to adulthood in safe environments. Both human
rights and social justice frameworks are integral to RJ.
3
RJ adopts the human
rights approach of positive rights: affirmative duties imposed upon the State to
actualize rights. RJ recognizes that the right to privacy and governmental non-
intrusion—at the core of much reproductive rights discourse—is inadequate to
address the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized women.
4
This Article explores how present-day reproductive oppression reflects an
attempt by the State to retain a property interest in Black women’s bodies once
held by their owners during the time of enslavement. Rather than endorsing the
view that sexuality and reproduction are legitimately conceptualized as property,
this Article merely seeks to identify some of the ways that current restrictions on
women’s reproductive liberty mimic systems that once formally commodified
1. LORETTA ROSS& RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 54-57 (2017).
2. I capitalize Black but use the lowercase when it was used in the original source. For the reasoning
behind the capitalization of Black, see Lori L. Tharps, The Case for Black With a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-for-black-with-a-capital-b.html
[https://perma.cc/6GFC-JESZ].
3. ROSS& SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 78-89.
4. Legal scholar Dorothy Roberts observes that the choice framework “aligns with a neoliberal
market logic that relies on individuals’ purchase of commodities . . . instead of the state investing in health
care and the other social needs of the larger public.” Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just
Rights, DISSENT (2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reproductive-justice-not-just-rights
[https://perma.cc/TGN5-MJ3U].
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Black women’s sexuality and reproductive labor. The Reproductive Justice
framework seeks to remove these property interests in Black women’s bodies
and return them to their rightful “owners.”
Part I describes how racialized rhetoric is used to justify reproductive
oppression and support the State’s property interest in Black women’s
reproductive capacity and sexuality. Part II analyzes the reproductive and sexual
oppression of Black women through a framework of the property rights of use
and exclusion.
5
During enslavement, these property rights were exploited by the
owner; currently, these property rights are exploited by the State. Part III
proposes that the RJ framework serves to emancipate Black women from
continued attempts to render their sexuality and reproductive labor the property
of the State, attempting to sever this badge of inferiority established during
enslavement.
I. THERACIALIZATION OF RHETORICOPPOSINGACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH SERVICES
Despite the consistent demonization of Black women’s reproductive
decision-making, this issue is all too often sidelined in examinations of the
legacy of enslavement and racial oppression.
6
This Section provides a sampling
of the ways that race has been inserted into debates about abortion and
contraception. Each of these examples illustrates Black women’s treatment as
passive objects who have no control over their reproductive decisions. These
rhetorical tools are an extension of the dehumanizing treatment enslaved women
experienced as the reproductive property of others, described in Section II.A.
This rhetoric also provides support for the oppressive policies that negate Black
women’s agency, explored in Section II.B.
A. Contraception and Abortion as Tools of a Conspiracy of Genocide
The myth of abortion as Black genocide depends on denying Black




5. The other property rights include those of possession and transfer. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES
E. KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1993).
6. Pamela Bridgewater has observed that despite a comprehensive treatment of reparations for the
descendants of enslaved Africans, Randall Robinson devotes little attention to the reproductive and sexual
exploitation of enslaved women. Pamela D. Bridgewater, Ain’t I a Slave: Slavery, Reproductive Abuse,
and Reparations, 14 UCLAWOMEN’S L.J. 89, 113 (2005).
7. Shyrissa Dobbins-Harris, The Myth Of Abortion As Black Genocide: Reclaiming Our
Reproductive Choice, 26 NAT. BLACK L.J. 85, 90 (2017). This article provides a comprehensive critique
of the “abortion as Black genocide” rhetoric and also highlights the Reproductive Justice Movement’s
response.
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Abortion rates have declined significantly for all groups since the early
1980s, but the rate for Black women remains at almost three times the rate as for
White women.
8
Black women comprise fifteen percent of the U.S. population,
but account for almost twenty-eight percent of women having abortions.
9
The
abortion rate is higher among Black women because the unintended pregnancy
rate is three times higher than that of white women.
10
Despite the well-
documented and complex factors causing the high abortion rate among Black
women, this fact is often used as “evidence” that abortion is a racist plot to
diminish the Black population.
11
In November 2018, Mississippi Governor Phil
Bryant defended a lynching joke by Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith, claiming that
the Black community should be more concerned with abortion than with
racism.
12
This claim of genocidal conspiracy about both abortion and contraception
was made prior to Roe v. Wade,
13
the Supreme Court case decriminalizing
abortion. Marcus Garvey, the leader of the Back to Africa Movement of the
1930s, decried birth control as “race suicide.”
14
Both the Black Panthers and
Nation of Islam opposed birth control and abortion, but the genocide argument
was much more common among the Panthers, who viewed Black children as
potential soldiers in the fight for Black freedom. The Nation’s opposition was
rooted in religious principles and women’s duty to raise children.
15
8. Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Population Group Abortion Rates and Lifetime Incidence of
Abortion: United States, 2008–2014, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1904, 1906 tbl.1 (2017) (showing rates of
10 abortions per 1,000 for White women versus 27.1 per 1,000 for Black women according to the most
recently available data).
9. Id.
10. Causes of unintended pregnancy among Black women include higher poverty rates, lower
marriage rates, less access to comprehensive sexuality education, lower health insurance coverage, and
less access to the most effective forms of contraception. Susan Cohen, Abortion and Women of Color:
The Bigger Picture, 11 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2-4 (2008).
11. Some individuals may indeed have a racist motivation for supporting abortion, and welcome the
high abortion rate among Black women. Likewise, conservatives were once strong proponents of
contraception, recognizing the potential impact on electoral politics. Loretta Ross, The Color of Choice:
White Supremacy and Reproductive Justice, RACIAL EQUITY TOOLS 7 (2005), http://www.racialequity
tools.org/resourcefiles/The-Color-of-Choice----Public-Version-with-footnotes-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8
22Q-59QP].
12. Amanda Michelle Gomez, Mississippi Governor Defended Lynching Joke by Calling Abortion
“Black Genocide,” THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/misogynoir-
mississippi-governor-phil-bryant-black-genocide-defense-cindy-hyde-smith-453c135339b9/
[https://perma.cc/RZK2-3AP9].
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACKBODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THEMEANING
OFLIBERTY 84 (2017). See alsoMiriam Zoila Perez, Past and Present Collide as the Black Anti-Abortion
Movement Grows, COLORLINES (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:35 AM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/past-and-
present-collide-black-anti-abortion-movement-grows [https://perma.cc/F2TE-6SDH].
15. JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 96-97
(2003).
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These organizations were justified in their suspicion of State-supported
family planning.
16
Birth control was the government’s preferred panacea to
poverty, promoting contraception, abortion, and sterilization rather than actually
responding to poverty’s root causes and providing meaningful social and
economic support to struggling families.
17
While the Nation of Islam has
maintained its stance,
18
eventually, the Black Panthers adopted a position in
support of abortion and contraception when freely chosen by the individual.
19
This came at the urging of Black feminists who recognized reproductive freedom
as a critical part of community empowerment.
20
The issue was unsurprisingly a contentious one within mainstream civil
rights organizations, which were heavily grounded in the church. Despite the
controversy over the use of abortion and contraception by Black women,
prominent individuals and organizations supported both measures as a tool for
women’s empowerment. The National Council of Negro Women supported
family planning in 1941.
21
Speaking on behalf of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee’s BlackWomen’s Liberation Committee, Frances Beal
stated that Black women must determine “when it is in the interest of the struggle
to have children or not have them.”
22
Shirley Chisholm, the first Black woman
in the House of Representatives, was a strong supporter of access to safe, legal
abortion, recognizing that most women dying from illegal abortions were Black
and Brown.
23
It was as easy then as it is now to distinguish government-imposed
population control from individually chosen family planning, yet this rhetoric
was reinvigorated in 2009 by the documentaryMaafa 21: Black Genocide in 21st
Century America, made by a white antiabortion activist.
24
The two-hour film
charts the alleged plan to eliminate the “surplus” Black population, those who
were rendered superfluous after emancipation when they could not be used for
free labor.
25
Investigative reporter Akiba Solomon describes the film as “the
16. Id. at 85-87.
17. See id. at 87-88. See also JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE & COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL,
STERILIZATION AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE (2005) (describing governmental
efforts to reduce childbearing among low-income women and women of color).
18. See Nation of Islam leader warns against abortion, DOMINICANEWSONLINE (Dec. 5, 2012, 7:39
AM), http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/muslim-leader-warns-students-against-abor
tion/ [https://perma.cc/7BWE-AUS5] (recounting Minister Louis Farrakhan telling students at Dominica
State College that “abortion should never be an option”); see also ELIJAHMUHAMMAD, HOW TO EAT TO
LIVE: BOOK 1 83 (2018) (in which the former Nation of Islam leader likens birth control to suicide).
19. NELSON, supra note 15, at 89. The leadership of Elaine Brown also played a role in the Party
Platform’s inclusion of women’s liberation. Id. at 109.
20. Id. at 109.
21. Perez, supra note 14. See also Ross, supra note 11, at 9.
22. Perez, supra note 14.
23. NELSON, supra note 15, at 77-79 (2003).
24. Mark Crutcher,Maafa 21: Black Genocide in 21st Century America, YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HshhtiNm2Kc [https://perma.cc/9H5V-QHFP].
25. With far more evidentiary support, Michelle Alexander has argued that the Prison-Industrial
Complex has developed as a “remedy” to underemployment and poverty in communities of color. See
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closest the predominately white, Christian right has come to successfully
exploiting Black Nationalist themes and aesthetics.”
26
Planned Parenthood is the primary focus of those claiming that abortion
constitutes Black genocide, with its founder Margaret Sanger receiving much of
the criticism. It is well-documented that Margaret Sanger believed in eugenics—
limiting reproduction to the mentally and physically fit.
27
Yet Sanger still
rejected the idea of State control of women’s reproductive choices that was at
the heart of eugenic ideology.
28
Planned Parenthood has addressed and
denounced this and other troubling actions and beliefs held by Sanger.
29
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Sanger coerced women of color into using
family planning.
30
It is also well-documented that Sanger was invited to work in
partnership with Black leaders, organizations, and healthcare providers to
increase access to contraception in Black communities.
31
Scholars have
documented the questionable motives for including Black healthcare workers
and maintaining Black leadership in the project, yet this reality coexisted with
Black women’s desire to control the timing and spacing of their pregnancies.
32
There is also a claim that Planned Parenthood situates its facilities in
predominately Black areas, with the implication being that Black women
terminate their pregnancies at higher rates simply because abortion services are
conveniently available. Aside from this argument being incredibly simplistic and
insulting, it is also false. Less than ten percent of abortion facilities are located
in neighborhoods with a majority Black population.
33
Both today and in Sanger’s
generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
26. Akiba Solomon, The Missionary Movement to Save Black Babies, COLORLINES (May 2, 2013,
7:40 AM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/missionary-movement-save-black-babies [https://perma.
cc/933C-7NXF].
27. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 57-59.
28. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, OPPOSITION CLAIMS ABOUT MARGARET SANGER 4 (2016),
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/37/fd/37fdc7b6-de5f-4d22-8c05-
9568268e92d8/sanger_opposition_claims_fact_sheet_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYC5-24WT].
29. Id. In addition to evidence of her belief in eugenics, it has been documented that Sanger spoke to
a meeting of the women’s auxiliary of the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 3.
30. Margaret Sanger did not support abortion. The procedure was not just illegal, but quite dangerous
in Sanger’s day. Imani Gandy,How False Narratives of Margaret Sanger Are Being Used to Shame Black
Women, REWIRE (Aug. 20, 2015), https://rewire.news/article/2015/08/20/false-narratives-margaret-
sanger-used-shame-black-women/ [https://perma.cc/3R6Q-2N5C].
31. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 28, at 1. The Harlem Project was supported by The Urban
League, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Abyssinian Baptist Church. It was in fact Du Bois who paternalistically
accused impoverished Black people of “breeding carelessly,” a quote that is often misattributed to Sanger.
Id. at 5.
32. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 77-78.
33. Using data from its survey of abortion providers, the Alan Guttmacher Institute found that 60
percent of abortion facilities are in predominately white areas. ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, News in
Context, Claim that Most Abortion Clinics Are Located in Black or Hispanic Neighborhoods Is False
(June 1, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2014/06/claim-most-abortion-clinics-are-located-
black-or-hispanic-neighborhoods-false [https://perma.cc/7Y9R-HSQU] (relying on data from Rachel K.
Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2011, 46 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 3 (2014)).
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day, Black women make their reproductive decisions as other women do: in the
context of their current lives, families, plans for the future, finances, education
and employment goals.
The most prominent campaign in recent memory arose from the Radiance
Foundation, with billboards placed in predominately Black areas declaring,
“Black children are an endangered species.”
34
Another campaign from
Life Always proclaims, “The Most Dangerous Place for an African American
is in the Womb.”
35
The founder and spokesperson for the organization is a
biracial adoptee, but the campaign is funded by white-led and Republican-
supporting organizations like Georgia Right to Life.
36
These and other “pro-life”
supporters asserting an interest in the disproportionate rate of abortions among
Black women have otherwise shown no commitment to the well-being of
mothers, infants, or children of any race.
37
Campaigns by Black women’s
organizations have responded to these claims, including Trust Black Women, a
project of SisterSong: Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective.
38
B. The Co-opting of Black Lives Matter
The most recent racialized anti-abortion rhetoric grows out of the Black
Lives Matter (BLM) movement. BLM, started by Black women in 2013, has an
explicitly anti-patriarchal frame.
39
BLM has also partnered with RJ
organizations, including Trust Black Women.
40
The two organizations issued a
solidarity statement affirming their common goals. In a joint interview, they
described the intersection of the movements, and how RJ demands that parents
be able to raise their children to adulthood free of State violence and poverty,
with quality education and in healthy environments.
41
34. RADIANCE FOUNDATION, Black Children Are An Endangered Species (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.toomanyaborted.com/black-children-are-an-endangered-species/ [https://perma.cc/ZE2V-JE
Z5].
35. “The Most Dangerous Place for an African-American is in the Womb”: Black Politician
Criticises Anti-Abortion Billboard, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-1360125/The-dangerous-place-African-American-womb-Black-politician-criticises-anti-abortion
-billboard.html [https://perma.cc/2XNH-LVR3].
36. Solomon, supra note 26.
37. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FORWOMENAND FAMILIES, A DOUBLEBIND:WHEN STATES
DENY ABORTION COVERAGE AND FAIL TO SUPPORT EXPECTING AND NEW PARENTS (Sept. 2016),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/repro/abortion/a-double-bind.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8DW3-MCT5] (reporting lack of workplace supports for parents in states with the most abortion
restrictions, largely tracking Republican-dominated state legislatures).
38. See TRUST BLACKWOMEN, www.trustblackwomen.org [https://perma.cc/BV42-SPU8].
39. See Platform, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma
.cc/52WC-YFW5]; see also What We Believe, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://blacklives
matter.com/about/what-we-believe/ [https://perma.cc/QE9Z-5ZR7].
40. Kenrya Rankin,Black Lives Matter Partners with Reproductive Justice Groups to Fight for Black
Women, COLORLINES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/black-lives-matter-partners-
reproductive-justice-groups-fight-black-women [https://perma.cc/XUH2-R2QT].
41. Id.
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Attempting to draw attention away from BLM and redirect to their anti-
abortion campaign, the Radiance Foundation’s most recent poster reads: Black
Lives Matter In and Out of the Womb.
42
The founder of the Radiance Foundation
has also decried the “hypocrisy” of the aforementioned partnership, noting that
Planned Parenthood “kills more unarmed black lives in one day than police are
accused of killing in one entire year.”
43
Again, this statement presumes that
Black women have no agency in determining whether or not to continue a
pregnancy.
Yet others have identified those opposing abortion in the name of “Black
Lives” as the actual hypocrites. One columnist describes his exchange with a
self-proclaimed pro-lifer, challenging him on commitment to Black lives with
regard to housing, education, and police brutality. He describes abortion
opponents’ purported interest in the lives of Black children as “cynical and
offensive” when the same individuals do nothing to improve the lives of Black
people.
44
Even Black clergy who are opposed to abortion have rejected the use of
Black Lives Matter by those who have shown no concern for the Black
community. Recognizing that Black women are acting in consideration of the
totality of their lives, they have opposed recent attempts to ban abortion, and
spoken out about addressing the social conditions faced by Black families.
“Those who are most vocal about abortion and abortion laws are my white
brothers and sisters, and yet many of them don’t care about the plight of the poor,




Another common tool among those opposing abortion is to compare it to
slavery. They assert that one day, the fact that abortion was deemed acceptable
42. See Feminista Jones, How Anti-Abortion Extremists are Exploiting #BlackLivesMatter to Vilify
African-American Women, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/
feminista-jones/anti-abortion-extremists-exploiting-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/4UMR-5NWU].
The “in and out of the womb” part of the poster, superimposed over a Black infant, is faded out.
43. Ryan Scott Bomberger, #Blacklivesmatter, White Guilt and the Marketing of Racism, RADIANCE
FOUND., (July 8, 2016), https://www.theradiancefoundation.org/blacklivesmatter/ [https://perma.cc/
XRD5-FKAA]. The article goes on to state that “those with Black skin” present the biggest threat to other
Black people. Id.
44. Leonard Pitts Jr., The hypocrisy of anti-abortion activists, BALT. SUN (May 26, 2019),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0526-pitts-abortion-20190522-story.html
[https://perma.cc/S5U7-EKGY?type=image].
45. John Eligon, When “Black Lives Matter” Is Invoked in the Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July
6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/06/us/black-abortion-missouri.html [https://perma.cc/KX
4E-96BE].
46. Arguments have also been made by abortion rights supporters comparing the forced continuation
of pregnancy to slavery. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense
of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990). Debora Threedy argues that such appropriation by either side
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to Americans will seem as unthinkable as (white) Americans’ acceptance of
slavery 200 years ago. The tactic serves two purposes: to link abortion to
something that people—especially those who consider themselves progressive—
would consider morally reprehensible today, and to further draw upon the
“abortion as a plot to destroy the Black race” narrative.
47
Although the comparison has been made since Roe,
48
it was most recently
re-popularized by Black Republican presidential candidate (and current
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development) Ben Carson.
49
Carson explicitly compared women who have abortions to slave owners, stating,
During slavery, a lot of the slave owners thought that they had the right
to do whatever they wanted to that slave . . . . And, you know, what if
the abolitionists had said, you know, “I don’t believe in slavery. I think
it’s wrong. But you guys do whatever you want to do”? Where would
we be?
50
Putting aside the obvious logical and factual weakness of the analogy, it
completely erases the reproductive experiences of enslaved women. As RJ
activist Imani Gandy observes, “if abortion is like slavery . . . then what of the
women who suffered under slavery? What of the women who performed self-
abortions in order to resist slavery? They cease to exist.”
51
Carson’s analogy results in the complete erasure of women who were
experiencing both enslavement and pregnancy. In thinking of the things that
slave owners “thought that they had the right to do,” Carson does not consider
that among those “rights” were forced breeding, rape, and removal of children
from their mothers. If the enslaved woman is centered in his analysis, not only
does the “slavery equals abortion” analysis fail, but reproductive oppression
begins to look far more like slavery than does abortion. Given that reproductive
oppression was essential to maintaining the system of slavery, this analogy is a
far easier one to draw, but only if Black women are considered.
indicates a failure to adequately appreciate the racial implications of such an analogy. Debora Threedy,
Slavery Rhetoric and the Abortion Debate, 1 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 3, 15 (1994).
47. Chloe Angyal, A New Federal Court Judge Compared Abortion to Slavery. He’s not Alone,
HUFFINGTONPOST (July 26, 2017, 3:47 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/judge-abortion-slavery_n_
5978ce3fe4b0c95f3760fc00 [https://perma.cc/9CYN-W7K9].
48. The most comprehensive academic treatment of this analogy is JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER,
SLAVERY, ABORTION, AND THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONALMEANING (2013).
49. Emily Crockett, Why Republicans like Ben Carson Love Comparing Abortion to Slavery, VOX
(Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.vox.com/identities/2015/11/1/9654462/ben-carson-abortion-slavery [https://
perma.cc/8LLT-2EGW].
50. Id.
51. Imani Gandy, Abortion Is not like Slavery, So Stop Comparing the Two, REWIRE (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://rewire.news/article/2013/11/12/abortion-is-not-like-slavery-so-stop-comparing-the-two/
[https://perma.cc/2FKZ-F96A].
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D. Racial Targeting at Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) and Abortion
Facilities
The first Crisis Pregnancy Center (CPC) was established in 1967 in Hawaii,
with the express purpose of dissuading women from having abortions through
false information.
52
Founder Robert Pearson said that a woman who wanted to
terminate her pregnancy “has no right to information that will help her kill her
baby.”
53
CPCs are organizations that advertise pregnancy testing and options,
leading women to think that they provide abortion services.
54
Once in the door,
staff use a variety of methods to convince women to continue their pregnancies.
Methods include generous offers of financial support to help raise the child
(which never materialize); convincing women that abortion causes breast cancer
and infertility (which is untrue); exaggerating the likelihood of complications,
including death; and using ultrasound pictures to evoke emotional responses.
55
Most insidiously, some CPCs tell women that they can get an abortion at any
time during their pregnancies, leading them to believe that there is no urgency in
their decision.
56
Other CPCs tell women that they are earlier in their pregnancy
so that women believe they have more time to decide to have an abortion than
they actually do, or that they are likely to miscarry so that there is no need for an
52. Crisis Pregnancy Centers: An Affront to Choice, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N (2006), http://pro
choice.org/wp-content/uploads/cpc_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYX3-29F7].
53. Id.
54. Several states and local jurisdictions have attempted to require CPCs to make clear that they do
not provide abortion services, or else to direct women to resources for comprehensive care. Most of these
efforts have been significantly scaled back, with the Supreme Court recently finding that such a
requirement violates the right to free speech. National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). In New York, CPCs are now only being required to disclose: “This facility does
not have a licensed medical provider on site to provide or supervise all services.” Lauren Evans, New Law
Hasn’t Stopped Anti-Abortion “Pregnancy Centers” From Misleading Women, VILLAGE VOICE (Sept.
13, 2017), https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/09/13/562988/ [https://perma.cc/7WJE-VKNF]; see also
David G. Savage, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Antiabortion Challenge to California Disclosure Law
for Pregnancy Centers, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-abortion-
court-california-20171113-story.html [https://perma.cc/YV9L-LWHB]; Pam Belluck, Pregnancy
Centers Gain Influence in Anti-Abortion Arena, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/05/health/pregnancy-centers-gain-influence-in-anti-abortion-fight.html [https://perma.cc/8XJM
-PAHH].
55. See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS LIE: THE INSIDIOUS
THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 8, 10 (2015), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/04/cpc-report-2015.pdf (breast cancer and death risks); id. at 9 (mental health risks);
MELISSA KLEDER & S. MALIA RICHMOND-CRUM, NARAL PRO-CHOICE MD. FUND, THE TRUTH
REVEALED: MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER INVESTIGATION 3 (Jan. 14, 2008) [hereinafter
TRUTH REVEALED], http://www.prochoicemd.org/assets/bin/pdfs/cpcreportfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YW9Q-4KGE] (breast cancer, infertility and mental health risks). CPC workers have also been filmed
using these tactics. See 12
TH
& DELAWARE (Loki Films 2010) (showing a CPC claiming that abortion
causes breast cancer and infertility); JACKSON (Girl Friday Films 2016) (documenting a CPC client being
told that she could “die from it [abortion],” that a CPC’s provision of clothes and diapers for the pregnant
client’s one-year-old were contingent upon her attendance of abstinence classes, and a CPC worker
performing an ultrasound offering to write “hi mommy” on the picture for a woman who was considering
terminating her pregnancy).
56. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, supra note 55, at 1255.
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abortion.
57
These tactics may result in a woman having a later, more expensive
and more dangerous procedure, or carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term.
58
While Planned Parenthood facilities are not primarily found in Black
neighborhoods, the same cannot be said for CPCs. Citing the high rates of
abortion in communities of color, CPCs have explicitly targeted what they call
“underserved” communities.
59
Tactics include buying airtime in media outlets
serving the Black community and advertising on public transportation routes in
Black neighborhoods.
60
While data on the race of staff members of CPCs is not available, CPCs are
largely funded by conservative, evangelical Christian organizations, and most
have white, male leadership.
61
Another significant portion of their funding comes
from governments: the federal government, which contracts with CPCs to
provide “abstinence only” education; and states, which support CPCs with tax
breaks, direct financial support, and fees collected from “Choose Life” license
plates.
62
CPCs view women of color as passive victims of abortion, rather than
individuals exercising their own volition, justifying the need for these “urban
initiatives.”
63
This reproductive paternalism, and presumption that Black women
are not competent decisionmakers regarding their own reproduction, reflects the
most abhorrent and stereotyped notions about Black women’s humanity and
competency. This harks back to enslavement, which “marked Black women . . .
as objects whose decisions about reproduction should be subject to social
regulation rather than to their own will.”
64
This racial targeting also occurs at facilities providing abortion care. A Black
obstetrician/gynecologist regularly receives racial taunts from protesters as he
enters a facility where he practices, being called “a filthy negro abortionist” by
a white man.
65
Another Black provider hears, “You’re killing the black race!”
57. 12
TH
AND DELAWARE, supra note 55 (a woman at a CPC was told she was seven weeks pregnant
instead of ten). NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, supra note 55, at 12 (miscarriage claim); TRUTH
REVEALED, supra note 54, at 4 (telling a woman she could get an abortion at any point in her pregnancy).
See also Jenny Kutner, “I Feel Like I Was Tricked”: New Documentary Uncovers How Crisis Pregnancy
Centers Lie to Women, SALON (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/09/18/i_feel_like_i_was
_tricked_new_documentary_uncovers_how_crisis_pregnancy_centers_lie_to_women/ [https://perma.cc/
34KP-9U72] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (purposely misdating gestation).
58. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, supra note 55, at 7.
59. FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PASSION TO SERVE: HOW PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS
EMPOWERWOMEN, HELP FAMILIES, AND STRENGTHEN COMMUNITIES 26 (2011).
60. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, supra note 55, at 16.
61. National Abortion Federation, supra note 52, at 14. These include the Pearson Foundation and
Liberty Foundation. The Christian Action Council’s Care Net is headed by a Black man.
62. Id. at 11-14.
63. The Family Research Council’s report also claims (incorrectly) that abortion facilities are
concentrated in minority areas. See supra note 59, at 26.
64. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 23.
65. DAVID S. COHEN &KRYSTEN CONNON, LIVING IN THE CROSSHAIRS: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF
ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM 96 (2015).
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yelled by the same woman every Friday.
66
A white protestor outside of an
Alabama clinic says to a reporter, “The KKK would be happy with what’s
happening here today . . . [a]ll these black babies being murdered. Black babies’
lives matter.”
67
I was working with the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy in the
Summer of 1993, challenging Mississippi’s parental consent law. As I walked
into the clinic to take depositions, a white protester holding a Black infant in the
90-degree August heat yelled out to me, “Malcolm X wouldn’t want you to kill
your baby.” My white female supervisor was also of childbearing age, but I was
the sole target of the protestors’ attention. Under the guise of “saving Black
babies,” the protestors saw nothing wrong with making assumptions based on
my status as a Black woman. Protestors have continued to use the tactic of racial
shaming at this particular clinic. In the opening scene of the documentary
Jackson, a protestor makes reference to Martin Luther King’s most famous
speech, calling out to a woman walking into the clinic, “Mommy, please don’t
kill me. I have a dream, Mommy.”
68
E. So-called “Race Bans”
Building on the argument that the higher abortion rate among Black women
is some sort of evidence of a genocidal conspiracy, legislation has been proposed
to ban abortion based on race.
69
In order to directly target Black women’s
reproductive decision-making, proponents claim that the disproportionate rate of
abortions among Black women is driven by some animus that these women have
against their fetuses based on its race.
Ironically, the only reported cases of abortion motivated by the race of the
fetus involve white women. Typically, these women are pressured by parents to
terminate the pregnancy because the man who impregnated their daughter was
66. Id. at 97.
67. Angyal, supra note 47.
68. JACKSON, supra note 55.
69. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2016, H.R. 4924, 114th Cong. (2016). Arizona is
the only state with a law banning race- and sex-selective abortions. SeeAriz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3603.02.
Rep. Trent Franks (R. Az.), who recently resigned from the House amid allegations that he offered staffers
money to conceive a child with him, was the champion of these bans. Ben Johnson, Banning Abortion
Based on Sex and Race is “The Civil-Rights Struggle That Will Define Our Generation”: Congressman,
LIFESITE NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/banning-race-and-sex-selective-
abortion-is-thecivil-rightsstruggle-that-wil [https://perma.cc/8HRJ-3HS8]; Katie Rogers, Trent Franks,
Accused of Offering $5 Million to Aide for Surrogacy, Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/us/politics/trent-franks-sexual-surrogacy-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/A6AY-2ZK7]. PRENDA and the Arizona law are the only efforts to directly restrict
abortion based on race, but every abortion restriction has a disproportionate impact on women of color.
Common restrictions include waiting periods, bans on Medicaid funding, and parental involvement
requirements. This is not only because of their higher abortion rates, but also due to their lower incomes,
lower rates of insurance, reduced access to transportation, and employment that typically does not allow
time off. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at xiv.
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Black.
70
These abortions procured by white women obviously were not included
in the statistics about abortion among Black women cited in the findings of
legislation to prevent “race-based” abortions.
This legislation is often coupled with efforts to ban sex-selective abortion.
71
The “Prenatal Non-Discrimination Act” cites extensive evidence suggesting that
some individuals choose to terminate their pregnancy based on the sex of the
fetus, but it can only cite the racial disparity in abortion rates as “evidence” of
individuals choosing to abort based on the fetus’s race.
72
This is because there is
no evidence of Black women basing their abortion decision on the race of the
fetus they are carrying. Fortunately, courts see these laws for what they are:
attempts to prevent women from terminating their pregnancies. Most recently,
Indiana’s race- and sex-selection ban has been enjoined by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
73
The Supreme Court recently denied Indiana’s request for review of the
provisions related to race and sex-selective abortions on the ground that the issue
had not been presented in any other Court of Appeals.
74
Justice Clarence Thomas
wrote a dissent that attempted to draw a connection between the disproportionate
abortion rate among Black women and eugenic motives, while devoting nary a
word to Black women’s capacity for decision-making.
75
Adam Cohen, the author
cited liberally by Justice Thomas in making his arguments about the eugenic
consequences of abortion and contraception explicitly rejected Thomas’
mischaracterization of his work:
Between eugenic sterilization and abortion lie two crucial differences:
who is making the decision, and why they are making it. In eugenic
sterilization, the state decides who may not reproduce, and acts with the
70. See, e.g., Ernie Suggs, Senate Abortion Bill Continues to Stir Emotions, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/senate-abortion-bill-
continues-stir-emotions/miKKzUrS4Z3UvnFm8pSDtM/ [https://perma.cc/S3WC-Q6RQ]; Associated
Press, Police: Parents Kidnap Plot Motivated by Race, NBC NEWS, (Sept. 19, 2006),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14893787/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/police-parents-kidnap-plot-
motivated-race/#.WjLltFWnGpo [https://perma.cc/UK7M-AVNX].
71. Skewed sex ratios indicating son preference are documented among some sub-populations in the
United States. Bans on sex-selective abortion, however, do not address the underlying causes of son
preference and subject certain women to racial profiling when they are seeking abortion care. NAT’L
WOMEN’S L. CTR., RACE AND SEX SELECTION ABORTION BANS ARE HARMFUL TOWOMEN 11 n.6 (Aug.
2015), https://www.nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/prendafactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JCM-
7FGW] (noting that the ratio could be the result of assisted reproductive technology and not abortion).
72. Compare H.R. 4924, § 2(a)(1) with H.R. 4924, § 2(a)(2).
73. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Indiana State Dept. of Health, 888 F.3d 300
(7th Cir. 2018).
74. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, No. 18-483, slip op. at 3 (May 28, 2019).
75. Id. slip op. at 17. Thomas also perpetuates the myth that Sanger targeted the Black community,
despite evidence that she rejected race-based eugenics. See Gandy, supra note 30.
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goal of “improving” the population. In abortion, a woman decides not
to reproduce, for personal reasons related to a specific pregnancy.
76
This legislation is based on the unproven hypothesis that Black women are
terminating their pregnancies because they do not want to have Black children.
Based on this rationale, proponents argue that race bans are consistent with U.S.
law that prohibits race discrimination.
77
Yet in practice this would require
doctors to give special scrutiny to Black women presenting for abortion care,
which would further entrench race discrimination rather than prevent it.
Finally, the fact that this theory is completely fabricated by those pushing an
anti-abortion agenda does not mean that such a reason to terminate a pregnancy
would be invalid. RJ principles assert that women’s decisions regarding
pregnancy termination should be left to them alone. It is plausible that a Black
woman, seeing the degree of State and private violence inflicted upon Black
children and adults, would determine that she would rather not carry a pregnancy
to term and raise a child in such a climate.
78
II. CLAIMING A PROPERTY INTEREST INBLACKWOMEN’S BODIES: PAST AND
PRESENT
The racialized rhetoric described in Part I contributes to a particular narrative
about Black women’s autonomy, agency, and value. It characterizes Black
women as objects, and not actors. This particular form of objectifying Black
women was also an integral part of how they were controlled during
enslavement. As property, they were merely to be acted upon, with their owners
holding all rights over them.
Property theory posits that there are two primary property rights: use and
exclusion. For the purposes of this analysis, the right of use of one’s reproductive
capacity and sexuality includes all of the benefits that one could draw from her
own sexual decision-making and reproductive labors. With regard to the right of
exclusion, this means one’s right to determine who has sexual access to her body,
whether that body will be used for reproduction, and whether that body will be
subjected to restrictions based on one’s reproductive status (for example, the
state of being pregnant). The RJ framework considers these rights as
encompassing the right to decide whether or not to have children, the right to
76. Adam Cohen, Clarence Thomas Knows Nothing of my Work, THE ATLANTIC (May 29, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/clarence-thomas-used-my-book-argue-against-abort
ion/590455/ [https://perma.cc/3HW7-WEW3].
77. H.R. 4924, § 2(a)(2)(B).
78. This echoes the decisions of enslaved Black women to resist the institution of slavery by
terminating their pregnancies or even killing their children. See ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 49; see also
NIKKI M. TAYLOR, DRIVEN TOWARD MADNESS: THE FUGITIVE SLAVE MARGARET GARNER AND
TRAGEDY ON THE OHIO (2016).
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raise children with adequate supports, and the right to express one’s sexuality
free from violence or coercion.
79
A. Enslaved Women as Reproductive Property
80
Inasmuch as enslaved Africans were the property of their owners, the sexual
and reproductive capacities of women were also owned. Women’s sexuality and
reproduction merely reinforced their status as property. Saidiya Hartman notes
that Black women’s sexuality and reproduction were an integral part of their
value as labor.
81
This Section identifies but a few of the ways that owners
possessed the property rights of use and exclusion in Black women’s sexuality
and reproduction.
1. The Right to Use: Being Denied the Benefit of One’s Reproductive
Labor
82
Enslaved parents lived with the reality that their children might be taken
from them at any time, with the threat of family separation often used as the
ultimate punishment.
83
The joy that parents receive in seeing their children grow
and thrive was often denied to enslaved women. The realities of raising children
while in bondage cannot be romanticized,
84
yet it is well-documented that strong
family ties grew despite the precariousness and instability posed by
enslavement.
85
Once sold to another owner, many parents lacked even the most basic
knowledge regarding their children’s whereabouts, condition, or even of whether
they were dead or alive.
86
The harm done by separating mothers and children
was lifelong. As women grew to old age, they were denied the comfort and care
79. ROSS& SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 9.
80. A comprehensive review of all the ways Black women’s reproductive capacities were rendered
property in enslavement is beyond the scope of this piece.
81. Saidiya Hartman, The Belly of the World: A Note on Black Women’s Labors, 18 SOULS 166, 166
(2016).
82. The right to use was also often denied in the selection of partners, the right to marry (or to receive
permission from the owner), and the right to cohabitate with a partner of one’s choosing. SeeMargaret A.
Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 195 (1987); see
generally Dacia Green, Ain’t I…?: The Dehumanizing Effect of the Regulation of Slave Womanhood and
Family Life, 25 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 191 (2018).
83. Burnham, supra note 82, at 201-02. See also Green, supra note 82, at 211-12.
84. Given this reality, enslaved women practiced contraception, abortion, and infanticide to spare
their children the perils of slavery. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in
Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE& ETHNICANC. L.J. 11, 27-28 (2001).
85. Burnham, supra note 82, at 190.
86. DeNeen L. Brown, “My Mother was Sold From Me”: After Slavery, the Desperate Search for
Loved Ones in “Last Seen Ads,” WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
retropolis/wp/2017/09/07/my-mother-was-sold-from-me-after-slavery-the-desperate-search-for-loved-on
es-in-last-seen-ads/?utm_term=.2d425e24826e [https://perma.cc/HR7K-7Z5H?type=image] (describing
archive of ads placed after the Civil War by both mothers and children).
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of their own children, but broader notions of family and fictive kin ensured that
the elderly received family-like care and attention.
87
Even those with the good
fortune to live in close proximity to their children still had no control over their
upbringing.
88
For children who were not sold, owners determined what work the
children would do, their food rations, and their discipline for any perceived
infraction.
89
Andrea Freeman identifies breastfeeding as another benefit of reproduction
denied to enslaved Black women.
90
Sometimes masters forced enslaved women
to stop breastfeeding their own children because of nursing’s contraceptive
properties, or because it disrupted their ability to work.
91
The practice of using
an enslaved woman as a wet nurse for white children on some plantations meant
that both mothers and their children were denied the benefits of breastfeeding.
92
In being deprived of an ongoing relationship with the children they bore, the
ability to nurture their own children, and the right to direct and influence the
upbringing of the children even when nearby, Black women were denied the
benefits of their own reproductive labor.
2. The Right to Exclude: Rape and Forced Breeding
93
Rape was a common feature of enslavement, and enslaved women had no
right to exclude others from access to their bodies. The crime of rape was not
recognized between an owner and an enslaved woman.
94
In State of Missouri v.
Celia, a case in which an enslaved woman killed her owner for raping her, the
court found that the rape statute did not apply because the definition of woman
87. DEBORAHGRAYWHITE, AR’N’T IAWOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 117
(1999).
88. Burnham, supra note 82, at 204.
89. Id.
90. See generally Andrea Freeman, Unmothering Black Women: Formula Feeding as an Incident of
Slavery, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1545 (Aug. 2018).
91. Id. at 1556-57.
92. Id. at 1558.
93. There are many other examples of practices that limited enslaved women’s right to exclude others
from their bodies. New Orleans and several other cities had a thriving market for “fancy girls,” enslaved
women of mixed race sold solely for the purpose of being held in sexual bondage as the concubine of one
man or to be prostituted to many. WHITE, supra note 87, at 37. The “father of American gynecology,” J.
Marion Sims, subjected enslaved women to medical experiments without the benefit of anesthesia.
HARRIETWASHINGTON, MEDICALAPARTHEID: THEDARKHISTORY OFMEDICALEXPERIMENTATION ON
BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 65-66 (2008). A statue of Sims, like the
statues of others who have committed atrocities concurrently with their good works, has been the subject
of recent controversy. DeNeen L. Brown, A Surgeon Experimented on Slave Women Without Anesthesia:
Now his Statues are Under Attack, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/retropolis/wp/2017/08/29/a-surgeon-experimented-on-slave-women-without-anesthesia-now-his-
statues-are-under-attack/?utm_term=.6593c3db06d8 [https://perma.cc/MB5T-MMLZ]. These women
had no right to refuse to be experimented on, and were thus denied the right to exclude others from the
use of their bodies. Id.
94. Burnham, supra note 82, at 199.
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did not include enslaved women.
95
As property, an owner had the right to use a
woman in any way he pleased. This impunity also extended to the owner’s family
members, overseers and even visitors to the household.
96
One particularly dehumanizing practice, compared to animal husbandry,
was “breeding”—the intentional pairing of female and male slaves for qualities
that would benefit the owner.
97
Certain enslaved women were forced to mate
with certain enslaved men, even if they were committed or married to someone
else.
98
These practices can also be viewed as a violation of the right to use, as
enslaved women were denied the right to procreate with the man of their choice.
Related to both rape and breeding practices, enslaved women were required
to prove their worth by bearing as many children as possible.
99
Bearing children
brought rewards in the form of better food, clothing, and a lighter workload.
100
Some owners even promised freedom to women upon birthing a particular
number of children.
101
In consideration of the brutality of enslavement, a woman
who attempted to meet such goals to improve her conditions can hardly be said
to have been acting of her own volition.
B. Regulating Black Women as Property of the State
Current attempts at reproductive oppression reflect the State’s property
interest in Black women’s sexuality and reproduction. Rather than an owner
determining the rights of use and exclusion, legislation now accomplishes the
same end by either targeting or disproportionately affecting Black women.
1. The Right to Use: Family Caps
102
The “Family Cap” is shorthand for State policies that deny an increase in
cash benefit assistance to families who have an additional child while receiving
95. Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African American Women’s History and the Metalanguage of
Race, 17 J. WOMEN SOC’Y 251, 257-58 (1992); see also DeNeen L. Brown, Missouri v. Celia, a Slave:




96. Burnham, supra note 82, at 200.
97. Id.; Green, supra note 82, at 202.
98. Burnham, supra note 82, at 200 n.55. Burnham also documents the limitations imposed on
marriage for enslaved persons, including the requirement to first receive permission from the master. Id.
at 195-97.
99. This was especially important after the ban on further importation of enslaved Africans in the
mid-1800s. Bridgewater, supra note 84, at 14.
100. Id. at 17.
101. Burnham, supra note 82, at 198.
102. For an overview of coercive practices in health and public welfare systems, see SCHOEN, supra
note 17. State attempts to limit or discourage Black women’s use of their bodies for childbearing have
been extensively documented: for sterilization abuse, see NELSON, supra note 15, at 65-67; for coercion
in the use of long-acting reversible contraceptives, see Rachel Benson Gold, Guarding Against Coercion
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Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF).
103
Through financial coercion, the
State attempts to limit reproduction among low-income women, who are
disproportionately Black. Not only are wealthier women not subjected to this
attempt to restrict their childbearing, but those with greater means are given tax
credits for each additional child.
Family Caps emerged from the “welfare queen” myth widely popularized in
the 1970s by then-presidential candidate Ronald Reagan.
104
This backlash and
narrative about race and poverty began shortly after the civil rights movement
successfully gained equal access to public benefits programs for those Black
people who had migrated to the North.
105
When benefits were primarily being
accessed by white families in need, there was little public outcry from taxpayers
or discussion of the worthiness of the beneficiaries.
106
This narrative reflects
beliefs about who deserves to be a mother. Roberts notes that images of
motherhood as worthy and honorable do not include Black mothers. “The image
of the welfare mother quickly changed from the worthy white widow to the
immoral Black welfare queen.”
107
The logic animating Family Caps is that women have children in order to
receive more benefits, so denying them additional funds will cause them to
refrain from childbearing.
108
This presumes that women receiving benefits,
disproportionately women of color,
109
are motivated by something different than
other women in their childbearing decisions. Contrary to the myth underlying
the policy, women receiving cash assistance benefits have the same average
number of children as all women: two.
110
While Ensuring Access: A Delicate Balance, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 8, at 10-12 (2014). See also
Elizabeth A. Stewart et al., The Burden of Uterine Fibroids for African-American Women: Results of a
National Survey, 22 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 807 (Oct. 2013) (discussing the overuse of hysterectomies as
treatment for fibroids).
103. CTR. ON REPRODUCTIVE RTS. & JUST., BRINGING FAMILIES OUT OF ‘CAP’TIVITY: THE PATH
TOWARD ABOLISHING WELFARE FAMILY CAPS 2 (Aug. 2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/2016-Caps_FA2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE8Z-WB36]. Family Caps were an
option made available to the states in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, President Bill Clinton’s plan to reform welfare. Since 1995, seven states have repealed their
Family Caps, and seventeen still impose a family cap. Id.





107. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 207.
108. One researcher observed, “It would be a quantum leap in faith to believe that $42 influences an
act that is usually spontaneous and occurs nine months before birth.” Patricia Donovan, Does the Family
Cap Influence Birthrates? Two New Studies Say “No,” GUTTMACHER REPORT (Feb. 1, 1998),
https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/1998/02/does-family-cap-influence-birthrates-two-new-studies-say-no
[https://perma.cc/NFM4-WGES].
109. Blacks and Hispanics receive TANF benefits at disproportionately higher rates than whites. A
third of TANF recipients are non-Hispanic whites. GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43187,
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASH
ASSISTANCECASELOAD (2016).
110. CTR. ON REPRODUCTIVE RTS. & JUST., supra note 103, at 5.
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Studies have largely shown that the only effect of the Family Cap is to drive
families further into poverty.
111
Other studies have shown that in states that had
both Family Caps and Medicaid coverage for abortion, the abortion rate
increased.
112
This is obviously not an outcome that self-identified social
conservatives would publicly claim as a victory, especially if their goal was to
“protect” children.
Khiara Bridges notes that that federal government continues to be the
primary propagator of the idea that all social ills are caused by childbearing
among poor—often falsely equated with Black—women.
113
Bridges notes that
by excluding the work of mothering for a group of women who are
disproportionately Black, welfare policy reinforces the historic belief that
“mother” is not a legitimate identity for Black women the way it is for white
women.
114
This is another way in which the State attempts to limit Black
women’s ability to use their bodies for reproduction and benefit from their
reproductive labor.
2. The Right to Exclude: The Detainment and Prosecution of Addicted
Women
115
Beginning with the rise of the crack epidemic in the 1980s, prosecutors
targeted addicted pregnant women for criminal punishment.
116
Charges typically
included child endangerment, drug delivery and homicide, even though the text
111. Id. at 6-7.
112. MICHAEL CAMASSO, FAMILY CAPS, ABORTION AND WOMEN OF COLOR 27 (2007); See also
Jennifer Preston, Births Fall and Abortions Rise Under New Jersey Family Cap, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/03/nyregion/births-fall-and-abortions-rise-under-new-jersey-
family-cap.html [https://perma.cc/5XCA-Z8Q3].
113. Khiara M. Bridges, Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the Reproductive Lives of Poor
Black and Racially Subjugated Women, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 609, 610 (2009).
114. Id. at 642-43.
115. Barriers to abortion and contraceptive access, such as restrictions on insurance coverage, also
violate the right to exclude because women are compelled to become pregnant and possibly carry
pregnancies to term against their wishes. Additionally, as during enslavement, Black women still suffer
disproportionate rates of sexual assault. Black women have the second-highest probability of surviving
rape in their lifetimes (21.2 percent). Native Americans have the highest at 27.5 percent. Matthew J.
Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner
Violence Victimization – National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, 63
MORBIDITY&MORALITYWEEKLYREP. 1, 6 tbl. 2 (Sept. 5, 2014). Because of the distrust of police, Black
women are less likely to report rape and have experienced re-victimization when they attempt to seek
justice against their attackers. See, e.g., Lauren Rosenblatt,Why It’s Harder for African American Women
to Report Campus Sexual Assaults, Even at Mostly Black Schools, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-black-women-sexual-assault-20170828-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/C5FX-4HC5].
116. Such interventions are not limited to addicts. Women have been subjected to State intervention
for failure to follow doctors’ orders, for suspicion of causing fetal harm, for suicide attempts, and for
failure to submit to a cesarean section. See generally April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and
Incarceration of Pregnant Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 147 (2007).
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of these laws gave no indication that they were intended to be enforced against
a pregnant woman for her actions during pregnancy.
117
These laws were justified as efforts needed to “protect” fetuses from their
“bad mothers.” Both the punitive nature of these laws, and the lack of other
efforts by states to actually advance maternal, fetal, and newborn health greatly
undermined states’ purported justifications. Furthermore, these laws operated
under several false assumptions: that women did drugs in order to harm their
fetuses; that women did drugs without regard to harm to their fetuses; that the
threat of punishment would prevent them from becoming addicted; that the threat
of punishment would inspire them to stop immediately; and there was treatment
available for those who wanted to stop using drugs.
Despite evidence that women of all races use illicit substances at equal rates,
Black women are more than half of those prosecuted for alleged fetal harm.
118
This is largely attributed to selective prosecution, as well as close scrutiny of
women using public facilities, who are disproportionately Black.
119
Healthcare
providers also limit their testing to drugs disproportionately used by Black
women, which are not actually those most dangerous to fetal development.
120
Studies have shown that poverty and inadequate nutrition were the
predominant factors in poor outcomes among women using crack cocaine during
pregnancy. Alcohol is actually more harmful to fetal development than cocaine.
With the rise of opioid use among white people, commentators have observed a
marked shift in the discourse of addiction; from one of individual moral failure
to a national public health crisis.
121
This again illustrates how Black women are
pathologized.
These forced interventions constitute the most drastic type of State intrusion
into women’s lives.
122
By virtue of their pregnant status, women are denied the
right of privacy, and the right not to give evidence against themselves as
117. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in
the United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 HEALTH
POL., POL’Y& L. 299, 323 (2013).
118. Id. at 310 tbl.1.
119. Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on
Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 381, 387-88 (2008).
120. The “crack baby” myth has been largely disproven. Laura M Betancourt et al., Adolescents With
and Without Gestational Cocaine Exposure: Longitudinal Analysis of Inhibitory Control, Memory and
Receptive Language, 33 NEUROTOXICOLY TERATOLOGY 36 (2011).
121. Jesse Mechanic, When a Drug Epidemic Hit White America, Addiction Became a Disease,
HUFFINGTONPOST (July 10, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/when-a-drug-epidemic-hit-wh
ite-america-addiction-became_us_5963a588e4b08f5c97d06b9a [https://perma.cc/N3D5-MA7H]; Vann
R. Newkirk II, What the ‘Crack Baby’ Panic Reveals About The Opioid Epidemic, THE ATLANTIC (July
16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/what-the-crack-baby-panic-reveals-
about-the-opioid-epidemic/533763/ [https://perma.cc/PP59-9KLA].
122. One private intervention started by a white woman pays substance addicted women $200 to get
sterilized or use LARCs, contraception over which they have no control. Erika Derkas, The Organization
Formerly Known as Crack: Project Prevention and the Privatized Assault on Reproductive Wellbeing, 19
RACE, GENDER & CLASS 179, 180 (2012). See also PROJECT PREVENTION, http://www.projectpre
vention.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZB2J-N464].
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protected by the U.S. Constitution.
123
Under the guise of fetal protection, states
have arrested and detained women, wholly depriving them of their liberty. Some
judges have offered reduced sentences to addicts for using invasive, long-acting
forms of contraception.
124
State legislatures have also proposed that addicted
women be required to use invasive, long-acting forms of contraception, or be
sterilized.
125
Other women have been subjected to parole only on the condition
of submitting to treatment, which, like other punitive interventions, is ineffective
according to addiction experts.
126
If the only way addicted pregnant women can
avoid prosecution is to terminate their pregnancy, this is also a violation of their
fundamental rights, and could be deemed a violation of their right to use as
well.
127
III. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: REJECTING THE STATE’S ATTEMPT TO SECURE A
PROPERTY INTEREST INBLACKWOMEN’S BODIES
As the property of their owners, enslaved Black women could neither use
their own bodies for their own benefit, nor exclude others from having access to
their bodies. In the 150 years since emancipation, Black women have continued
to be oppressed by governmental control of their reproduction, frustrating their
own desires to procreate, parent, or abstain from pregnancy and childbearing.
Current methods of reproductive oppression, in which the State holds property
rights over Black women’s bodies through restrictive laws and policies, replicate
what was once owners’ private property interest in their female slaves.
Black women in the United States have always been burdened with
advancing others’ priorities with regard to their reproductive decision-making.
From arriving on the shores of Virginia in 1619
128
to emancipation, their duty
was to increase the wealth of their masters, while at the same time being denied
the entitlements and pleasures of motherhood. In the twentieth century, the duty
imposed by their own community was to build Black warriors and voters, with
123. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1991).
124. Despite some improvement in the narrative around addiction stemming from the opioid crisis,
judges are still coercing pregnant addicts to use contraception. See Rise in Drug-Addicted Babies Prompts
Judge's Controversial Solution, CBS NEWS (July 21, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/opioid-
crisis-tennessee-judge-neonatal-abstinence-syndrome-birth-control-inmate/ (Tennessee judge offering
reduced sentence to both male and female inmates suffering addiction).
125. Roberts, supra note 123, at n.217 (describing Ohio bill).
126. Ehrlich, supra note 119, at 392.
127. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 117, at 308.
128. Although this date is widely acknowledged as the arrival of African peoples in the American
colonies, one scholar cautions that Africans had a history in the Americas predating 1619, and that the
sole focus on 1619 renders Africans mere subjects in America’s history when they were much more. See
Michael Guasco, The Misguided Focus on 1619 as the Beginning of Slavery in the U.S. Damages Our
Understanding of American History, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.smithsonian
mag.com/history/misguided-focus-1619-beginning-slavery-us-damages-our-understanding-american-his
tory-180964873/ [https://perma.cc/8EPV-M6KC].
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little consideration given to the mental and physical strains that motherhood
imposed on women living with racism, sexism, and poverty. In the twenty-first
century, Black women are at the center of the culture wars. Their childbearing is
perceived as the root of all social ills, yet they are the subject of “rescues” by
those who claim to be pro-life. At the same time, they are denied any meaningful
social support for healthy parenting and are criminalized for their reproductive
decisions. They are demonized as threats to the Black community for deciding
to terminate pregnancies—often in consideration of what is best for the children
they are already raising. And police or private vigilantes can kill Black male
children who are deemed threats to the white community and suffer no
consequences.
129
RJ seeks to move Black women from the position of object to the position
of subject, from acted upon to actor. Reproductive Justice organizations led by
Black women and based in the communities they serve have been responding to
these current attempts to render Black women objects without agency, and
centered the time- and place-specific needs of Black women. In addition to
SisterSong’s Trust Black Women, In Our Own Voice: National Black Women’s
Reproductive Justice Agenda works with eight local partner organizations to
advance policies in Washington, D.C. and around the nation that take into
consideration the historical mistreatment of Black women and exploitation of
our reproductive capacities. These organizations have led local and national
fights to decriminalize sex work, expand birthing options for women on
Medicaid, and destigmatize abortion.
Reproductive oppression has always been and continues to be heavily
racialized. Therefore, as Bridges argues, the regulation of Black women’s
sexuality and reproduction must be treated as a matter of racial justice.
130
The
discourse about Black women’s reproductive and sexual capacities is still
influenced by the notion developed during enslavement that Black women’s
reproductive labors are for the benefit of others; that they are the property of
others, be it individual masters or the State acting as master. The Reproductive
Justice movement serves to resuscitate the Black body that has been killed by the
reproductive oppression so eloquently described by Professor Dorothy Roberts
over twenty years ago. Current attempts to marginalize and objectify Black
women vis-à-vis their reproductive capacities reflect this centuries-long history
of oppression, and must be explicitly rejected on this basis.
129. Alana Horowitz Satlin, Hillary Clinton Meets With Mothers of Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis,
Michael Brown and Tamir Rice, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/hillary-clinton-gun-violence-black-lives-matter_n_563881d3e4b00a4d2e0bb83f [https://perma.cc/
2HK3-9JVS]. Their children’s respective ages were 17, 17, 18 and 12. Only Jordan Davis’s killer was
convicted. Id.
130. Bridges, supra note 113, at 611.
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On the surface, it might appear that § 1409 treats men and women differently
because it is easy to determine a child’s mother, as opposed to a child’s father,
at birth. In fact, a majority of the Supreme Court has deployed these “natural”
differences between men and women to shield § 1409 from three separate
gender-based equal protection challenges. Justice Ginsburg, however, has keenly
observed, “[H]istory reveals what lurks behind § 1409.” What lurks behind
§ 1409 is a long legacy of white heteropatriarchy deploying the legal category of
citizenship to perfect sovereignty
1
in itself and vulnerability in “foreign” women
for the very purpose of sexual domination.
The historical model for this racialized regime of sexual domination is the
classic case of Dred Scott,
2
where the denial of citizenship to anyone of African
descent further facilitated a white heteropatriarchal property right in
philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. In Dred Scott, the exclusion of
anyone of African descent from personhood, through the legal mechanism of
citizenship, perfected power in white men and vulnerability in racialized others.
By excluding anyone of African descent from citizenship, enslaved owners
continued to enjoy an unbridled property right in the use and enjoyment of the
enslaved. The denial of citizenship to the enslaved facilitated their use as
property. Following suit, § 1409 makes citizenship the property of men, through
which they can exclude their nonmarital foreign-born children frommembership
in the American polity. Section 1409 vests in these fathers not just a right to
exclude their children, but to discard them, leaving them profoundly vulnerable
to the sting of “illegitimacy,” ethnic and racial animus, and financial precarity—
a form of destruction, while simultaneously empowering these fathers to sexually
possess, control, use, and enjoy foreign women. Section 1409 understands all too
well: in order to sexually exploit the mother, one must control the status of the
child.
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militarism and sexual tourism have much in common: Each has





has argued, this footprint is an inestimable number of children
that American men have fathered and abandoned around the world.
6
On the
streets of Olongapo, Philippines alone, the home of a former American naval
base, countless abandoned Amerasian children are reduced to prostitution and
crime.
7
Far from innocence, accident, or some act of nature, these children are
the products of centuries of American imperialism, lawmakers, judges,
administrators, military men, and sexual tourists, who, taken together, reflect a
societal policy that creates supremacy by making property of others.
3. I use the terms “American” and “America” deliberately, not to insult the other countries with
whom America shares a hemisphere, but to shed light on the irony of “America” as a bastion of freedom
and equality contrasted with the underlying thesis of historical denigration in this Article.
4. Sex trafficking is a global problem. As of September 2017, 24.9 million people were trafficked
each year; of these, over seventy percent were women and girls. Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking by the
Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Trafficking
bytheNumbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERX7-JLSJ]. Estimates vary, but trafficking for the purpose of
sexual exploitation could drive as much as seventy-nine percent of all human trafficking. Policy Analysis
& Research Branch,Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, U.N. OFF.ONDRUGS&CRIME (Feb. 2009),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BND-DHXL]. The
trafficking of women and children is frequently reported as the world’s fastest-growing crime. See, e.g.,
Morgan Brinlee, 13 Sex Trafficking Statistics That Put The Worldwide Problem Into Perspective, BUSTLE
(July 30, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/13-sex-trafficking-statistics-that-put-the-worldwide-problem-
into-perspective-9930150 [https://perma.cc/8ADW-KJ3P]. But see Fact Sheet, supra (estimating that sex
trafficking comprises nineteen percent of all human trafficking).
5. This Article relies heavily on Kristin Collins’s trailblazing, comprehensive, and brilliant work on
citizenship transmission laws. This piece, however, is the first treatment of § 1409 that applies a Critical
Race Feminist lens and property rubric to § 1409. In doing so, this piece highlights the white
heteropatriarchal operations of § 1409, which, as I argue throughout this article, creates a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual, exploitation, and rape. This Article centralizes the
role of power, as it is raced, classed, and gendered in order to expose the ways in which the sexual
exploitation of foreign women becomes the routinized practice of a highly industrial nation, namely the
United States, through § 1409.
6. It is impossible to know how many children American men have abandoned abroad. See
Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family,
Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2212 (2014). In an act of willful blindness, no government
bureaucracy maintains records of the nonmarital foreign-born children discarded by their American
fathers. Just the numbers of nonmarital foreign-born children in Asia from American servicemen alone
varies based on the source. See Amerasian Immigration Proposals: Hearing on S. 1698 Before the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 63 (1982)
(statement of Alfred Keane, Dir., Americans for International Aid) (estimating between 30,000 and 80,000
Amerasians in Southeast Asia); JOHN SHADE, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: THE AMERASIANS 15
(1981) (estimating the number of Amerasians born in Vietnam at between 20,000 and 100,000); Collins,
Illegitimate Borders, supra, at 2212 n.308 (“Estimates vary significantly, from 20,000 to more
than 200,000.”). John Shade suggests that by 1952 over 200,000 children had been born in Japan to
American servicemen. SHADE, supra, at 24. If that is true, the number of children born to servicemen in
Asia in the second half of the twentieth century could be closer to 300,000.
7. JosephM. Ahern,Out of Sight, Out ofMind: United States Immigration Law and Policy as Applied
to Filipino-Amerasians, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 105, 108 (1992).
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Collectively, these actors have decided that mass destruction is worth the price
of a frolic.
Vulnerability is the lynchpin of exploitation.
8
Historically, white
heteropatriarchy—that is, power as it is raced, classed, sexed, and gendered
9
—
has deployed the legal mechanism of citizenship to perfect sovereignty in itself
and vulnerability in others for the specific purpose of sexual exploitation. Title 8,
United States Code, § 1409 is a variation of this scheme. It is a biopower (or a
legal mechanism) that subjugates the bodies of women for both sexual pleasure
and racial purity, all the while exerting control over populations.
10
Section 1409 regulates the transmission of citizenship from American
citizens to their nonmarital, foreign-born children.
11
Section 1409, however,
draws an explicit gender distinction based on the sex of the parents: An unwed
citizen mother, who has a child abroad with a foreign man, transmits citizenship
automatically to her child. By contrast, an unwed citizen father who fathers a
child abroad with a foreign woman has the prerogative to transfer citizenship to
his child and, if he so desires, to complete a process to do so, which includes
agreeing in writing to provide financial support to his child until the child is
eighteen years old.
12
Many have argued that § 1409 treats citizen fathers and mothers differently
because it is relatively simple to determine a child’s mother, as opposed to the
father at birth. The Supreme Court has, in fact, used this “natural,” “biological,”
and “physiological” distinction between men and women to immunize § 1409
from three distinct gender-based equal protection challenges.
13
Despite
8. See generally Blanche Bong Cook, Stop Traffic: Using Expert Witnesses to Disrupt Intersectional
Vulnerability in Sex Trafficking Prosecutions, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 147 (2019) (arguing that the
creating and sustaining of vulnerability are necessary ingredients for sexual exploitation, at the individual
level of traffickers as well as the routinized operations of highly industrial nations, like the United States).
9. “White heteropatriarchy” refers to a racialized system of power and control based on white
supremacy, compulsory heterosexuality, patriarchy, and an imposed gender-binary system. Blanche Bong
Cook, Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury Process, and
Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. REV. 567, 573 (2017).
10. Biopower is literally having power over other bodies, “an explosion of numerous and diverse
techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.” 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THEHISTORYOF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 139-40 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990)
(1979) (“The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the
administration of bodies and the calculated management of life . . . in the field of political practices and
economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration.”).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 235-36, 238-39, §§ 301, 309, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1409.
12. Id. § 1409(a), 1409(c) (2018).
13. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (evenly split per curiam)
(affirming lower court rejection of gender equal protection challenge to the physical presence requirement
in § 1409); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (stating “[g]iven the 9–month interval between
conception and birth, it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it
always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s identity”); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,
436 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion) (upholding legitimation against gender based equal protection
challenge for several reasons, including it ensured reliable proof of paternity, stating, “There is no doubt
that ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship between the potential citizen and its citizen parent
is an important governmental objective”).
62 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
technologically advanced paternity testing, like DNA testing, § 1409 continues
to thrive on antiquated justifications about the “natural” and “biological”
differences between men and women—presumptions that scholars have
universally denounced as “sexist, narrow-minded, and patently conservative.”
14
So why does § 1409—with its explicit gender disparity between unwed
citizen fathers and mothers when sexually active abroad in foreign places—
continue to endure?
15
As Justice Ginsburg shrewdly noted, “[H]istory reveals
what lurks behind § 1409.”
16
What lurks behind § 1409 is a long legacy of white
heteropatriarchy deploying the legal mechanism of citizenship to perfect
sovereignty in itself and vulnerability in racialized and “foreign” others for the
purpose of sexual exploitation. The gender asymmetry in the transfer of
citizenship between men and women in § 1409 reflects norms that privilege and
protect male sexual prerogative outside of marriage while structurally supporting
the creation and maintenance of vulnerability for purposes of sexual exploitation
in foreign women.
17
More concretely, § 1409 creates a white heteropatriarchal
property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape (the WHP).
Under § 1409, Congress, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, conferred a
property right to citizen men in the form of citizenship. Under this particular
form of citizenship, citizen men have a property right to either grant or deny
citizenship to their nonmarital foreign-born children. The prerogative to grant or
deny citizenship functions like property. Section 1409 confers to citizen men a
package of entitlements, a bundle of rights, that includes the right to exclude,
transfer, destroy, possess, control, use, and enjoy.
18
Under § 1409, citizen men
have a right to exclude their nonmarital foreign-born children from the American
polity. By bestowing citizen fathers with the right to exclude their children from
citizenship, § 1409 entitles these fathers to abandon their children, leaving them
profoundly vulnerable to the sting of “illegitimacy,”
19
ethnic and racial hatred,
20
14. Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 405, 407 (2013) (quoting Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives
and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 222, 245-50 (2003)).
15. Other scholars have attempted to answer this question. See Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of
Sex and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1485,
1487 (2011); Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2137-38 (“At formative moments in the
development of American nationality law, gender- and marriage-based domestic relations laws were
enlisted by administrators, judges, and legislators to deny the citizenship claims of nonwhite children,
especially those who were excludable under the race-based immigration and naturalization laws.”).
16. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
17. See Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1495 (“By restricting derivative citizenship as
between Citizen fathers and their nonmarital foreign-born children, federal citizenship law perpetuates a
system of sexual ethics that privileges men’s sexual prerogative outside marriage.”).
18. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1731 (1993) [hereinafter
Harris,WAP] (describing the ways in which whiteness functions as property, in that whiteness conforms
to the general contours of property, including the rights of possession, use, disposition, transfer or
alienability, use and enjoyment, and most important, the absolute right to exclude).
19. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2167.
20. In criticizing the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision, upholding the constitutionality of antebellum
slavery, in 1857, then presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln stated, “There is a natural disgust in the
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and financial precarity
21
—a form of destruction and statelessness.
22
Section 1409
simultaneously invests in these fathers a biopower to continue the sexual
possession, control, use, and enjoyment of foreign women. (For more on this,
see Figure 1, p. 101.) Unprotected philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape,
liberated from parental responsibility,
23
are property interests that flow from
Congress’s grant of power to citizen men under § 1409. Section 1409 is where
American citizenship for men becomes indistinguishable from the right to
engage in hypermasculinity.
24
Although this may initially seem hyperbolic, once
minds of nearly all white people, to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black
races.” ABRAHAM LINCOLN, From Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois, in
SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 117, 119 (First Library of Am. Paperback Classic Edition 2009)
(speech given June 26, 1857). In the same speech, Lincoln again references “the amalgamation of the
races” as an “odium.” LINCOLN, supra.
21. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2167.
22. In 2014, upon recognizing that discrimination against either mothers or fathers in citizenship and
nationality laws is a major cause of statelessness, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) undertook a ten-year project to eliminate statelessness by 2024. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, A SPECIAL REPORT: ENDING STATELESSNESS WITHIN 10 YEARS (Nov. 2010),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/546217229.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CQR-H76S]; U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, THE CAMPAIGN TO END STATELESSNESS: APRIL 2016 UPDATE 1 (referring to speech of
UNHCR “highlight[ing] the issue of gender discrimination in the nationality laws of 27 countries—a
major cause of statelessness globally”), https://www.refworld.org/docid/571e23fb7.html
[https://perma.cc/NU4H-6DU7]; see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1697 (2017).
23. The determination of citizenship for foreign-born nonmarital children and parentage are two
separate legal matters. Both citizenship and parentage of foreign-born children can be determined
independently. Although citizenship and parentage are two separate legal matters, the absence of
citizenship is a deliberate obstacle and interference with the establishment of a parental relationship as a
practical matter. The absence of citizenship for the nonmarital foreign-born offspring makes it more
difficult pragmatically to take advantage of parental duties and support. Moreover, the absence of
citizenship inhibits the ability to establish a parental relationship.
24. See infra Figure 1, p. 101. Throughout this article, I use “hypermasculine sexual performance,”
“hypermasculine performance,” or “hypermasculinity” as a shorthand for “unprotected philandering,
sexual exploitation, and rape,” within the context of my analysis of § 1409. In addition, I use
“hypermasculinity” as primarily a performance of control over others. Drawing from Angela Harris,
hypermasculinity is the exaggerated performance of masculinity, enacted out of an anxiety about the status
of one’s manhood, and deployed in order to bring others under one’s domination and control through
sexual performance, humiliation, and sexualized physical violence. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence,
Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777 (2000). As Harris states, “men achieve masculinity at
the expense of women.” Harris, supra, at 785. Hypermasculinity makes of bodies and persons “sites” for
the performance of their masculinity, as if to prove it—to inscribe it—permanently upon the flesh or
psyche of another. Harris demonstrates how the state is complicit in hypermasculinity through the
American military and police work, both of which are primary sites and practices for gender violence. As
Harris points out, fundamentally grounded in an “us” v. “them” culture, the police is “what street gangs
aspire to be: sovereign protectors of turf, defenders of the innocent, and possessors of a monopoly on
violence and moral authority” who “share a commitment to masculine ideals, moving within a culture of
honor in which respect must be paid or violence will follow.” Harris, supra, at 794-795. As Harris states,
“[M]ilitary work . . . offers individuals a chance at all the privileges of hegemonic masculinity in exchange
for embracing and excelling at the job.” Harris, supra, at 798. Harris, in conversation with Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, explicates the hypermasculinity of the American military as follows:
[T]he military is a place where both men’s manipulability and their capacity for violence is at
a premium. As is true elsewhere in the culture, the privileges of masculinity require that one
establish intimate relationships with other men; yet the very closeness of these bonds provokes
the terror of being marked homosexual and of losing one’s masculine privileges. The
instability of masculine identity under these circumstances makes insecure men easily
manipulable (anxious and eager to prove their masculinity) and potentially violent (for not
only status but also personal identity itself is at stake). The military both exemplifies and
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placed in a historical context of white heteropatriarchy’s use of citizenship to
both ensure racial purity and to create vulnerability for purposes of sexual
exploitation, this net result is undeniable.
25
Section 1409 is part of a long-enduring legacy of using the legal category of
citizenship, coupled with matrilineal succession (the status of the child following
that of the mother), to control women’s bodies for racial purity and sexual
pleasure. This practice dates back to antebellum slavery, but continues forward
to the sexual practices of the American military and sexual tourism.
26
Moreover,
the ability to control the legal status of the nonmarital child is vital to sexually
dominating, controlling, and exploiting the mother. The blueprint for § 1409’s
racialized regime of sexual domination is the classic case of Dred Scott,
27
where
the denial of citizenship to anyone of African descent further facilitated a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. In
Dred Scott, the lethal trifecta of (1) excluding anyone of African descent from
personhood, through the legal mechanism of citizenship; (2) the continued
propertization of bodies; and (3) the rules of matrilineal succession outside
marriage—the status of the offspring of an enslaved woman and a white man
follows the status of the mother—perfected power in whitemen and vulnerability
in anyone of African descent. By excluding anyone of African descent from
citizenship, men, white men in particular, continued to enjoy a white
heteropatriarchal property right in the unbridled use and enjoyment of the
enslaved.
Following suit, § 1409 creates the WHP, a white heteropatriarchal property
right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. Section 1409 creates a
property right that is “white” in that citizenship has been, and continues to be,
highly racialized. Historically, white heteropatriarchy has used the legal category
shrewdly exploits the internal structure of masculinity: Military culture, like prison culture,
both seeks to make men doubt their own masculinity and encourages them to prove their
manhood through violence and casual sexuality.
Id. at 787-88 (citation omitted). Throughout this piece, I discuss § 1409’s impact not just on the American
military, but also sexual conduct abroad, particularly sexual tourism. Thus, the use of hypermasculinity
has particular resonance within the military, but it also has application within the entire scene of sexual
tourism, as domination, subjugation, and performance are fundamentally a part of sexual exploitation.
25. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1496 (“Limitations on citizenship claims asserted by
or on behalf of the nonmarital foreign-born children of American fathers highlight the troubling practice
of sexual exploitation of non-white foreign women by white American men. If this suggestion strikes
some readers as speculative, consider the statement of Edwin Borchard, one of the most well-respected
citizenship law experts of the early Twentieth Century, who in 1912 uncritically declared that it ‘seems
clear that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries of American fathers and native women
are not American citizens.’” (quoting EDWINM.BORCHARD, THEDIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OFCITIZENS
ABROAD 612 (1915))).
26. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2152.
27. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; but see Joshua J. Schroeder, The Body Snatchers: How the Writ
of Habeas Corpus was Taken from the People of the United States, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 60–61
(2016) (“But even today, when all of the Justices symbolically express disgust over Dred Scott the U.S.
Supreme Court still has not expressly overruled Dred Scott or explained why its approach fails
constitutional muster.”).
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of citizenship to make America white—synonymous with whiteness—to make
America the private property of whites.
28
Of necessity, white supremacy, and its
handmaiden racial purity, require control over women’s bodies. White
heteropatriarchy, however, not only exerts control over women’s bodies for
racial purity, but also for pleasure.
To be clear, like Dred Scott and the entire system of antebellum slavery,
§ 1409 is not averse to what AbrahamLincoln called the “disgust” and “odium”
29
of racial mixing, miscegenation, or the “amalgamation of the races.”
30
After all,
masters, overseers, and other males regularly raped the enslaved, male and
female.
31
Rather, the historical concern of § 1409 is to exclude foreigners from
the polity—the governing body; ownership and inheritance of property—and the
privileges and immunities of citizenship—“white space.”
32
Although any citizen
28. See Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1736 (“The right to exclude was the central principle, too, of
whiteness as identity . . . . [t]he possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others
from the privileges inhering in whiteness; whiteness became an exclusive club whose membership was
closely and grudgingly guarded.”); see also GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN
WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 1 (2006) (chronicling the United
States’ historical legislation and policies that expressly excluded non-White groups from entitlements);
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006) (documenting the
legal, historical, social, and political forces that create whiteness); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 55 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing racial formation refers to “the
sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”);
Dana Milbank, Opinion, Yes, Half of Trump Supporters Are Racist, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/clinton-wasnt-wrong-about-the-deplorables-among-trumps-
supporters/2016/09/12/93720264-7932-11e6-beac-57a4a412e93a_story.html [https://perma.cc/MPN4-
QPJH]; Steve Phillips, Opinion, TrumpWants to Make America White Again, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/opinion/trump-wants-to-make-america-white-again.html
[https://perma.cc/ZVL2-GD54] (arguing that the aggressive pace of immigrants of color deportations, the
elimination of the DACA program protecting immigrant children, and the constant dog-whistling cry to
build a wall are all efforts to make America White again).
29. See LINCOLN, supra note 20.
30. See id. at 118.
31. There are no databases and few records of rapes during antebellum slavery. In an early stroke of
legal realism, however, in 1857, then-presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln estimated that white males
had raped enslaved black women at least 405,751 times around the time of 1850 alone. Abraham Lincoln,
Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (June 26, 1857), U. VA., https://www.virginia.edu/woodson/courses/
aas-hius366a/lincoln.html [https://perma.cc/LN4H-9BYN] (“In 1850 there were in the United States,
405,751, mulattoes. Very few of these are the offspring of whites and free blacks; nearly all have sprung
from black slaves and white masters.”). As to the sexual assault of male slaves, Thomas Foster writes,
“The rape of slave men has also gone unacknowledged because of the current and historical tendency to
define rape along gendered lines . . . [which] has obscured our ability to recognize the climate of terror
and the physical and mental sexual abuse that enslaved black men also endured.” Thomas A. Foster, The
Sexual Abuse of Black Men Under American Slavery, 20 J. HIST.OF SEXUALITY 445, 448 (2011). Thomas
argues that there are accounts from both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the eighteenth-
century diary of a Jamaican planter Thomas Thistlewood, who tersely noted two incidents of homosexual
assault. In one entry he recorded: “Report of Mr. Watt Committing Sodomy with his Negroe waiting
Boy.” The language is specific enough to indicate this was a case of sodomy. Thistlewood’s diary also
noted “strange reports about the parson and John his man.” While the term “strange reports” is not precise,
Trevor Burnard interprets it as meaning homosexual activity. Id. at 453-54.
32. As Elise Boddie explains, “space itself has social, cultural, and—in particular—racial meaning”
and this “racial meaning helps to instigate territorial behavior in which one racial group seeks to exclude
another racial group from what it perceives to be its own space.” Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality,
58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 435 (2010).
66 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
man, including a man of color, can exclude or confer citizenship on his
nonmarital foreign-born child, the American polity, as an institution, is
synonymous with whiteness. The driving force in the bundle of rights that § 1409
confers upon citizen men is the right to exclude from the American polity, which
structurally assumes whiteness. Section 1409 grants citizen men the right to
transform their nonmarital foreign-born children into trespassers on (white)
American soil. Congress protects citizen men from their nonmarital foreign-born
children who, with the power of citizenship, might roam freely in America, and
perhaps, arrive at the family gathering in the suburbs and ask Dad for inheritance
as well as a serving of turkey.
Section 1409 is “male” in that it confers privileges upon men that it
withholds from women. These are the right to decide whether to transfer
citizenship to offspring, an ability to abandon offspring, and the right to engage
in unprotected sex outside of marriage free from the responsibilities of
parenthood. It would not be hyperbolic to say that § 1409 elevates a class of
johns, purchasers of sex, sexual exploiters, philanders, sexual tourists, and rapists
beyond the reach of parenthood and confers to them a statutorily sanctioned right
to discard their children.
33
It might also not be hyperbolic to say that Congress,
with the Supreme Court’s blessing, is facilitating an international, worldwide
brothel.
Section 1409 is heteropatriarchal in that it facilitates a privilege in men to
perform heterosexually on foreign women free from the sanction of parenthood
and the burden of “illegitimate” inheritors. It paradigmatically exemplifies what
Andrew Krinks calls “the heteropatriarchal familiast ideal,” as it is a law that
organizes life, human embodiment, social structures, and the political economy
according to male desire by subjugating female bodies with a dominant-elite
male gaze
34
for the purposes of phallocentric sexual pleasure and the
perpetuation of male-centered authority and lineage—and describes this all as
the natural order.
Section 1409 ensures female subjugation in two ways: First, § 1409 keeps
foreign women steadfastly prone. Specifically, § 1409 enables citizen men to go
abroad, spread their seed, and then dictate the terms of their relationship with
their children and the mothers of their children or whether to have any
relationship at all. Section 1409 assists citizenmen in leaving the foreignmothers
of their children solely responsible for those children. Section 1409 thwarts any
duty owed by American fathers to their nonmarital foreign-born children or the
33. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power:
Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22
(observing that § 1409 reinforces men’s “sexual irresponsibility” by giving “U.S. men, but not U.S.
women, a choice to disavow the children they conceive with foreign partners”).
34. Using Foucault’s “Panopticon,” the “gaze” creates a sense of “constant and permanent visibility,”
so that the subject self-monitors and thoroughly internalizes the unrelenting surveillance. MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195, 201-02 (1977).
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mothers of their children.
35
Second, § 1409 regulates the sexual activity of citizen
women engaged in nonmarital sex with foreign men through the sanction of
automatic parental responsibility—a kind of reproductive punishment.
36
On the surface, it may seem that § 1409 grants a privilege to citizen women
that it denies citizen men: an opportunity to transfer citizenship automatically.
By contrast, men must undergo a more arduous process.
37
That, however, is
§ 1409’s normative hegemonic trick: disguising treachery as something “good,”
and obfuscating the sexual domination of women as the biological difference
between men and women. Section 1409 camouflages the sexual domination of
women as a bonus for citizen mothers. This deflects attention away from the
hypermasculine sexual performance of men with foreign women and the
sanctioning of women with reproductive punishment for analogous sexual
conduct with foreign men. Structurally, conceptually, and symbolically, § 1409
entertains male sexual prerogative and female domination, subjugation, and
control.
In § 1409, Congress has turned a physiological difference between
establishing paternity and maternity into assumptions, and therefore material
realities, about sexual behavior. These assumptions are inextricably linked to
male power, prerogative, and privilege.Women are not permitted the same range
of sexual prerogative and agency as men under § 1409. Under § 1409, women,
particularly citizen women, should be home raising children, not out “whoring.”
If Congress wanted to avoid the gender asymmetry of § 1409, it could have
granted both citizen men and women prerogative citizenship for their children,
but that would not exact punishment on citizen women who philander with
35. This paper analyzes the application of American law on nonmarital foreign-born children, their
American fathers, and their foreign mothers. This paper does not address the foreign laws applicable to
nonmarital foreign-born children, their American fathers, and their foreign mothers. Section 1409
extinguishes any duty American fathers owe to their nonmarital foreign-born children and the mothers of
those children under American law. I do not argue that American law eliminates the duties foreign
countries impose on these fathers.
36. Saddling women with sole responsibility for children born outside of marriage as a form of
reproductive punishment has a long history around the globe. See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley,Unwed Fathers’
Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 60, 67 (1995) (explaining that giving custody of nonmarital children to mothers reflects not
“hostility to biological fathers” but the “patriarchal roots of family law,” which produce “devastating
social and economic consequences” for women); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000)
(arguing that divesting nonmarital fathers of parental rights harms mothers who are exclusively charged
with the care and support of children); Sabina Mariella, Note, Leveling Up Over Plenary Power:
Remedying an Impermissible Gender Classification in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 219, 227 (2016) (stating that unwed citizen mothers who conceive a child abroad with a noncitizen
bear legal responsibility for their children by the default assignment of their citizenship to their children
at birth; and that the distinction encourages men to conceive children outside of marriage, and compels
women to bear the costs and the stigma of non-marital sex alone when men are unwilling to do so).
Furthermore, saddling women with primary, if not sole responsibility, for nonmarital children is
Congress’s baseline assumption in § 1409, as well as the legal doctrine the Supreme Court ratifies and
normalizes to shield § 1409 from equal protection challenge, as discussed in detail in Part IV.
37. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1707.
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foreign men.
38
While § 1409 saddles women with the responsibilities of
parenthood, it invests in men a property right to roam freely and abandon their
children. As Justice Ginsburg shrewdly noted in the context of a § 1409 gender-
based equal protection challenge, “There are . . . men out there who are being
Johnny Appleseed.”
39
Section 1409 outsources the white heteropatriarchal work of the state to
individual men—individual citizen fathers—middle managers—as gatekeepers
at the American borders of what Angela Onwuachi-Willig calls “white space”
40
and perpetrators of racialized and gendered violence. It confers a right in men to
police white and nationalistic supremacy’s control over the purity of bloodlines
while simultaneously ensuring access to vulnerable foreign female bodies for
pleasure. Section 1409 outsources the supply of available bodies for sexual
domination beyond the border by liberating men from obligations under
American law for the children who result from their sexual conquest. It thereby
demonstrates the endless adaptability of white heteropatriarchy, particularly its
limitless ability to morph into modern forms of female subjugation abroad
despite the end of antebellum slavery domestically. Section 1409 allows citizen
men to engage in hypermasculinity, as it shuts the door to hapless wards of the
state discarded by their citizen fathers. Far from being an insignificant matter,
§ 1409 impacts the lives of an inestimable number of children abandoned by their
American fathers.
Taken together, § 1409 creates an intersectional hierarchy—a hierarchy that
is raced, classed, sexed, and gendered. Section 1409 grants citizen fathers the
right to exclude their foreign-born children from the polity while facilitating the
vulnerable conditions necessary to continue exploiting foreign women. Property,
like citizenship, allocates resources, but in the context of § 1409, property and
citizenship collude to dominate others and to ratify a hierarchical social order,
38. See Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 527 (1988) (“Gender performances . . . are governed by . . . punitive
and regulatory social conventions.”); Stewart Chang, Feminism in Yellowface, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
235, 262 (2015) (“Gender performance is intertwined with community expectations of how members of
each gender must behave, and when those expectations are not followed, society sanctions and
marginalizes deviant actors.”). Section 1409 envisions and concretizes a world in which women should
be at home raising children, not out “whoring,” or having children with foreign men, and when they do,
§1409 exacts a kind of punishment by saddling women with the responsibilities of parenthood. Compare,
however, § 1409’s vision of men engaged in unprotected sex with foreign women who at their leisure can
escape both the responsibilities of parenthood and responsible sex by being allowed to abandon their
children.
39. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1495 (“Justice Ginsburg noted wryly, ‘[t]here are ...
men out there who are being Johnny Appleseed,’” and “Justice O’Connor articulated a similar concern,
observing that our sex-based citizenship laws are ‘paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with
responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.’” (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument at 31, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071))); see Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of
Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2017) (discussing the
development of America as “white space” and the strategies, practices, and tactics for protecting it).
2019] “Johnny and the WHP” 69
all under the hegemonic cover of nature.
41
Treating § 1409 as solely a problem
of the biological differences between men and women allows it to surreptitiously
advance its white heteropatriarchal agenda. It is not just race. It is not just class.
It is not just gender. It is all of these things working in concert. Although § 1409
does not explicitly reference race, its explicit silence works an implicit racialized,
as well as gendered, result.
42
Section 1409 is a citizenship regulation that
facilitates a white heteropatriarchal desire to perform hypermasculinity, while
simultaneously functioning as a broader mechanism of population control.
Section 1409 is a classic case of sexually explicit discrimination, masking and
obfuscating
43
racially implicit sexual subjugation, to work a white
heteropatriarchal favorable outcome.
44
Enough cannot be said about § 1409. Section 1409 is perched at the
entangled, intertwined, and mutually reinforcing valences of race, class, gender,
sexuality, war, the American military, rape, sex, sexual tourism, sex trafficking,
hypermasculinity, reproductive domination, racial purity, citizenship, property,
belonging, and statelessness.
45
It is ripe for intersectional analysis. Section 1409
exemplifies how sexism keeps racism in place and racism keeps sexism in place,
with all the spoils awarded to white heteropatriarchy.
46
What is at stake in equal
protection challenges to § 1409 is not only its constitutionality, but also white
heteropatriarchy’s entrenched legacy of creating and sustaining hierarchy,
vulnerability, and regimes of violence and exploitation.
Part I of this Article lays out the text of § 1409. Drawing on the extensive
work of Kristin Collins, Part II historically contextualizes § 1409 to reveal its
mens rea. Historical contextuality de-obfuscates § 1409’s coercive nature and
underlying legal legacy.
47
Part II grounds § 1409’s genesis in the legacy of
antebellum slavery to expose how the absence of citizenship in enslaved females
in combination with the rule of matrilineal succession worked to facilitate the
WHP—a white heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual
exploitation, and rape, prototypically exemplified in Dred Scott.
41. See Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKEL.J. 1287, 1299 (2014).
42. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2134 (“[A]n important yet overlooked reason
for the development of gender- and marriage-based derivative citizenship law—jus sanguinis
citizenship—was officials’ felt need to enforce the racially nativist policies that were a core component
of American nationality law for over 150 years.”).
43. See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 10, at 86 (“[P]ower is tolerable only
on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own
mechanisms.”).
44. As Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality, § 1409 is quintessentially “the
imposition of one burden that interacts with preexisting vulnerabilities to create yet another dimension of
disempowerment.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV 1241, 1249 (1991).
45. See generally SUSAN ZEIGER, ENTANGLINGALLIANCES: FOREIGNWARBRIDES ANDAMERICAN
SOLDIERS IN THE TWENTIETHCENTURY 9 (Kindle ed., 2010).
46. Crenshaw,Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1249.
47. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1673.
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Drawing on the work of Cheryl Harris and modern theories of property, Part
III proposes a theoretical foundation for the WHP as a conceptual model. As a
conceptual model, theWHP problematizes § 1409’s function, brings it into sharp
relief, and exposes it to the precious antiseptic light of day. Historical
contextuality and property as a theoretical framework expose the choices and
values underlying § 1409, particularly the value of male access to the bodies of
foreign women outweighing the value of discarded and abandoned foreign life.
Using the historical context of § 1409, as well as the property rubric of theWHP,
Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court cases that have sustained the constitutional









Part IV centralizes whiteness, hypermasculinity,
and hypersexualized foreign women as the central tenets, governing principles,
and driving forces upon which the Supreme Court has clung in defending the
property interests embedded in § 1409. Whiteness, hypermasculinity, and
hypersexualized foreign women are part of the intellectual machinery and
Supreme Court narratives that justify the nefarious operations of § 1409. Part IV
demonstrates how § 1409 is part of an intended and organized regime of
racialized sexual domination, all ratified in law. As argued in more detail in Part
IV, in the last of the four cases, Morales-Santana, Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the majority, launched a Herculean effort to find an equal protection violation in
§ 1409. More specifically, she found that the more lenient physical presence
requirement that applied to female citizens, not males, violated equal protection.
In fashioning a remedy, however, the Court preserved male privilege at the
expense of women, applying the more onerous standard to both men and women,
as opposed to nullifying the more onerous standard entirely. Part V proposes
solutions, including automatic citizenship for nonmarital foreign-born children
of both citizen men and women.
I. WHAT IS TITLE 8, UNITED STATES CODE, § 1409?
The United States has “two sources of citizenship, and two only—birth and
naturalization.”
52
As to “birth” citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that every person “born in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no
naturalization.”
53
As to naturalization, congressional acts govern the acquisition
of citizenship by persons not born in the United States.
54
48. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
49. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
50. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
51. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
52. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).
53. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 703.
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There are two sources of birthright citizenship: (1) place of birth (jus soli)
or (2) parentage (jus sanguinis).
55
This Article addresses the latter, jus sanguinis
citizenship—a right to citizenship by virtue of a circumstance or condition in
existence at the time of a child’s birth.
56
More specifically, this Article focuses
on a form of jus sanguinis citizenship applicable to American citizens, male and
female, who have children out of wedlock and in foreign places, a set of laws
known as citizenship transmission laws or derivative citizenship laws, codified
in Title 8, United States Code, §§ 1401 and 1409.
57
When citizenship derives from parentage (jus sanguinis), American
citizenship laws explicitly discriminate on the basis of marital status as well as
the gender of the parents in the transmission of citizenship to foreign-born
children.
58
Title 8, United States Code, § 1401(g) governs citizenship
transmission to children born outside of the United States and its outlying
possessions to married parents when one is a citizen and the other is an alien.
59
Section 1401 provides that the child is also a citizen if, before the birth, the
citizen parent had been physically present in the United States for a total of five
years, at least two of which were after the parent turned fourteen years of age.
60
As for children born under the same circumstances, but to unmarried
parents, § 1409(a) sets forth the following requirements when the father is the
citizen parent and the mother is an alien:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established
by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the
person’s birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18
years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence
or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
55. The Fourteenth Amendment confers jus soli citizenship based on place of birth. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Acts of Congress, however, govern the grant of citizenship to persons born outside of
the United States. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702-03 (explaining that persons born outside of the
United States only acquire citizenship by birth pursuant to acts of Congress).
56. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1487.
57. Id.
58. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(e), (g)-(h) (2019), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
60. Id. As will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, the last § 1409 challenge to reach the Supreme
Court, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017), nullified an earlier version of this
physical presence requirement.
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(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.
61
In addition, § 1409(a) incorporates the physical presence requirement of §
1401(g).
In stark contrast, when a citizen woman gives birth to a nonmarital foreign
born child fathered by a foreign man, the requirements for the transmittal of
citizenship are described in § 1409(c):
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out
of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status
of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at
the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been
physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions
for a continuous period of one year.
62
Section 1409 thus imposes a set of requirements on citizen fathers that it
does not impose on citizen mothers, namely proof of paternity by clear and
convincing evidence, a written agreement by the father to pay child support, and
paternal acknowledgment of the child before the child’s eighteenth birthday.
63
Before turning to the historical context out of which § 1409 emerged, it is
imperative to highlight several distinguishing features of § 1409—features that
explain the power § 1409 confers to men.
64
Sections 1409(a)(3) and (4) set a
statute of limitations (eighteen years) for citizenship claims brought by or on
behalf of nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers; nonmarital foreign-
born children of citizen mothers have no such limitations.
65
Section 1409(a)(3)’s
requirement of financial support in writing and § 1409(a)(4)’s requirement of
legitimation (a father’s declaration of paternity under oath or a court order of
paternity) confer control to men.
66
Section 1409(a)(1) requires the “blood”
relationship between the child and father,
67
but that relationship requirement may
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
64. See id.; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2235.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
67. See Manisha Lalwani, The “Intelligent Wickedness” of U.S. Immigration Law Conferring
Citizenship to Children Born Abroad and Out-of-Wedlock: A Feminist Perspective, 47 VILL. L. REV. 707,
735 (2002) (demonstrating that the legislative history reveals that the superfluousness of the legitimation
requirements in 1409(a)(4), when 1409(a)(1) already requires a biological relationship, originated from
an adoption of the coverture principles into § 1409(a)(4), with the three legitimation options merely
simplifying the previously complex legitimation rules); Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court’s Blind
Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of Familial Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 in Nguyen v. INS, 20 LAW& INEQ. 275, 306 (2002).
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be satisfied against the father’s will or without the father’s consent.
68
By contrast,
§§ 1409(a)(3) and (4) pivot around male prerogative. This prerogative is
absolutely central to an analysis of § 1409. Unlike women, who transfer
citizenship automatically, § 1409 gives men the power to exclude their
nonmarital foreign-born children from citizenship. In doing so, it allows men to
engage in unprotected hypermasculinity while abroad with foreign women,
liberated from the responsibilities of parenthood.
As discussed in more detail in Part IV, § 1409 is particularly pernicious
because the Supreme Court has tucked the power § 1409 confers to men behind
the “natural” differences between men and women in establishing genetic
parentage. It is this obfuscating function that Justices Stevens and Kennedy, both
American servicemen ostensibly intimately familiar with the sexual practices
and ethics of the military, deployed in shielding § 1409 from equal protection
challenges. In the doctrine that shields § 1409 from challenge, the “natural”
difference between men and women is used to obfuscate the hegemonic function
of § 1409. In this way, § 1409 gives the owner of citizenship an entitlement to
foreign women’s bodies that becomes naturalized in the everyday.
As developed in more detail in Part II, § 1409 did not evolve out of nature
and the biological difference between men and women. As Kristin Collins has
argued, § 1409 is a product of choices, particularly choices about values and the
relationship between rights and power.
69
White heteropatriarchy prefers to
truncate history because it appears more innocent in freeze-frame analysis, which
is fundamental to its obfuscating survival, deniability, and claims of sweet
innocence. Section 1409 is the product of centuries of individual decisionmakers,
lawmakers, judges, administrators, and other legal actors with vested interests
that are raced, classed, sexed, and gendered.
70
Section 1409 bestows a right on
men who father nonmarital children abroad to abandon those children. It enables
citizen fathers to control the terms of the legal relationship with their children as
well as with the mothers of their children. It also empowers citizen men to
determine whether to have a relationship at all.
71
The power Congress confers to
citizen men is absolutely central to both an understanding and critique of § 1409.
The intersectionality of marital status and gender-differentiated norms for the
transference of citizenship—the distinction between automatic parenthood for
women and prerogative parenthood for men—is part of an enduring legacy that
(1) grants men the right to engage in unprotected sexual conduct outside of
68. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (remarking on how paternity can be established
against the father’s will or knowledge if DNA samples from a few strands of hair are collected years after
the birth).
69. Singer, supra note 41, at 1323; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2137.
70. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2134, 2144 (contextualizing § 1409 historically as
a product of lawmakers, judges, and administrators who made choices based on “racially nativist nation-
building project” and “norms and mores concerning gender, parental roles, [and] sexuality”).
71. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1698.
74 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
marriage with foreign women without incurring the full weight of parenthood;
(2) sanctions women with parenthood for engaging in sex outside of marriage;
(3) protects men from the children they abandon; and (4) protects the polity from
children men have abandoned, all strapped in § 1409.
II. § 1409’S CONTEXTUALITYREVEALS ITSMENS REA
As Justice Ginsburg noted, “History reveals what lurks behind” the
derivative citizenship statute.
72
What lurks behind § 1409 is a long legacy of
white heteropatriarchy deploying the legal mechanism of citizenship to create
property rights in others, more pointedly to perfect sovereignty in itself and
vulnerability in others. Both the historical context of § 1409 and the conceptual
model proposed in Part III—the WHP—serve the same function: to expose the
nefarious underbelly of § 1409 and to subject it to precious antiseptic light.
Section 1409 is a direct descendant of antebellum slavery, where the trifecta of
propertizing vulnerable bodies, barring citizenship, and following matrilineal
succession outside of marriage
73
made the enslaved a perennial source of
unbridled cheap sex while simultaneously eliminating “illegitimate” inheritors
from individual lines of inheritance or belonging in the American polity.
Grounding § 1409 squarely within its racist, sexist, and hypermasculine past
eliminates any claims or justifications involving nature, innocence, or un-
intendedness. Instead, both historical contextuality and the WHP cast § 1409 as
a deliberate societal policy created by intentional individual decisions, all vested
with interests in whiteness, hypermasculinity, and hypersexualized and
racialized female bodies upon which to perform sexual violence. It is historical
context that gives § 1409 content.
The history of § 1409 exposes the choices and vested interests of American
imperialism, policymakers, judges, administrators, servicemen, and sexual
tourists in a legal regime that enshrines, ratifies, and protects hypermasculine
performances on the bodies of foreign women liberated from paternity and
citizenship claims from their offspring. Nature and neutrality did not create
§ 1409 or the normative base that interprets and safeguards it. White
heteropatriarchy did. The history of § 1409 epitomizes the law’s active role in
72. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017); see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that sex-based statutes, like §1409, cannot be viewed in a vacuum; but
rather, their gender based disparity becomes clearer when historicized and placed in historical context,
stating, “Sex based statutes, even when accurately reflecting the way most men or women behave, deny
individuals opportunity. Such generalizations must be viewed not in isolation, but in the context of our
Nation’s “ ‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’”) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-61 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(revealing the hegemonic trick of § 1409, which masquerades as something favorable toward women, but
when placed in historical context reveals that it privileges ideas about women being primary caregivers
stating, “But pages of history place the provision in real-world perspective.”).
73. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2152.
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creating and sustaining racialized and gendered hierarchies in the American
polity.
74
Far from innocent, its history reveals its hegemonic function in
normalizing the denigration of women and the abandonment of “illegitimate”
children. In addition to cloaking its function with nature, § 1409 achieves its
hegemonic operation by assuming a baseline that seamlessly incorporates the
vested interests of the WHP as political ideology, legal doctrine, and
philosophical assumptions while peddling these vested interests as biological,
natural, and “just the way things are.”
75
Furthermore, the history of § 1409 reverses the pathological gaze: rather
than fixating on hypersexualized foreign women, who Justice Kennedy
disturbingly said “may be unsure of the father’s identity,”
76
or the evil specter of
millions of war babies raiding the government coffers and flooding American
bureaucracies with fraudulent claims of inheritance and citizenship, historical
context focuses attention on a class of johns, purchasers of sex, sexual exploiters,
philanders, and rapists, as well as the judges, lawmakers, and administrators that
are complicit in their scheme. Moreover, reversing the pathological gaze through
historicizing lays the foundation to bring § 1409 in line with modern notions of
democracy and fairness.
As part of this historical contextualization, Section II.A squarely grounds
§ 1409 in its roots, antebellum chattel slavery. Drawing on Kristin Collins’s
extensive work on § 1409, Section II.B discusses Guyer v. Smith
77
as part of the
lineage of § 1409 and as an example of white heteropatriarchy’s adaptability
after Dred Scott appeared imperiled. Section II.C traces three governing forces
in the historical development of American citizenship and immigration law: (1)
whiteness, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3) female subordination. These governing
principles comprise the central tenets of the WHP as well as of immigration law
generally. As will be discussed in Part IV, these central tenets will become the
three prongs that the Supreme Court uses to immunize § 1409 from equal
protection challenges. Finally, as Collins has argued, Section II.D explicates how
Congress and the military actively discouraged interracial marriage between
American men and racialized foreign women, while simultaneously facilitating
sex trafficking between them, all of which led to disproportionate numbers of
racialized children being discarded by their American fathers. Part II, overall,
provides the historical tissue connecting § 1409’s deliberate restrictions on
citizenship claims asserted by or on behalf of the nonmarital foreign-born
children of American fathers to what Collins calls “a troubling practice of sexual
exploitation of non-white foreign women by white American men.”
78
74. Id. at 2139-40.
75. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988).
76. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54.
77. 22 Md. 239 (1864) (foreign-born children who remain illegitimate do not qualify for citizenship).
78. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1492.
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A. Dred Scott and the Anatomy of the WHP
Vulnerability is the lynchpin of exploitation.
79
Antebellum chattel slavery
exemplifies this point. Without the full protections of citizenship, African
Americans had no access to the courts or police and were, therefore, prone to





Virginia colonial assembly ruled that “[c]hildren got by an Englishman upon a
Negro woman shall be bond or free according to the condition of the mother.”
82
In reversing the traditional common law presumption that the father determined
the status of the child, the rule of matrilineage for the enslaved in combination
with the negation of citizenship concretized the continued vulnerability of
enslaved women to rape, philandering, and sexual exploitation. As Cheryl Harris
noted, it also facilitated the reproduction of a white heteropatriarchal-dominated
labor force.
83
As founding father Thomas Jefferson bragged, the profitability of
enslaved black women could be realized more efficiently from breeding than
from labor, stating, “I consider the labor of a breeding woman as no object, and
that a child raised every 2 years is of more profit than the crop of the best laboring
man.”
84
In remarking on the economic incentives for owners to rape their
enslaved, abolitionist Henry Highland Garnet concluded that the true treachery
of slavery arose from the enslaver’s desire to possess the sexuality of the slave,
79. Cook, Stop Traffic, supra note 8 (manuscript at 3).
80. In her autobiography about slavery, Harriet Jacobs described the complete control her master
exerted over her: “[H]e was my master. I was compelled to live under the same roof with him . . . . He
told me I was his property; that I must be subject to his will in all things.” HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS
IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL, CLASSIC AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN’S NARRATIVES 223 (William L.
Andrews ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (1861). In describing Jacobs’s narrative, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
stated it “charts in vivid detail precisely how the shape of her life and the choices she makes are defined
by her reduction to a sexual object, an object to be raped, bred or abused.” Gates, To be Raped, Bred or
Abused, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 22, 1987, at 12; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1437 (1991) (describing acts of unbridled power stating, “Slaveowners forced women to lie face down in
a depression in the ground while they were whipped. This procedure allowed the masters to protect the
fetus while abusing the mother.”).
81. Many historians of Africans in the United States begin with the arrival, in 1619, of a ship in
Jamestown carrying twenty black persons, likely slaves, although possibly indentured servants. See A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 20-21 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (1978). It is
interesting to note that the Virginia colonial assembly set rules on matrilineal succession less than fifty
years after the arrival of that ship.
82. Harris, WAP, supra note 18 at 1719 (citing HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 81, at 43). By the late
1600s and early 1700s, the legislatures of various colonies adopted similar rules of classification. See,
e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 81, at 128, 252 (citing a 1706 New York statute; and then citing a 1755
Georgia law).
83. Harris, WAP, supra note 18 at 1719 n.37 (“According to Paula Giddings, the Virginia statute
completed ‘[t]he circle of denigration . . . [in] combin[ing] racism, sexism, greed, and piety” in that it
“laid women open to the most vicious exploitation.’ She noted that ‘a master could save the cost of buying
new slaves by impregnating his own slave, or for that matter having anyone impregnate her.’” (quoting
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA 37 (1984))).
84. Harris, WAP, supra note 18 at 1720 n.38 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jordan
(Dec. 21, 1805)).
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writing, “Every man who resides on his plantation may have his harem, and has
every inducement of custom, and of pecuniary gain, to tempt him to the common
practice.”
85
As Kimberlé Crenshaw has noted, for the enslaved woman, “[t]heir
femaleness made them sexually vulnerable to racist domination, while their
Blackness effectively denied them any protection.”
86
This dichotomy is central
to an understanding of § 1409’s function. The negation of citizenship in both
child and mother coupled with matrilineage outside marriage aided white men in
raping enslaved women, protected white men from the duties and responsibilities
of fathering children, and protected the racial purity of white sovereignty, the
governing principles underlying § 1409.
These intersectional governing principles that privilege white
heteropatriarchy
87
lie at the heart of Dred Scott, a Supreme Court decision that
further entrenched antebellum planation slavery and the legal domination of
black people. Dred Scott accomplished much: (1) it affirmed the continued the
use of the “Negro” as property
88
; (2) it held that anyone of African descent was
not a citizen, including free blacks
89
; and (3) it affirmed that the status of the
enslaved child followed that of the mother (matrilineage outside marriage).
85. 2 HARRIET MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN AMERICA 320 (AMS Press, Inc. 1966) (1837) (footnote
omitted). In an early stroke of legal realism, Lincoln remarked on the scale of white males raping enslaved
females in the mid-nineteenth century and argued that slavery incentivized the amalgamation of the races
though rape, rather than racial purity:
In 1850 there were in the United States, 405,751, mulattoes. Very few of these are the offspring of
whites and free blacks; nearly all have sprung from black slaves and white masters. A separation of
the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation but as all immediate separation is
impossible the next best thing is to keep them apart where they are not already together. If white and
black people never get together in Kansas, they will never mix blood in Kansas. That is at least one
self-evident truth. A few free colored persons may get into the free States, in any event; but their
number is too insignificant to amount to much in the way of mixing blood. In 1850 there were in the
free states, 56,649 mulattoes; but for the most part they were not born there—they came from the
slave States, ready made up. In the same year the slave States had 348,874 mulattoes all of home
production. The proportion of free mulattoes to free blacks—the only colored classes in the free
states—is much greater in the slave than in the free states. It is worthy of note too, that among the
free states those which make the colored man the nearest to equal the white, have, proportionally
the fewest mulattoes the least of amalgamation. In New Hampshire, the State which goes farthest
towards equality between the races, there are just 184 Mulattoes while there are in Virginia—how
many do you think? 79,775, being 23,126 more than in all the free States together.
Lincoln, supra note 31.
86. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 158-59 (1989).
87. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, famously declared that people in
America of African descent had “no rights which white man was bound to respect” whether born free, set
free, or enslaved. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Chief Justice Taney explained that the Constitution did not confer
citizenship to African Americans. They were “not included, and were not intended to be included, under
the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution” and “therefore [they can] claim none of the rights and privileges”
of citizenship.Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404; see ErnestoHernández-López, GlobalMigrations and Imagined
Citizenship: Examples from Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and When Questioning Birthright Citizenship,
14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 265-266 (2008).
88. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410.
89. Id. at 395.
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Taken together, these policies ensured the continued vulnerability of the
enslaved to sexual exploitation.
90
Dred Scott exemplifies how the denial of
citizenship concretized the use of African Americans as property and left African
Americans in a form of statelessness, leaving them vulnerable and defenseless
targets for sexual terrorism. In Dred Scott, the denial of citizenship to anyone of
African descent left them without recourse to the courts or to legal protection,
and therefore vulnerable to unbridled performances of rape, power, and rituals
of spectacle.
91
Without citizenship and personhood, one cannot assert an interest
in or against property. The combined effect of propertization, lack of citizenship,
and the rule of matrilineage allowed white males to continue unprotected and
unbridled feats of hypermasculinity on the bodies of enslaved women without
incurring illegitimate inheritors and while maintaining racial purity in the
polity.
92
Like Dred Scott, § 1409 demonstrates how property and citizenship occupy
central roles in the allocation, preservation, and maintenance of sovereignty and
vulnerability. As in antebellum slavery, § 1409 illustrates how property laws,
and the policies they animate, have long channeled the benefits of full citizenship
through one’s relationship to property. Dred Scott solidified a property right in
philandering, rape, and sexual exploitation, as well as a right of sovereignty in
the owner and vulnerability in the victim. In antebellum slavery and § 1409,
white heteropatriarchal sexual autonomy is achieved through the foreign
woman’s sexual subjugation (the propertization of her sexual function).
93
Similarly, white heteropatriarchal reproductive freedom is achieved through the
denial of reproductive freedom for the enslaved and the disenfranchisement of
the enslaved female and her child. Additionally, the denial of citizenship to the
enslaved enshrined the antebellum enslavers’ economic investment in the
enslaved’s sexual function.
94
The enslavers’ economic investment in the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 406. See also Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as Property: Sex, Race, Status, and Wealth, 1
STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & C.L. 51, 52, 75 (2005) (arguing that the paradigms of private property, enslavement,
and sexuality shared a nexus of white males generating wealth and sexual gratification through cheap
land, the exploitation of enslaved labor, and the exploitation of black female labor and sexuality; and that
these paradigms interacted to create the white male “American Dream” of cheap land, cheap labor, and
cheap sex).
92. To be clear, Dred Scott was only one among many cross-pollinated and cyclically reinforcing
factors that ensured the racial domination of African Americans.
93. Crusto, supra note 91, at 81 (“[W]hite masters exploited enslaved black women to satisfy their
desire for cheap sex.”); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 334 (1996) (“[W]hile sexual contact between Black
men and white women was rigorously policed, the sexual abuse and rape of Black women was
decriminalized. This allowed for the full sexual exploitation of Black women’s bodies and
systematic sexual abuse without social consequences or legal sanction.” (footnote omitted) (citing
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?: Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of
Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 413 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992))).
94. Neal Kumar Katyal, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced
Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 792 (1993) (“Both pimps and antebellum slave masters have and had
economic investments in women’s sexual functions.”).
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enslaved’s sexually subjugated function was so important to the nation that it
rose to the occasion of constitutional protection. As the Chief Justice Roger
Taney famously declared, people in America of African descent had “no rights
which white man was bound to respect” whether born free, set free, or
enslaved.
95
Taney explained that the Constitution did not confer citizenship to
African Americans.
96
They were “not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution” and “therefore [they can]
claim none of the rights and privileges” of citizenship.
97
For blacks, this
constitutional relationship ensured complete subjugation for the very purpose of
unbridled exploitation.
98
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney grapples with the question, “What must
white supremacy do to own the sexual function of the enslaved?” In answering
this question, Chief Justice Taney understands a vital element of § 1409. The
continued use and enjoyment of the enslaved’s sexual function requires
controlling the status of the offspring. In other words, the white father’s right to
discard his child, abandoning fatherly responsibility as a matter of law, is the
sine qua non of owning the enslaved mother’s sexual function. Eliminating
fatherly responsibility licensed white males to continue the naked propertization
of the enslaved’s sexual function for hypermasculine performance. Like § 1409,
Chief Justice Taney achieves the “absenting of fatherly responsibility” by
endorsing the rule of matrilineage for the enslaved. Harkening all the way back
to the Roman Empire and the Institutes of Justinian, Chief Justice Taney made it
abundantly clear that, as in § 1409, the enslaved followed the status of the
mother, noting that in the Roman Empire, slave status “was decided by the
condition of the mother,” and quoting the Institutes of Justinian to show that
slaves had long been “born such of bondwomen.”
99
Like § 1409, Chief Justice
Taney and the Dred Scott Supreme Court understood that the continued sexual
domination of the mother mandated the right to legally discard the child.
95. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. at 407.
96. Id. at 404.
97. Id.
98. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution allowed southern states to count slaves as three-
fifths persons for the purposes of apportionment in Congress (even though the slaves could not, of course,
vote). JUAN F. PEREA ET.AL., RACEANDRACES 104 (3d ed. 2015). Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 restrained
Congress’s ability to stop the slave trade by expressly denying congressional power to prohibit
importation of new slaves until 1808. PEREA, supra. Furthermore, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3
mandated that slaves who escaped into freedom in the North were required to be sent back to their owners
in the South. PEREA, supra. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, contains the Fugitive Slave Clause, which
states:
No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.
PEREA, supra. In effect, these constitutional provisions, by ensuring slavery and rendering non-free
persons property, legally prohibited Blacks from being citizens and asserting fundamental rights. Id. Each
of these clauses of the Constitution made black bodies vulnerable to exploitation by operation of law.
99. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 478-79; see Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2151.
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Lest there be any doubt about white heteropatriarchy’s use of citizenship to
create vulnerability for the express purpose of sexual exploitation, in 1867, then-
presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln drew the connection between
citizenship, property, and sexual domination in the following response to the
Dred Scott decision:
This very Dred Scott case affords a strong test as to which party most
favors amalgamation [of the races], the Republicans or the dear union-
saving Democracy. Dred Scott, his wife and two daughters were all
involved in the suit. We desired the [C]ourt to have held that they were
citizens so far at least as to entitle them to a hearing as to whether they
were free or not; and then, also, that they were in fact and in law really
free. Could we have had our way, the chances of these black girls, ever
mixing their blood with that of white people, would have been
diminished at least to the extent that it could not have been without their
consent. But Judge Douglas is delighted to have them decided to be
slaves, and not human enough to have a hearing, even if they were free,
and thus left subject to the forced concubinage of their masters, and
liable to become the mothers of mulattoes in spite of themselves—the
very state of case that produces nine tenths of all the mulattoes—all the
mixing of blood in the nation.
100
In grounding the utter savagery that was antebellum slavery in the original
intent of the Founding Fathers, Chief Justice Taney made the following
statement, which bears repeating in its entirety because his narrative provides
foundational grounding for the WHP and recurring themes in the legal doctrines
surrounding § 1409:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was
bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that
time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one
thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in
every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in
their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
101
100. Lincoln, supra note 31.
101. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
2019] “Johnny and the WHP” 81
Several distinguishing features of Chief Justice Taney’s straightforward,
transparent, undiluted, de-obfuscated, and fully intended white supremacist
mantra should be noted, as they are ongoing themes in the genealogy and
doctrine of § 1409. In order to appreciate the function of § 1409, one might
substitute foreign women and their nonmarital children fathered by American
men in the quote above for the contemplated “negro” or enslaved. The idea of
inferiority as a justification for the domination and propertization of human
beings has an extensive history in Western thought. It is just this notion of
“inferiority” that will figure prominently in the legal doctrine surrounding § 1409
as it relates to the exclusion of foreigners and both the hypersexualization and
sexual domination of foreign women (“treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic”
102
), developed in more detail in Parts III and IV.
Chief Justice Taney’s mantra reflects the deliberate creation of a form of
statelessness (“no rights which the white man was bound to respect”
103
) for the
express purpose of propertization, commodification, and sexual trade.
Section 1409 facilitates a wall of immunity around citizen men while abroad as
they procreate and sexually exploit foreign women, leaving both their offspring
and foreign women in a figurative and literal form of statelessness. It is the very
exclusion of anyone of African descent—foreign women and their children—
from the legal category of citizenship that facilitates their vulnerability to
dominant desire and fetish.
In drawing the distinction between both the “private pursuits and public
world,” Chief Justice Taney dog-whistles a veiled appeal to an ongoing theme in
§ 1409, the distinction between the sexual politics and cultural norms of the slave
quarters versus that of the big house, the master’s house.
104
Under § 1409, as in
antebellum slavery, citizen men can activate the sexual politics and cultural
norms of the slave shacks and preserve their respectability politics at home in the
“big house.” Section 1409 outsources the supply of enslaved females to the
platforms of hypersexualized foreign women for hypermasculine sexual
performance. Section 1409 provides the “dark place,” where citizen men can let
their sexual energy explode unbridled and come unhinged. It allows citizen men
the opportunity to keep their impulses in check under cover of respectability
politics while at home, and then let their impulses go unchecked abroad. It
liberates citizen men from the expectation of respectability at home, so that they
can go abroad liberated from those cultural restraints and come unhinged in the
slave shacks. It allows citizen men to present fine-tuned, highly moral, dignified
images in the American public, and then let their unrestrained impulses explode
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ever happened.
105
Section 1409 restrains the foreign-born nonmarital child’s
ability to push against the private/public boundary between male prerogative in
the shack and respectability in the big house. Allowing the foreign-born
nonmarital child, particularly those who are racialized, the free-flowing freedom
to show up at Dad’s home, his house of worship, and in his community would
pierce the veneer of respectability and would subject Dad to tremendous
questioning about what exactly happened down in the shack. Congress has
restrained the foreign-born nonmarital child from pushing across the partition of
private slave shack politics and publicly damaging respectability in the big house
of the American polity. Furthermore, § 1409 allows for the illusion that the
Japanese comfort women and rapes in the Congo are “foreign” phenomena by
those “evil” people, rather than the routinized practices of a highly industrial
nation, right here at home.
Unlike the individualized actions of citizen men, § 1409 makes sexual
domination systemic. Citizen men are not making decisions as atomized
individual agents or singular secretaries of state, but rather, from a long enduring
culture of white heteropatriarchal supremacy. Congress has created a power
imbalance between foreign women and citizen men, which also functions as part
of the sexually exploitative draw and allure for citizen men toward foreign
women. It is where vulnerability becomes enticing. The grant or denial of
citizenship acts as a white heteropatriarchal cudgel—a whip—in the already
highly imbalanced power relationship between citizen men, who are coming
from a rich country, and foreign women, who often are not. Facilitating the
domination of foreign women, therefore, is part of the property right that
Congress bestows on citizen men. The ability to dictate the terms of the
relationship with foreign women and their offspring as well as to determine
whether there will be a relationship at all becomes dialectical in that it reinforces
the vulnerability while simultaneously serving as enticing.
Before turning to the theoretical framework for the WHP, one more
comparison between § 1409 and antebellum slavery may be illustrative. Dorothy
Roberts explains that a common method of whipping the pregnant enslaved
female throughout the South illustrates the slave owners’ dual interest in owning
the enslaved woman, particularly her sexual function, and maximizing her use
as a reproductive harvester: “Slaveowners forced [pregnant] women to lie face
down in a depression in the ground while they were whipped. This procedure
allowed the masters to protect the commercial fetus while abusing the
mother.”
106
Both § 1409 and the whipping of the pregnant enslaved vividly
105. Anthony Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 464 (1997) (“Race is a
form of pleasure in one’s body which is achieved through humiliation of the Other and, then, as the last
step, through a denial of the entire process . . . . By denying their fetishization of ‘race,’ whites create a
culture in which they are both masters and innocents.”).
106. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 80, at 1438.
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illustrate that control over the child was inextricably intertwined with the
continued domination of the mother. In antebellum slavery, the slave owner was
incentivized to protect the child’s life for commercial gain, while still exerting
complete domination over the enslaved mother. In § 1409, the right to eliminate
the child from personhood, as a practical matter, is endemic to the continued
sexual enjoyment of foreign women. Controlling the child is fundamentally
important to dominating the mother. Whether the gain or loss is protected, the
goal is the domination of the female body, which necessitates control over the
offspring.
In order to understand the intersectional interconnectedness and mutually
reinforcing layers of race, class, gender, property, and citizenship in § 1409, it is
imperative to acknowledge how slavery created a culture that incentivized and
normalized sexual terrorism. The history of rape during antebellum chattel
slavery provides the quintessential backdrop for understanding the moves and
maneuvering in § 1409: by denying citizenship to both enslaved and their
offspring coupled with matrilineage outside marriage, slaveholders were able to
perpetuate a property interest in rape, sexual exploitation, and philandering, the
prototype for § 1409. Moreover, non-inheritance erased any claim of legacy
between an enslaved child and white father—for the children of Thomas
Jefferson and Sally Hemmings, for example—while effectively ensuring that the
legal heirs of white ruling-class men remained white, all embedded in § 1409.
107
B. Guyer: Extending the WHP
Although the Fourteenth Amendment effectively overruled Dred Scott, it
remains foundational for using citizenship to create a white heteropatriarchal
property right in sexual domination. As Cheryl Harris helps us to understand,
after legalized forms of white supremacy, like slavery or segregation, were
overturned, the white heteropatriarchal property right in hypermasculinity
evolved into a more modern form through the law’s ratification of the settled
expectations of white heteropatriarchal privilege as a legitimate and natural
baseline.
108
Section 1409 demonstrates the unrelenting adaptability of white
heteropatriarchy: It achieves the propertization of foreign human bodies without
announcing itself as such. It is an example of how even after slavery was
outlawed, the same result can be achieved by other means. Guyer v. Smith,
109
decided in 1864, also illustrates this point.
107. E. Michelle Rabouin, “Gifting Children of Promise”: Re-Imagining the Academic Margins as
Transformative Legal Space, 3 J. GENDER RACE& JUST. 581 (2000).
108. Harris,WAP, supra note 18 at 1741.
109. 22 Md. 239 (1864).
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As the advancement of abolition undermined the legal substructure of
slavery and when Dred Scott was no longer sound precedent,
110
Guyer
maintained a stronghold over a white heteropatriarchal power to sexually exploit
foreign women, to be free of the inheritance claims of their offspring, and to
protect the polity from racialized others. According to Kristin Collins, the Guyer
court incorporated into citizenship law “the same set of domestic relations law
principles that had been instrumental to the maintenance of slavery and the denial
of citizenship for persons of African descent: laws that recognized the unmarried
mother as the source of status for her children, including slave status.”
111
Guyer
recognized the ability to preserve a hierarchal order that preserved vulnerability,
precarity, and disenfranchisement in foreign women by continuing the use of
matrilineage for nonmarital children.
In Guyer, a white American citizen fathered two nonmarital foreign-born
sons with a woman “of African descent.”
112
When the American citizen father
died, he bequeathed land in America to his sons. Upon recognizing the
contestability of the sons’ claims to citizenship, two other white men (the
“interlopers”), challenged the sons’ claim to the property. The jus sanguinis
citizenship statute relevant at the time allowed for citizenship transmission to
foreign-born children but was silent on the marital status of the parents.
113
Despite the intentions of the individual citizen father, as a matter of systemic
policy, the Guyer court declared that foreign-born “illegitimate” children of
American fathers were not citizens under the statute.
114
Like Dred Scott and § 1409, Guyer did many things at once. It illustrates
how white heteropatriarchy uses both citizenship and property laws to allocate
sovereignty to itself and vulnerability to others. It exemplifies white
heteropatriarchy’s unrelenting fundamental compulsion and need to control
vulnerable bodies in space, specifically lines of inheritance and ownership. It
shows the resiliency of white heteropatriarchy in using both citizenship and
property laws to exclude racialized foreign others from the polity and preserve
the ability to engage in sexual conduct with foreign women without the burdens
of parenthood as a matter of societal policy, ratified in law. Furthermore, and as
Collins demonstrates in granular detail, for decades after Guyer, administrators,
judges, and legislators enlisted the antebellum-slavery-based matrilineage-
outside-of-marriage/patrilineage-inside-marriage distinction to ensure racial
purity in the polity and the continued sexual control of foreign women. As
110. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2149 (noting that fifteen days before Guyer was
decided “Maryland adopted a new state constitution that abolished slavery and declared that ‘all men are
created equally free’” (citing BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE
GROUND: MARYLAND DURING THE NINETEENTHCENTURY 131 (1984))).
111. Id. at 2141.
112. Id. at 2140.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Collins demonstrates, for decades, these decisionmakers denied the citizenship
claims of nonwhite children, especially those who were excludable under the
race-based immigration and naturalization laws, in an effort to ensure racial
purity.
115
C. Whiteness, Hypermasculinity, and Hypersexualized Foreign Women: The
Driving Forces of American Immigration and Citizenship Law
Whiteness, hypermasculinity, and the narrative of hypersexualized foreign
women have coursed through the veins of citizenship transmission since the
founding.
116
They are the three organizing tenets that govern the field of
citizenship. These three straps in the WHP have shaped and designed the entire
regulatory field, and the boundaries and contours of America.
117
Section 1409 is
merely one in a myriad of laws that use the legal category of citizenship as a
means of granting or denying rights, creating vulnerability for purposes of
exploitation, and distributing resources and burdens.
118
Derivative citizenship
laws involve a quagmire of statutes, administrative decisions, and policy
practices. However, three unifying principles explain the chaos: (1) the need for
racial purity and white supremacy; (2) the sanctioning of white women for
having sex with foreign men; and (3) the creation and maintenance of
vulnerability in foreign women for hypermasculine sexual exploitation.
As for whiteness, citizenship as a legal mechanism is the primary site of
“racial formation.”
119
It is where America not only constructs itself as white,
120
but also bulwarks its porous boundaries against “aliens” and simultaneously
perfects its ability to exploit.
121
Since its inception, America has used the legal
category of “citizenship” to make America synonymous with whiteness.
122
In its
very first citizenship act, the Naturalization Law of 1790, Congress explicitly
115. Id. at 2137-38.
116. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1680; see also
Chang, supra note 38 (arguing that the regulation of sex is a central tenet of U.S. immigration policy);
Eithne Luibhéid, Heteronormativity, Responsibility, and Neo-liberal Governance in U.S. Immigration
Control, in PASSING LINES: SEXUALITY AND IMMIGRATION 69 (Brad Epps et al. eds., 2005) (“Sexuality
has long been a concern to the framers of U.S. immigration law and policy, and it has consistently
comprised an important axis for the regulation of newcomers.”).
117. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1492 (“The history of U.S. citizenship law cannot be
understood without due recognition of racism’s central role in shaping the entire regulatory field.”).
118. Freddy Funes, Note, Beyond the Plenary Power Doctrine: How Critical Race Theory Can Help
Move Us Past the Chinese Exclusion Case, 11 SCHOLAR 341, 342 (2009).
119. OMI&WINANT, supra note 28 at 1-3.
120. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1119.
121. See Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1496.
122. See LÓPEZ, supra note 28. For a much more detailed history that centralizes race, see Collins,
Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6. For a much more detailed history of derivative citizenship statutes that
centralize gender, see Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36.
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restricted naturalized citizenship to “free, white persons.”
123
Whiteness remained
the gold standard when Congress passed racially exclusionary immigration laws,
including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
124
the Immigration Act of 1891,
125
and the Geary Act of 1892.
126
Although there were amendments to this “whites
only” restriction, racial bars to naturalization were not fully extirpated until
1952.
127
White supremacy, however, was not the only driving force shaping
immigration policy. As in Dred Scott, the creation, maintenance, and regulation
of sexual subjugation were also guiding principles in American citizenship and
immigration law. The demonization and perennial hypersexualization of Asian
women also typify the centralized role of sex and sexual conduct regulation in
immigration law. Stewart Chang argues that Asian women, particularly Chinese
women, were monolithically constructed as pernicious prostitutes, the antithesis
to normative American sexuality, a foreign peril that threatened the integrity of
American domestic unity. Quoting historian Nayan Shah, Chang explains,
“[D]uring the nineteenth century anti-Chinese advocates characterized Chinese
immigration as a racial war where the most pernicious weapon was the Chinese
female prostitute, who . . . was ‘infusing a poison into the Anglo-Saxon blood’
and imperiling the future of the American nation.”
128
Capitalizing on the
stereotype of Asian women as immoral and sexual deviants, President Ulysses
S. Grant signed the Page Act of 1875, which restricted the immigration of
Chinese womenwhowere presumed to be prostitutes.
129
Following the Page Act,
the Chinese Exclusion Act was just one of a myriad of laws that systemically
excluded Asians, including the renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1884,
1888, and 1892.
130
The 1917 Immigration Act created the “Asiatic Barred Zone,”
123. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (limiting jus sanguinis
citizenship to the children of U.S. citizen fathers; restricting naturalization to “free white” persons).
124. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
125. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
126. Geary Act of 1892, chs. 60-61, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
127. See LÓPEZ, supra note 28. It should be noted that in addition to congressional acts, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that that “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty”
and that therefore questions arising from the exercise of that sovereignty “are not . . . for judicial
determination.” Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). Furthermore, until 1965,
American citizenship laws standardized racial and national-origins restrictions. See Kristin A. Collins,
Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 180 n.64 (2017)
(“Race-based immigration and naturalization laws and race-salient national-origins quotas were gradually
repealed starting in the 1940s and were finally repudiated by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), and in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).”).
128. Chang, supra note 38 at 240 (quoting NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: EPIDEMICS AND
RACE IN SAN FRANCISCO’S CHINATOWN 107 (2001)).
129. Id. (citing Page Act, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974)).
130. See generally H.R. Res. 282, 112th Cong. (2011) (resolution regretting the passage of
discriminatory laws against the Chinese beginning in the nineteenth century).
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which prohibited immigration from most of Asia.
131
The Immigration Act of
1924 followed, which extended exclusion to all “alien[s] ineligible for
citizenship,” including Asians.
132
According to Chang, throughout the nineteenth
century, the Asian prostitute was politically manipulated as a racial other against
which normative citizens and immigrant subjects who could racially and
culturally belong in America were defined.
133
In addition to whiteness, heteropatriarchy governed the laws associated with
citizenship transmission. Beginning in 1790, white citizen fathers had the right
to transmit citizenship to their marital foreign-born children provided that the
mother was also white and otherwise eligible for naturalization.
134
White married
citizen mothers, however, did not have the right to transmit citizenship to their
white marital foreign-born children until 1934.
135
Racial purity requires control
over women’s bodies; thus, under the Expatriation Act of 1907, female citizens
automatically forfeited citizenship if they married an alien, a practice known as
marital expatriation.
136
The same act prohibited women from transmitting
citizenship to their foreign-born children.
137
As Collins argues, “Prior to 1934, the text of the derivative citizenship
statute recognized only the foreign-born children of citizen fathers as citizens,
thus using the patrilineal norms that had long characterized domestic relations
law to regulate [white] membership in the American polity.”
138
As inDred Scott,
outside marriage, matrilineal lineage was recognized for foreign-born nonmarital
children.
139
As in Dred Scott, the foreign mothers of nonmarital children,
fathered by American men abroad, were not citizens. Following matrilineal
norms outside marriage allowed citizen men to continue sexual engagement with
foreign women free of legal responsibilities for fathering children.
Collins further argues that the primacy placed on marriage to secure the
transfer of citizenship to foreign-born children was no accident; rather, the
centrality of marriage “remained a vital and racially exclusionary principle from
131. Immigration Act, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 876 (1917) (repealed 1952).
132. Chang, supra note 38, at 268 (quoting Immigration Act, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed
1952) (restricting immigration for all “alien[s] ineligible for citizenship” and setting an annual quota of
150,000 immigrant entries per year based on national origin, where immigration from each eligible nation
was limited to two percent of the number of foreign-born persons of that nationality residing in the United
States as of the 1890 census)).
133. Id. at 242.
134. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2235 (citing Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1795)).
135. Id. (citing Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797).
136. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1490 (citing Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3,
34 Stat. 1228).
137. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228.
138. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 178–79 (footnotes omitted);
see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 462 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In 1855, Congress
clarified that citizenship would pass to children born abroad only when the father was a United States
citizen.” (citing Act of February 10, 1855, § 2, 10 Stat. 604)).
139. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1490.
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the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century. The marriage
requirement was racially exclusionary because marriage was not a race-neutral
institution.”
140
The Supreme Court did not declare miscegenation laws
unconstitutional until 1968.
141
According to Collins, the marriage requirement
was also racially exclusionary because immigration administrators constrained
definitions of marriage and legitimacy in cases involving citizenship claims of
nonwhite children.
142
The 1922 Cable Act terminated marital expatriation; thus, marriage to an
alien no longer forfeited a woman’s citizenship automatically.
143
A woman,
however, still lost her United States citizenship if she married an alien ineligible
for citizenship, such as Chinese men.
144
In 1934, Congress passed an
immigration act that allowed citizen-mothers, for the first time, to confer
citizenship on their children.
145
Under the Nationality Act of 1940, Congress
preserved equality in the transmission of citizenship to marital children based on
the parent’s sex, but established a completely different scheme for nonmarital
children, one that discriminated on the basis of marital status and the sex of the
parents.
146
Nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers were
automatically entitled to citizenship. Nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen
fathers, however, acquired citizenship only upon legitimation or adjudication of
paternity during the child’s minority.
147
Drawing from Collins, by recognizing
mothers as the source of parental responsibility for nonmarital children and
preserving a father’s prerogative regarding his nonmarital children, the 1940 Act,
like coverture, shielded men from the burdens of childcare and support for their
non-marital offspring.
148
140. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2182–83.
141. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
142. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2154.
143. Cable Act of 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1022.
144. Id. at §§ 3, 5.
145. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797. The Act amended § 1993 of the Revised Statutes to
read:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose father
or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States; but the
rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen
mother . . . has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child. In cases where
one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship shall not descend unless the child comes
to the United States and resides therein for at least five years continuously immediately
previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within six months after the child’s twenty-first
birthday, he or she shall take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America.
48 Stat. 797, supra.
146. Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1138-40; see Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra
note 6, at 2150.
147. Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1138-40.
148. See Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in
Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 222, 234 (2003). As Collins notes, the common law imposed
a duty on women of nonmarital children to care for those children, but protected men from the property,
support, and status claims of those children. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties,
supra note 36, at 1683.
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Before turning to the next section, there are a few features of citizenship
transmission that require highlighting. It is important to note that § 1409, like
marriage expatriation, is an example of coverture,
149
a continuum of laws that
regulated or controlled women’s bodies for purposes of racial purity, regulated
women’s sexual practices outside marriage through the sanction of parenthood,
and legally ratified sexualized violence.
150
Like coverture, § 1409 incorporated
the common law regime that allocated the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood according to marital status and parental gender.
151
As Collins argues,
“The history of coverture and the transmission of American citizenship brings
an elementary point into focus: the allocation of parental rights is always
correlated with the allocation of parental responsibility.”
152
Drawing from
Collins, this basic legal truism and its numerous implications for citizenship law
suggests that the gendered injustice caused by § 1409 is its creation and
perpetuation of a legal regime that squarely fixates full responsibility for foreign-
born nonmarital children on women, while allowing men to escape and to
continue engaging in unprotected hypermasculinity free of reproductive
sanction. As Collins argues, “Once we recognize this gendered operation of
§ 1409, broader failures of equal protection analysis come into relief.”
153
Furthermore, both slavery and coverture allowed men to solidify their
dominance over women and set the stage for modern approaches to derivative
citizenship.
154
The ideologies, discourses, and strategies that entrenched
citizenship and property codes in antebellum slavery and coverture continue to
have tremendous traction in our shared societal consciousness, particularly in the
narratives that justify racialized and sexualized domination as exemplified in
victim blaming, slut shaming, and the ways in which the bodies of women
continue to be viewed as the property of men, discussed inmore detail in Section
III.C. Although women’s formal legal status has changed, contemporary
approaches to derivative citizenship reflect a racialized commitment to female
subordination.
155
149. Coverture, in the common law, defined marital unity as a merging of a married couple into a
single person—the “head” of the marriage—the husband. SeeNANCYF. COTT, PUBLICVOWS:A HISTORY
OFMARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11-13 (2000); CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER
OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUSTICE: A LEGALHISTORYOFU.S.WOMEN (1991); M. Isabel Medina,Derivative Citizenship: What’s
Marriage, Citizenship, Sex, Sexual Orientation, Race, and Class Got to Do with It?, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
391, 453 (2016).
150. Coverture included a continuum of laws that created a right in men to dominate women,
including marriage as a status contract, regulation of divorce and child custody, legal treatments of
women’s obligations for housework and child care, lack of recognition of marital rape, and legal
sanctioning of domestic violence. Elizabeth Beaumont,Gender Justice v. the “Invisible Hand” of Gender
Bias in Law and Society, 31(3) HYPATIA J. FEMINIST PHIL. 668, 676 (2016).
151. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1672.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1681.
155. Beaumont, supra note 150, at 676.
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D. World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam: Foreign Woman As
“Whore” and the Military Sex Trade
It is imperative to contextualize § 1409 in the hypermasculine sexual ethics
of the American military. As Susan Zeiger notes, war engagements are powder
kegs for sexual exploitation from the brothels of the French demimonde, to the
German bordellos, to sprawling “camp towns,” often military-run, that provided
sex trafficking for American GIs in Korea, the Philippines, Okinawa, Vietnam,
and Thailand.
156
As Zeiger notes, the loneliness, fear, boredom, lust, and racially
exoticizing and fetishizing tastes of servicemen combined with the economic
vulnerability of foreign women detonate sexual exploitation.
157
American
military engagements are primary sites for hypermasculinity with all the
trappings incident to sexualized violence, including exponential incidents of
rape.
158
When contextualizing § 1409 in the hypermasculine sexual practices of
156. ZEIGER, supra note 45.
157. Id. at 19-20 (“Having endured the ‘rigors of the front,’ these men were eager to be sexually
serviced.”) It should also be noted that the glove-like fit between war and sexual exploitation is not unique
to the United States. See, for example, the comfort women the Japanese made of Korean women, rape as
warfare in the Congo, and the former Yugoslavia.
158. Because sexual assault is a severely underreported crime, no one can know just how pervasive
the culture of sexual assault is in the American military, let alone how often American servicemen sexually
assault when they are abroad. Thirty-three percent of women in the militarywill experience sexual assault.
Approximately twenty percent of all rapes for military personnel get reported. See Kristina B. Wolff &
Peter D. Mills, Reporting Military Sexual Trauma: A Mixed-Methods Study of Women Veterans’
Experiences Who Served from World War II to War in Afghanistan, 181 MIL. MED. 840 (2016). Between
nine and a half and thirty-three percent of women report experiencing either an attempted or completed
rape during their military service. See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Taking Military Sexual Trauma
Seriously, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/
women-vets-and-mst/498866? [https://perma.cc/85VE-S426]. Approximately one out of every five
women in the United States is raped in her lifetime. For a woman in the military, her chances of being
raped increase to one out of every three women. Kristina Bell et al., When Public Institutions Betray
Women: News Coverage of Military Sexual Violence Against Women 1991-2013, 10 J. INTERDISC.
FEMINIST THOUGHT 1 (2017). Of the 5,277 service members who reported an incident of sexual assault
that occurred during military service, 4,193 were women, while 1,084 were men. The number of women
had increased by thirteen percent from the previous year. Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Releases Annual Report
on Sexual Assault in Military, U.S. DEP’T OFDEF. (May 1, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/
Article/1508127/dod-releases-annual-report-on-sexual-assault-in-military [https://perma.cc/AC2M-PJ
RA]. Women in combat are 180 times more likely to be sexually assaulted by a fellow soldier than killed
by the enemy. The Military’s Sexual Assault Epidemic, THE WEEK (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://theweek.com/articles/466100/militarys-sexual-assault-epidemic [https://perma.cc/JZ4M-6PNH].
Up to thirty-six percent of women veterans screened at Virginia treatments centers showed signs of trauma
from either sexual abuse, harassment, or assault which occurred while on active duty. See Valerie A.
Stander & Cynthia J. Thomsen, Sexual Harassment and Assault in the U.S. Military: A Review of Policy
and Research Trends, 181 MIL. MED. 20, 21 (2016). If these reported rates of sexual assault within the
military itself are any indication of the pervasiveness of a sexual assault culture in the American military,
where there are legal protections for American service men and women, then one might reasonably assume
that assault culture abroad is even more expansive.Moreover, the military is characterized by a patriarchal
structure that emphasizes masculine ideas, dominance, and control. This is demonstrated in instances
when men primarily dominate leadership and high-ranking positions. The military’s hypermasculine
dynamic is associated with the acceptance and perpetration of sexual assault, where a man’s sense of
patriarchal entitlement makes it easier for them to justify sexual assault. The men’s feelings of entitlement
to regular sex is perceived to be the link between masculinity and rape-related attitudes. Carl Andrew
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the American military, three themes emerge: (1) governmental prohibition of
marriage between American servicemen and racialized foreign women; (2)
military facilitation of sex trafficking between servicemen and racialized foreign
women; and, as Collins has argued, (3) the combined impact of governmental
policies that restricted marriage with racialized foreign women and the
facilitation of sexual exploitation led to a disproportionate number of racialized
nonmarital foreign-born children being abandoned by their fathers.
159
History is replete with examples of both Congress and the American military
restricting interracial marriage. As Zeiger chronicles, the government’s
repression and condemnation of interracial relationships was a central feature of
marriages between members of the military and foreigners from World War I
through the Korean War and the Vietnam War: “In World War I, for instance,
U.S. military and civilian authorities took a paternalistic stance toward white
soldiers” and white foreign women, “determined to ‘protect’ them from sexually
promiscuous foreign women.”
160
When it came to black soldiers, however, in
addition to an outright ban on interracial marriages, military officials warned
allies of the sexual danger that black servicemen posed to the white women of
other nations.
161
In another example, the American Expedition Forces threatened
a Filipino-American serviceman with statutory rape charges for attempting to
marry a German woman with whom he had fathered two children.
162
In World War II, the government, with the support of the military,
maintained its ban on interracial soldier marriage. In 1945, the War Brides Act
explicitly excluded womenwhowere “ineligible for citizenship” because of their
race, such as Asian women, and the privilege of preferential immigration status
was denied to them.
163
As Collins argues, “The racial prohibitions incorporated
into the War Brides Acts meant not only that a soldier could not bring his racially
excludable wife home, but also—pursuant to explicit military policy—that the
soldier would not likely be given permission to marry his racially excludable
girlfriend in the first place.”
164
Continuing through the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the military actively
thwarted marriages between soldiers and their Asian girlfriends,
165
but facilitated
Castro et al., Sexual Assault in the Military, 17 MIL. MENTAL HEALTH 2-3 (May 16, 2015),
http://cir.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Sexual-Assault-in-the-Military.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA
4Q-D67M].
159. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6.
160. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 6.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 36.
163. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2208 (citing War Brides Act, Pub. L. No. 79-271,
§ 1, 59 Stat. 659, 659 (1945) (excluding brides under immigration laws from preferences provided in
Act)).
164. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2208-09.
165. Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361, 1407-11, 1429 (2011).
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and encouraged sex trafficking.
166
Citing Zeiger, Collins explains this duality
and its impact on nonmarital foreign-born children:
[A]s Zeiger demonstrates, during the Vietnam War the military
“vigorously and systematically discouraged marriage for American
service personnel in Vietnam, placing a wide array of bureaucratic and
financial obstacles in front of marriage aspirants.” Instead, drawing on
a set of conventions and practices that had emerged during the Korean
War, the military encouraged nonmarital sexual liaisons between
American soldiers and local women, including long-term “contract”
arrangements. The children born to such relationships were illegitimate
and hence not American citizens.
167
As in the Korean War, during the Vietnam War, the American military
actively facilitated a sex trafficking culture, through “R & R” programs, for
example, which facilitated sexual exploitation between servicemen and foreign
women.
168
In elaborating on the impact of the duality of racially restrictive
marriage policy and military-facilitated sex trafficking, Zeiger argues the
combined policies shared a common core:
The intention to preserve and extend male control over women. This
intention was overt in regard to prostitution. The image of a military
red-light district, guarded by American MPs, surrounded by a wall
topped with broken glass, and staffed by army “inspected” prostitutes,
is an apotheosis of female disempowerment. But crucial features of
overseas marriage policy during World War II also created a wall of
male control around the foreign brides of American servicemen. The
procedures for wives to enter the United States and the establishment of
paternity claims were both areas in which the alien spouse was denied
standing to act independently and on her own behalf. In the matter of
paternity, an alien woman, married or unmarried, who had given birth
to the child of a U.S. serviceman had no access to child support, nor the
child, access to citizenship, unless the American father formally agreed
to recognize the child. Similarly, though a GI dependent was,
166. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 79; Bruce Cumings, Silent but Deadly: Sexual Subordination in the
U.S.-Korean Relationship, in SAUNDRA POLLOCK STURDEVANT & BRENDA STOLZFUS, LET THE GOOD
TIMES ROLL: PROSTITUTION AND THE U.S. MILITARY IN ASIA 169 (1992); see also Linda Trinh Võ &
Marian Sciachitano,Moving Beyond “Exotics, Whores, and Nimble Fingers”: Asian American Women in
a New Era of Globalization and Resistance, 21 FRONTIERS: J.WOMEN STUD. 1, 4 (2000) (“The trafficking
of Asian women as commodities in the global sex trade continues because of the U.S. military presence
in Asia, the sex tour industry in Asia, and the Asian mail-order bride business. The construction of Asian
women as hyperfeminine erotic exotics who willingly and passively service male desires has contributed
to these thriving sex industries.” (citation omitted)).
167. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2211 (citing ZEIGER, supra note 45).
168. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 79-80.
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theoretically, eligible for transportation to the United States, only the
American serviceman could file a transportation request.
169
As the result of American military bases in Philippines, thousands of
Filipino mothers filed a $68 million dollar lawsuit arguing that America had a
legal responsibility to educate and provide medical care for an estimated 8,600
Amerasians in Olongapo, the site of Subic Bay Naval Station, about the size of
Singapore.
170
The court filings described the Navy’s direct role in the local bar
and sex industry, where the Navy helped regulate the clubs, some of which were
owned by Navy officers or retirees. They registered 15,000 to 17,000
“hospitality” women and gave them information and medical care aimed at
limiting venereal disease. The Navy also approved off-base apartments where
many sailors lived with girlfriends.
171
In remarking on Olongapo, one Navy
Judge Advocate stated, “[W]e participated in creating the world’s biggest
brothel. Olongapo is called ‘the city of 10,000 whores.’”
172
In describing the
carnival-like atmosphere of the brothels for American servicemen, the judge
advocate stated:
If you’re an impressionable young kid, and you’re taken in tow—
outside to Olongapowhich is just row after row of bars, massage parlors,
and no-pretext brothels—what does that do to a young kid’s view on the
value of women?
These gals would do the most degrading things—and do them in public.
And it was always in a group. A gal would come along to a table in a
bar and literally “serve” all the guys at the table. It was always in groups.
In fact, girls would do tricks with their bodies and orifices on stage—
that was very common. One game was to have the girl go under the table
and fellate each guy—and whoever’s face cracked soonest would buy
the next round of drinks. This was true in all the enlisted bars—in the
officer clubs there wouldn’t be the group sex, but there would be group
performances.
169. Id.
170. Bruce Lambert,Abandoned Filipinos Sue U.S. Over Child Support, N.Y.TIMES (June 21, 1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/21/world/abandoned-filipinos-sue-us-over-child-support.html
[https://perma.cc/3KMC-MXCQ]. Olongapo had the largest prostitution trade near any military base in
Asia. Approximately 15,000 to 17,000 sex workers worked in Olongapo and neighboring towns. An
estimated 9,000 of these women worked in over 330 bars, massage parlors, and other “entertainment”
establishments in Olongapo. Elizabeth Kolby, Comment, Moral Responsibility to Filipino Amerasians:
Potential Immigration and Child Support Alternatives, 2 ASIAN L.J. 61, 64 (1995).
171. Lambert, supra, at 173.
172. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 711-
12 (1996).
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Subic Bay was an automatic stop for all the ships in the Pacific. So all
the guys experienced this. This was not just a few of the guys or some
small proportion; this was all the guys . . . .
That place was a circus. If I had to guess at the percentage of sailors—
officer and enlisted—who never partook of those activities in Olongapo
and Subic, I’d guess five percent.
The one thing that strikes me is: I don’t think it’s possible to
overestimate the influence of places like Olongapo. And these included
graduates of the top law schools in the country—and we were all
affected by it . . . . I mean I can’t overstate it; it was beyond anything
I’d ever seen or ever have seen since . . . . The whole carnival
atmosphere cannot be overstated.
173
This fun-filled, carnival-like frat house circus contrasts sharply with the utter
squalor American servicemen, with insatiable appetites for unprotected “One
Dollar Chicky-Chicky Girls,” create for their abandoned children, described in
more detail in Section III.C. The descriptions above provide context for the
property right Congress gives these servicemen to go abroad and “Let the Good
Times Roll”
174
without any fear that their offspringmight show up at their Senate
hearings, houses of worship, and family gatherings to remind Dad, his family,
and his community of all those raucous fun-filled nights, all the laughter, and all
the giggling. The images also reflect the moral bankruptcy of the American
military in facilitating and subsidizing sex trafficking while restricting interracial
marriage and the life chances of children Americans fathered. As Collins
poignantly argues, the combined restrictions on interracial marriage, particularly
to racialized foreign women, and the military’s active facilitation of sex
trafficking, particularly with racialized foreign women, along with the derivative
citizenship laws enacted by Congress, resulted in “the predominantly white
babies of World War II soldiers [becoming] citizens and ‘baby boomers,’ while
a very significant population of nonmarital Amerasian babies were excluded and
became ‘bui doi’—children of the dust.”
175
III. JOHNNY, HISWHP, ANDHIS SUPPORTING CAST OF CHARACTERS, JEZEBEL
ANDOFFRED
Congress, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, has equipped citizen men with
both a dagger and a shield when traveling abroad and spreading their seed.
173. Id. at 711–12.
174. See generally STURDEVANT& BRENDA STOLZFUS, supra note 166.
175. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2213.
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Section 1409 is a weapon to engage in hypermasculinity liberated from the
shackles of reproductive burdens and responsibilities—freed from reproductive
punishment or sanction. Under § 1409, men have a right—which is so valued
that it rises to the occasion of a property interest—to proclaim to the world, “I
want to whore all I want without a care in the world,” and to not suffer the
reproductive sanction or punishment of forced parental responsibility against
their male prerogative, autonomy, and freedom.
Section 1409 is a direct descendant of antebellum chattel slavery: using the
legal category of citizenship, § 1409 perfects sovereignty in white
heteropatriarchy and vulnerability in racialized and gendered others. According
to Joseph Singer, “the legal system makes constant choices about what interests
to define as property.”
176
Moreover, “[s]tate power defines and allocates property
rights, and property rights, in turn, allocate power and vulnerability. Seemingly
neutral definitions of property rights by the courts [and Congress] distribute
power and vulnerability in ways that construct illegitimate hierarchies based on
race, sex, class . . . and sexual orientation.”
177
In § 1409, Congress delegated to
citizen men the sovereign power of “the legal category of citizenship,” which
functions like property. In § 1409, Congress conferred upon citizen men a
package of entitlements that work on the valences of white, male, and
hypermasculine supremacy, taken together as white heteropatriarchy. Under
§ 1409, citizen men have the right of exclusion, what Cheryl Harris calls “the
conceptual nucleus of whiteness”—the right to discard and exclude their children
from the American polity, which is historically and consistently synonymous
with whiteness. As part of the package of entitlements, § 1409 gives American
men the power to abandon their children to circumstances tantamount to
destruction. As Joseph Stigler states, “Ownership, with the attendant right to
exclude others, confers power on the owner—power to deny other people things
they need to live.”
178
In having the right to exclude and destroy, citizen men can
continue the right to control, use, and enjoy foreign women free from the
responsibilities and regulation of parenthood. Section 1409 turns foreign women
into things to be used and their offspring into stuff to be discarded. If property is
a legal relation among persons with respect to things, then § 1409 creates a legal
relation of racialized and gendered sexual subordination shared between citizen
men with respect to foreign women. Section 1409, like property, creates a stable
basis of expectation with respect to sexual control over foreign women because
it mitigates the burdens of parenthood. To the extent that property is inherently
distributional,
179
§ 1409 allocates a valued resource, citizenship.
176. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1791 n.82 (quoting Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 47 (1991)).
177. Id. (quoting Singer, Sovereignty and Property, at 8).
178. Singer, supra note 41, at 1322.
179. Joseph W. Singer, Property, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 240, 249 (David Kairys 3d ed. 1998).
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In § 1409, Congress has given men a right to mitigate any duty or
responsibility owed to their children or the mothers of their children, under
American law. Furthermore, Congress has granted American men a birthright to
either create American citizens or to exclude and destroy them. At the same time,
Congress has suppressed the ability of foreign women to create American
citizens. Foreign women are good enough to sexually exploit, but not to create
American citizens outside of wedlock. The right Congress gave to citizen men
in the form of a choice as to the citizenship of their children mitigates the rights
and decision making of foreign women who birth American citizens. The
decision is one of male prerogative.
Through this process, whiteness, maleness, and hypermasculinity take on
the character of property in much the same way as Cheryl Harris’s “whiteness as
property,”
180
where whiteness, maleness, and the heteropatriarchal familiast
ideal become the governing organizing principles of all space—citizenship.
Whiteness is the touchstone and talisman of American entitlement and sense of
belonging. Section 1409 is “male” in that it is an exclusively male prerogative.
It is heteropatriarchal familiast in that § 1409 extends a property right, part of the
package of entitlements, which encompasses the right to engage in
hypermasculine sexual performance freed from reproductive sanction or
punishment—free from the consequences of creating children. This Article
refers to the entire process outlined in this Part III as a white heteropatriarchal
property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape (the “WHP”).
The WHP is a conceptual model that negates the claim that § 1409 emerged
from the biological and natural differences between men and women. On the
contrary, the WHP exposes § 1409 as the product of foundational choices—
choices about the relationship between rights and power.
181
The WHP casts
§ 1409 as a form of property that, as a social institution, privileges the rights of
men to perform hypermasculinity on foreign women and discard their children.
The WHP exposes Congress’s creation of an institution and social arrangement
that distributes a highly significant social good—citizenship—and justifies
privilege. The WHP places § 1409 in a moral framework, so that its obfuscating
layers, hidden presumptions, and allocation of rights and duties can be
scrutinized and measured against a society that pledges allegiance to liberty and
justice. The WHP questions whether § 1409 is an outlier in a society that rejects
forms of social life and political systems, like slavery, as a way of organizing
control over humans.
182
In its foundational choices, § 1409 creates a property
system inconsistent with the norms governing a free and democratic society that
treats each person with equal concern and respect.
183
As discussed in more detail
180. Harris,WAP, supra note 18.
181. Singer, supra note 41, at 1323.
182. Id. at 1325.
183. Id. at 1336.
2019] “Johnny and the WHP” 97
in Part V, § 1409 stands at odds with the rhetoric surrounding abortion rights and
women’s reproductive integrity, specifically the morality of sexually responsible
behavior, the sanctity of human life, and the responsibilities and duties of
parenthood.
This Part lays the theoretical underpinnings for the claim that § 1409 creates
the WHP. Drawing from Cheryl Harris and other modern theories of property,
Section III.A further explicates § 1409 as a property right. Drawing from
Anthony Farley and Angela Harris, Section III.B explicates the hypermasculine
performance aspect of the WHP. Finally, Section III.C introduces Jezebel, the
whore, the Aristotelian evil snare of men, and Johnny’s doppelganger. She
embodies the narrative of victim blaming that allows Johnny to engage in
treachery and still maintain his innocence. She is part of the cast of characters
embedded in the DNA of § 1409. She becomes the hidden justification, “slut
shaming,” in the interpretive base and doctrine that protects § 1409 from equal
protection challenges in four Supreme Court cases, discussed in Part IV. Just as
Jezebel symbolizes foreign women, Offred embodies citizen women. Offred is
the main character in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, which depicts
a dystopian universe where women are banished to reproductive enslavement
and harvesting.
184
Offred is the citizen woman automatically saddled with
parental responsibility.
185
A. The WHP as Property
According to Cheryl Harris, “whiteness as property” names the concept that
whiteness is a form of property because (1) whiteness is constitutive of what it
means to be a free person; (2) the law excludes others from whiteness (strictly
policing its boundaries); and (3) crucial legal rights and advantages flow from
whiteness.
186
Whiteness satisfies the functional criteria of property because it
includes the enjoyment of rights and privileges as well as the dominion over land,
bodies, and other forms of materiality. By both shielding white people from the
vulnerability that comes from lacking rights, land, or wealth, and conferring
upon white people the ability to materially increase their power, white
personhood confers a kind of property right that solidifies white supremacy
conceptually, spatially, and ontologically.
187
According to Harris, property is
possessed not only in the form of land, but in the form of white personhood.
184. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (Anchor Books Penguin Random House ed.
1998).
185. I mention Offred here because she is the subject of upcoming scholarship—a companion piece
that argues that § 1409 creates moral and legal accountability, as well as equality asymmetry with laws
involving abortion and the criminalization of women for birthing drug-dependent children. Although some
of these arguments are explored in this piece, future scholarship will explore those ideas in depth.
186. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1725-30.
187. Id. at 1713.
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White personhood, according to Harris, is exclusively given the powers of
possession, which manifests materially in the owning of property, immunity
from legal harm, and the subordination of non-whites.
188
Whiteness itself is the
property of being able to possess rights, power, immunities, as well as land and
human beings. White people have created supremacy in themselves by making
property of others. Drawing from Harris, and as Andrew Krinks observes,
whiteness is the preeminent mode of ownership and power and, in turn, has the
authority to bend blackness to its will. Whiteness becomes the Earth because
whiteness subsumes everything into itself, likewise materially manifesting itself
onto the world, such that blackness can both literally and figuratively function
as intrusion or trespass, simply for existing in what is sometimes explicitly or
implicitly understood as “white space”
189
or America.
Drawing from Harris, § 1409 is where the monopolization of citizenship in
the hands of citizen men traveling abroad, and the propertization of foreign
bodies conflates ideologically, doctrinally, and materially: citizenship is where
white heteropatriarchy perfects sovereignty in itself and vulnerability in others
through a kind of statelessness
190
—a place without rights, what Chief Justice
Taney called, “no rights which the white man was bound to respect”
191
—and a
place implemented by force and ratified by law.
192
Citizenship, therefore, polices
the boundaries of whiteness at the nation’s border as a means of preserving the
material and psychological benefits of whiteness as well as lines of
inheritance.
193
Section 1409 sets the boundary between the American polity and
racial “filth,” bringing down the value of white cleanliness and societal order.
Section 1409 draws a divide between America and inestimable numbers of
foreign women whose sexual exploitation by American men marks them as the
undesirable “other” imperiling white space and societal cleanliness.
Section 1409 keeps foreign women and their children fathered by American men
frozen as “dirty secrets” petrified in the white heteropatriarchal mind and a
material world of limitless exploitation beyond the border far, far away.
Harris provides the connection between property and relationships of
domination and exploitation in the following:
[P]roperty is a legal construct by which selected private interests are
protected and upheld. In creating property “rights,” the law draws
boundaries and enforces or reorders existing regimes of power. The
188. Id. at 1725-30.
189. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1121.
190. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1715 (“Although the systems of oppression of Blacks and Native
Americans differed in form—the former involving the seizure and appropriation of labor, the latter
entailing the seizure and appropriation of land—undergirding both was a racialized conception of property
implemented by force and ratified by law.”).
191. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
192. Id.
193. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1119.
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inequalities that are produced and reproduced are not givens or
inevitabilities, but rather are conscious selections regarding the
structuring of social relations. In this sense, it is contended that property
rights and interests are not “natural,” but are “creation[s] of law.”
194
Under § 1409, Congress, with the Supreme Court in tow, has made a choice
to grant the WHP legal status, which allocates and distributes power and
vulnerability for the express purpose of sexual domination and commodification.
These choices are not the product of physiological differences between men and
women, but rather, valued access to foreign women for hypermasculine
purposes. Section 1409 is where citizen men become ideological propositions
enforced through power, and foreign women and their nonmarital children
become ideological propositions imposed through subordination, all of whom
exist in a material reality of power and control that § 1409 creates.
195
Under
§ 1409, citizen men become weapons of law and a resource deployable at the
social, political, and institutional level to maintain control over foreign women
and their children while engaged in the sexual exploitation of foreign women.
196
Under § 1409, the legal mechanism of citizenship maneuvers, much like
property, to endow white heteropatriarchy with both the ideological and material
right to exclude, possess, control, enjoy, transfer, and destroy.
197
In that way,
§ 1409 satisfies the functional criteria of property.
198
Like property, § 1409
creates rights and privileges in white heteropatriarchy, and it also creates duties
in foreign women and their offspring, namely to respect the rights and privileges
in American men and to accept their own denigration at the hands of American
men. Section 1409 creates “outside” children. In this way, property not only
protects value, it creates value. Section 1409 protects and creates value in
whiteness and vulnerability in foreignness. It protects and creates value in
maleness and vulnerability in femaleness. It protects and creates value in
194. Harris,WAP, supra note 18 at 1730.
195. Id. (“The law constructed ‘whiteness’ as an objective fact, although in reality it is an ideological
proposition imposed through subordination. This move is the central feature of ‘reification’: ‘Its basis is
that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’
an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental
nature: the relation between people.’”).
196. Id. at 1734 (“The state’s official recognition of a racial identity that subordinated Blacks and of
privileged rights in property based on race elevated whiteness from a passive attribute to an object of law
and a resource deployable at the social, political, and institutional level to maintain control.”).
197. Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness As Property
and Racial Performance As Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL&ETHNIC JUST. 7, 30 (2015). (quoting
Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1736 (“The right to exclude was the central principle, too, of whiteness as
identity . . . . [t]he possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others from the
privileges inhering in whiteness; whiteness became an exclusive club whose membership was closely and
grudgingly guarded.”).
198. Harris, WAP, supra note 18, at 1731 (arguing that whiteness functions as property in the right
to exclude, possess, transfer, use, dispose, and enjoy).
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heteropatriarchal sexual performance and the material circumstances necessary
to sexually exploit.
At the core of whiteness is what Harris calls its conceptual nucleus of
exclusion.
199
Making whiteness a kind of property “reproduces black
subordination” by default, because the construction of whiteness as superior and
as the access to wealth, property, and citizenship, is not possible apart from the
dehumanization of blackness.
200
Thus, whiteness not only sets up the dichotomy
of insider and outsider, but by positioning itself inside the circle of rights and
privileges and situating the other outside the charmed circle, it also establishes
racial hierarchy that enables the vulnerable conditions for exploitation. In
Harris’s words, “The fundamental precept of whiteness—the core of its value—
is its exclusivity. But exclusivity is predicated not on any intrinsic characteristic,
but on the existence of the symbolic Other . . . .”
201
In other words, as with many
objects generally in a capitalist society, the thing in and of itself lacks value. The
ability to exclude creates value. Valorized whiteness requires dehumanized
blackness in order to be powerful materially and symbolically. If whiteness is
property, then blackness is always trespass.
202
Drawing from Harris, the “white” in the WHP is the right to exclude from
the American polity, which is synonymous with whiteness. The driving force in
the bundle of rights, or package of entitlements, that § 1409 confers to citizen
men, regardless of their race, is the right to exclude, which structurally assumes
whiteness. In fact, and as discussed in more detail in Part IV, which analyzes the
Supreme Court cases that have addressed § 1409, it is the power of exclusion
that triggers Congress’s plenary power in areas of immigration. It is also
Congress’s plenary power that has shielded § 1409 from amore exacting scrutiny
than would otherwise apply to explicit race, gender, or nationality disparity in
other areas of law.
203
As Harris states, “American law has recognized a property
interest in whiteness that although unacknowledged now forms the background
against which legal disputes are framed, argued, and adjudicated.”
204
Moreover,
§ 1409 not only policies the boundaries of white space, but it also sets up a
perimeter around foreign women against whom citizen men form their masculine
identities through hypermasculine sexual performance. And then, in an endless
199. Id. at 1714; see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1153; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW 257-58 (2012) (“[A]n aspect of human nature is the tendency to cling tightly to one’s
advantages and privileges and to rationalize the suffering and exclusion of others.”).
200. Harris,WAP, supra note 18 at 1731.
201. Id. at 1789.
202. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1156-57. This concept might also explain why black
equality, for some whites, looks like trespass, a feeling some characterize as being left behind.
203. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.”); Michael G. McFarland, Derivative Citizenship: Its History, Constitutional Foundation, and
Constitutional Limitations, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 467, 509 (2008).
204. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1714.
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stream of ironies, the foreign woman’s sexual exploitation by American men
becomes yet another reason to deny her children citizenship. As discussed in
more detail in Part IV, the Supreme Court has justified the constitutional
solvency of § 1409 by raising the evil specter of millions of war babies ready to
raid the government coffers, and an equal number of menacing foreign women
who do not know the identities of their children’s fathers; thus, the sexual
immorality and depravity of these foreign women become yet another reason to
deny their children access.
Extending from Harris, § 1409 creates the WHP. By conferring a package
of entitlements to citizen fathers, more specifically by granting citizen fathers
the right to exclude their nonmarital foreign-born children from the polity—to
deny them citizenship—§ 1409 vests in these men not just a right to exclude their
children, but a right to effectively destroy them, while simultaneously investing
in these fathers a biopower to continue the sexual possession, control, use, and
enjoyment of foreign women. The following chart is a visualization of theWHP.
Figure 1: Visualization of the WHP
To further illustrate the power conferred by § 1409 and to humanize the
claim that § 1409 creates a right in citizen fathers to abandon their children in
circumstances tantamount to destruction, consider the following passage from
Bonnie Kae Grover, describing the “bui doi,” “children of the dust,
205
the
205. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2213. Similarly in the Philippines, the
Amerasians, fathered by Americans, are known as “throwaway children,” “bye, bye, Daddy,” “half
dollar,” or “souvenir.” Lambert, supra note 170. They live on the margins, endure high rates of poverty
and ill health even by Filipino standards, and are frequently abandoned as infants or raised by young single
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children American military men fathered and abandoned during the Vietnam
War, when America was out spreading democracy.
206
These discarded children
are now middle-aged and living in squalor facilitated by their American fathers
and the societal policies embedded in § 1409:
Most Amerasians were born to working class women and thus lack the
education and resources to relocate to the United States or even make
contact with their fathers. Many of them look strikingly occidental, but
far from conferring an advantage, their Western appearance subjects
them to scorn and derision. Vietnam is a relatively homogeneous society
in which Amerasians cannot hide that their mothers consorted with a
hated enemy. Some mothers abandoned their children, placed them in
orphanages, or gave them to relatives to raise. Today, they are subject
to intense discrimination. Most cannot find jobs and live on the streets
or lead lives of crime and prostitution. Many live in official compounds
built for their protection or otherwise depend on the government for
safety. There has been little public pressure to make amends and little
hue and cry in the United States to try to relieve the conditions under
which these children live.
207
In sum, modern theories of property explain the power of the WHP and its
formidable strength in the face of constitutional challenge. Although many laws
that facially discriminate on the basis of gender have been overturned, partially
because their explicit gender references trigger a greater burden of justification,
§ 1409 remains entrenched. It remains resilient because it protects a time-
honored property right behind the obfuscating glare of legal doctrine’s power to
ratify the settled expectations of white heteropatriarchal privilege as natural—
the legitimate natural baseline—evinced in the biological differences between
Feelings on American Return, WASH. POST (May 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/filipino-children-of-us-sailors-and-soldiers-have-mixed-feelings-on-american-return/2016/
05/15/a12b8a7a-1621-11e6-971a-dadf9ab18869_story.html [https://perma.cc/3W3D-MLBL].
206. “No one knows how many Amerasians were born—and ultimately left behind in Vietnam—
during the decade-long war that ended in 1975. In Vietnam’s conservative society, where premarital
chastity is traditionally observed and ethnic homogeneity embraced, many births of children resulting
from liaisons with foreigners went unregistered.” David Lamb, Children of the Vietnam War,
SMITHSONIANMAG. (June 2009), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/children-of-the-vietnam-war-
131207347 [https://perma.cc/ZUB3-EDAJ]. Congress enacted legislation in 1987 giving Amerasians
special immigration status. James Dao, Vietnam Legacy: Finding G.I. Fathers, and Children Left Behind,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/us/vietnam-legacy-finding-gi-
fathers-and-children-left-behind.html [https://perma.cc/7BAL-QNAL]. Since then, more than 21,000
Vietnamese Amerasians have relocated to the United States. Dao, supra. “It is also estimated that there
are roughly 50,000 Filipino Amerasians, due to the United States’ 94-year occupation of the archipelago
from the Spanish-American War in 1898 until withdrawal in 1992.” Emily von Hoffmann, The Forgotten
Americans: Meet the Abandoned Children of U.S. Military Servicemen Abroad, PIXEL MAG. (Nov. 19,
2015), https://medium.com/pixel-magazine/the-forgotten-americans-meet-the-abandoned-children-of-u-
s-military-servicemen-abroad-3fc54f8cd8f3 [https://perma.cc/7L23-3WKN].
207. See Bonnie Kae Grover, Aren’t These Our Children? Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement and
Restitution, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y& L. 247, 254 (1995).
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men and women, which cannot be disturbed without overturning the entire
natural order.
208
Part IV illuminates how the Supreme Court has entrenched and
legitimated the settled expectations of the WHP through the obfuscating might
of nature and biology, turning those hegemonic maneuvers into legal doctrine,
which reifies a material reality of sexualized racial domination.
Before turning to the performative aspects of the WHP, it is imperative to
highlight the novelty of this article, and that is the value of applying a property
rubric to § 1409; centralizing the lives of racialized women as the interpretive
base for a critique of § 1409; and the value of intersectional analysis to unearth
the pernicious endurance of the WHP. Although the current controversy
surrounding § 1409 is rightfully multifaceted, a property analysis is absent from
the dialogue and debate. And yet a property perspective is ubiquitous in § 1409.
Applying a property rubric to citizenship reveals that both citizenship and
property share the same conceptual nucleus—exclusion. Property involves how
society recognizes value,
209
how society organizes space, and how society
organizes people in space. Drawing from Harris, white heteropatriarchy has
usurped all space and relegated vulnerable bodies to particularized places, for
the purpose of exploitation. Space, therefore, becomes hierarchical on the
valences of race, class, and gender. In restricting the movement and actions of
nonmarital foreign-born children, Congress has fundamentally framed § 1409 as
a property interest. In § 1409, Congress is grappling with what to do with
disposable children—how to physically cordon them off from the American
polity—how to leave them behind as a “dirty” and “dark” secret.
Not just Congress, but the Supreme Court, in immunizing § 1409 from equal
protection challenges, has justified § 1409 as protecting government coffers,
legitimate lines of inheritance for citizen men, and the nation’s (white)
boundaries from undesirability, in the form of nonmarital foreign-born children
and their immoral mothers. Section 1409 is a direct descendant of antebellum
slavery: it is where citizenship and property collude to render foreign women
vulnerable to hypermasculine performance. From the standpoint of property, it
allows American men to treat both foreign women and their own children as if
they were nonhuman, much like slave laws allowed white men to treat their own
enslaved children and the mothers of those children as property. It makes
208. Harris, WAP, supra note 18, at 1714 (“After legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness
as property evolved into a more modern form through the law’s ratification of the settled expectations of
relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline.”).
209. Quoting James Madison, Cheryl Harris states:
In James Madison’s view, for example, property ‘embraces everything to which a man may attach
a value and have a right,’ referring to all of a person’s legal rights. Property as conceived in the
founding era included not only external objects and people’s relationships to them, but also all of
those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important for human well-being,
including: freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom from bodily harm, and free and
equal opportunities to use personal faculties.”
Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1726.
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children fathered by American men trespassers on American soil. It makes
individual citizen men border agents at the nation’s white borders materially,
psychically, and aesthetically—defending the nation’s boundaries from
penniless vagrants, bringing down the value of whiteness with racialized filth.
Citizenship, like Harris’s whiteness as property, confers tangible and
economically valuable benefits and is jealously guarded as a valued possession,
allowed only to those who meet a strict standard of proof.
210
In immunizing
§ 1409 from equal protection challenges, the Supreme Court is engaged in a turf
battle—warfare—protecting the nation from undesirability, particularly
racialized trespassers fathered by American men, discarded and left behind. To
the extent that property law and property rights have an inescapable distributive
component,
211
Congress has distributed a set of rights and privileges to citizen
men that work along the valences of whiteness, hypermasculinity, and foreign
female subjugation—the three straps in the WHP. Moreover, as discussed in
more detail in Part IV, each of the Supreme Court cases that have upheld § 1409
can be read as the Supreme Court’s defense of property interests embedded in
the WHP. Finally, applying a property rubric to § 1409 reveals it as a white
heteropatriarchal project—fundamental to white heteropatriarchal identity
formation, whereby sexually subjugated foreign women become a rite of passage
in masculine identity formation, American immigration and citizenship policy,
and American imperialism.
B. The WHP as Performance
In arguing that § 1409 creates a property right in white heteropatriarchal
performance on vulnerable bodies, I reference several theorists. Most
immediately, I reference Anthony Farley and his seminal article The Black Body
as Fetish Object, particularly Farley’s argument that black bodies have provided
platforms, canvasses, stages, and theater for the formulation and formation of
“whiteness.”
212
Farley argues, “The white identity is created and maintained by
decorating black bodies with disdain, over and over again”
213
and that “[r]ace is
a form of pleasure in one’s body which is achieved through humiliation of the
Other and, then, as the last step, through a denial of the entire process.”
214
Whiteness, as an identity, emerges out of this discourse; for “[i]f the black body
is the site and cite of all ills, then the white body is not.”
215
Moreover, once the
black body, and by extension foreign women, particularly foreign nonwhite
women, is branded as the site for all ills, it provides carte blanche for sexual
210. Id.
211. Singer, Property, supra note 179, at 249.
212. Farley, supra note 105, at 464.
213. Id. at 463.
214. Id. at 464.
215. Id. at 475.
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exploitation because the foreign body, and foreign land, become an
indispensable justification for sexual domination and canvass for unbridled
sexual fantasy.
216
Far from aberrant, these performances are endemic to the formation of white
heteropatriarchal identity, and by extension, American sovereignty. It is through
these performances that white heteropatriarchy takes material shape. Angela
Harris, citing Elaine Scarry, maps out the connective tissue between these
performances on vulnerable bodies and the creation of sovereignty, dominion,
and control:
Literary theorist Elaine Scarry argues that one of the properties of
human pain is that its characteristics—its vibrancy, its reality, its
certainty—can be transferred away from a human body and onto
something else, something that in itself does not appear vibrant, real, or
certain. In this sense, pain, and the violence that induces it, is a means
of creation, a way of making ideas real, the way bloodless ideas such as
property and sovereignty are made real in war and conquest by the
presence of actual blood and the mutilation and destruction of human
bodies.
217
In the context of § 1409 and its history, white heteropatriarchal performance
on vulnerable bodies, including philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape, is a
way of materializing an idea about inferiority and superiority, entitlement and
property, sovereignty and vulnerability, and belonging and statelessness upon
the foreign female’s very flesh. Such an inscription is a form of maintaining
power over foreign women. It is a modality of domination. Section 1409 enables
a performance on vulnerable bodies that functions as an identity formation, a rite
of passage, that draws the line between domination and subjugation.
Section 1409 facilitates a male citizen release valve through the inscription of
sexualized performance on foreign women, creating a hierarchy of mastery and
submission and superiority and inferiority, which taken together reestablishes
masculinity.
C. Johnny’s Doppelganger Jezebel—the Whore and Aristotelian Evil Snare of
Men
Jezebel is Johnny Appleseed’s necessary mirror image, foil, or
doppelganger—the foreign woman as “whore” and Aristotelian evil snare of
men. Johnny Appleseed, of course, is the embodiment of white heteropatriarchy,
216. See id. at 475. (discussing the branding power of narratives of supremacy to justify the use of
black bodies as places for a canvass for both pleasure and humiliation).
217. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, supra note 24, at 781.
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wielding hisWHP. Joan Tarpley defines Jezebel as “the wanton, libidinous black
woman whose easy ways excused white men’s abuse of their slaves as sexual
‘partners’ and bearers of mulatto offspring.”
218
Stacey Floyd-Thomas explains
“the Aristotelian evil snare of men” as the necessary supporting narrative of rape
culture and sexualized regimes of violence. As she explains, “[s]ex is an
undisciplined result of a body overtaking its soul—a powerful force that drives
men more than it does women, yet one nonetheless caused by women. Since the
mind should control the body, sexual activity should be controlled as well.”
219
Interrelated patterns of sexism follow suit, for as kings and warriors, men are
superior and must guard both their bodies and those of women who are subject
to a “strict watch.”
220
According to Floyd-Thomas, when men rape women, it is
because women have used their bodies to ensnare the soul of men:
As a result, misogyny is rational, and heterosexism is a virtue. Likewise,
sexual activity should be severely restricted for women of the same
social and economic class as the men whose sexual needs are so
powerful and demanding, but it is nonetheless allowed and encouraged
for men with “lower-class” women (women outside the circle of
dominant-class men).
221
Hypersexualized, exoticized, and licentious, Jezebel embodies a form of
victim blaming that reflects a discourse of domination. She is the narrative and
direct outgrowth of laws that made vulnerable bodies property (e.g., Dred Scott
and laws of coverture).
222
Victim blaming normalizes exploitation because the
pathology of the perpetrator is rendered invisible by blaming the victim. Victim
blaming is a fundamental precept of hegemony because it explains societal order
as the fault of its victims. Jezebel, the whore, or the snare, is a quintessential
counterpart to Johnny, the embodiment of white heteropatriarchy: through the
snare (victim blaming), Johnny can engage in hypermasculinity and treachery
and still maintain his innocence—and the importance of Johnny’s innocence can
never be imperiled, questioned, or undervalued. No matter how treacherous,
Johnny must always be innocent and his actions utterly deniable. By way of
example, it is the constant over-pathologizing of vulnerable women, which leads
218. Joan Tarpley, Blackwomen, Sexual Myth, and Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1343, 1345
(1996) (defining Jezebel as “the wanton, libidinous black woman whose easy ways excused white men’s
abuse of their slaves as sexual ‘partners’ and bearers of mulatto offspring”).
219. BEYOND THE PALE: READING ETHICS FROM THE MARGINS 12 (Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas &
Miguel A. De La Torre eds., 2011). This view of women, particularly loose women, as the Aristotelian
Evil Snare of Men, is also reflected in the books of the Old and New Testaments. See Proverbs 23:27-28
(“For a whore is a deep ditch; and a strange woman is a narrow pit. She also lieth in wait for a prey, and
increaseth the transgressors among men.”); 1 Corinthians 6:13 (“Now the body is not for fornication, but
for the Lord; and the Lord for the body.”).
220. BEYOND THE PALE: READING ETHICS FROM THEMARGINS, supra note 219.
221. BEYOND THE PALE: READING ETHICS FROM THEMARGINS, supra note 219.
222. Cook, Stop Traffic, supra note 8.
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to their (over)criminalization. It explains why we incarcerate women who give
birth to children dependent upon illicit substances, but we allow Johnny to spread
his seed all over the globe and discard his children. As another example, the
American military sometimes facilitated the circumstances in which servicemen
fathered children—for instance, by establishing “R & R centers”—but that
facilitation did not factor into Justices Stevens’s and Kennedy’s opinions
upholding the constitutionality of § 1409. They instead justified upholding
§ 1409 in part because they believed that many foreign women “do not know the
identity of the fathers.”
223
The hypersexualized, fetishized, and racialized narrative of Jezebel, as seen
in the Supreme Court’s references to foreign women who do not know the
identities of the fathers of their children, is what allows Johnny to engage in
treachery and sexual transgression while maintaining his innocence. Jezebel is
the foreign women whose demonization provides cover for Johnny’s
pathology—his whoring. Jezebel is also the exoticized footstool for Johnny’s
unbridled and unhinged sexual fantasy and fetish. She is the “goings on” between
master and enslaved in the dirty slave shacks. Jezebel renders Johnny’s
hypermasculinity obfuscated, hidden from view, and latent because the focus
shifts from Johnny’s WHP onto the hypersexualized body of a racialized foreign
woman. To be clear, Jezebel is not a reflection of how foreign or racialized
women are, but rather, what white heteropatriarchy needs them to be.
224
She is a
deliberately created fiction to render invisible the pathology of the WHP. She is
one aspect of a complex set of images and mythology that deny humanity in
order to rationalize exploitation.
225
In the lexicon of the master, she is an “evil”
deserving of rape and barred from the big house along with her disposable
children.
Jezebel, like the libidinous enslaved woman and the exoticized Asian
woman, is simultaneously a product of white heteropatriarchal fantasy, sexual
conduct, deniability, and excuse. By way of illustration, victim blaming was a
narrative created and sustained by the American military to justify sexual
exploitation and to provide a defense and justification for rape. The narrative
serves a two-fold purpose: both of which perfectly track the workings of implicit
bias and the pathological gaze: it (1) over-valorizes the innocent men of the
military and (2) pathologizes foreign women. It concretizes the concept of the
American warrior as pure and at the mercy of the foreign woman as evil and
transcended.
226
According to Susan Zeiger, victim blaming created a veil,
223. Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1702; Kolby, supra
note 170, at 63-65 (discussing the U.S. government’s role in encouraging the growth of prostitution in
Angeles City, just outside Clark Air Force Base, and Olongapo, next to Subic Bay Naval Stations, both
in the Philippines).
224. Chang, supra note 38, at 250, 261 (2015).
225. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 80, at 1437.
226. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 15.
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providing the right conditions to perpetuate the sexual exploitation, but to hide
it from public approbation that might undermine public support for the war. In
other words, it hid it in plain sight for continued pleasure, but cloaked it for
protection from condemnation.
227
Section 1409 facilitates the sexual exploitation
of foreign women, but is enshrouded with obfuscating veils to assuage guilt and
to remain hidden so that the viewer of the American scene can continue to
participate in the implicit bias bubble, where one can consciously and
simultaneously commit treachery, wallow in ignorance, steep oneself in denial,
and then claim, “Oh my goodness. Well . . . I just didn’t know.”
As developed in more detail in Part IV, the Supreme Court has deployed the
evil snare to immunize § 1409 from gender-based equal protection challenges.
When the Court submerged § 1409’s gender disparity in “the problems of
determining paternity” and foreign womenwho did not know the identity of their
children’s father, the snare becomes part of the victim blaming process that
inverts the gaze of pathology from the perpetrator to the victim, further
obfuscating the perpetrator’s treachery. This move is key in the context of § 1409
because it becomes part of the government’s justification for § 1409 and is
adopted in the majority opinions by both Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy,
military men.
228
In their majority opinions, the snare is lurking in the
background. Johnny and Jezebel are engaged in what Angela Harris calls a
Manichean
229
struggle of good and evil, where the innocent Johnny falls prey to
the conniving trickery of the evil Jezebel and must be liberated by the Supreme
Court.
IV. THE SUPREMECOURTOPINIONS AND THREE STRAPS IN THEWHP—
WHITENESS, HYPERMASCULINITY, AND FEMALE SUBORDINATION
On four separate occasion in the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has
had an opportunity to bring § 1409 in line with modern standards of decency that
mark the maturation of an advancing nation. The Court has, however, declined
such advancement. The Court has instead erected legal narratives that ratify and
normalize white heteropatriarchal entitlement, privilege, and power. The Court
has submerged the gender asymmetry in § 1409 into the natural differences
between men and women as well as Congress’s plenary power to police the
nation’s borders. In the last of the four cases, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, found that the more lenient physical presence requirement that applied
227. Id. (stating that “[p]olitical considerations also played a role, chiefly President Wilson’s need
to steer unsettled public opinion in support of the European war; an army with high moral standards was
an important condition of war support for many American voters, especially evangelicals”).
228. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
229. Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78.
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to female citizens, not males, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
230
In
fashioning a remedy, however, the Court applied the more onerous standard
applicable to men to women; thus, in a valiant effort to bring the gender
asymmetry in § 1409 in line with modern notions of fairness, the Supreme Court
preserved male privilege at the expense of women.
So why has § 1409 proven so resilient? It is resilient because it strikes at the
core of American identity: it perpetuates racial discrimination through gender
discrimination with an added bonus of hypermasculine sexual performance. As
such, it operates along three axes: (1) whiteness, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3)
female subjugation, the three straps in the WHP. Each of these axes become
justifying principles as the Supreme Court defends the property interests and
allocation of rights embedded in the WHP. As to the first category, “whiteness,”
in its earlier approaches to § 1409, the Court explicitly—and later implicitly—
found that § 1409 triggered Congress’s plenary power to police the nation’s
white borders against aliens and national security threats.
231
As such, with the
exception of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion inMorales-Santana, the Court
has applied a diluted form of scrutiny, much lower than the constitutional
exacting applied to most explicitly discriminatory statutes.
232
As discussed in more detail in this Part IV, each of the opinions that have
upheld the constitutionality of § 1409 have raised the evil specter of the “alien”
in various forms to trigger using the plenary power doctrine to shield § 1409,
whether it was Congress’s recognized authority to protect the country from
communists, national security threats, Jezebel, millions of war babies, or
racialized deportable criminals. The massively destructive abandonment of
inestimable numbers of children fathered by American men was not viewed as
unconscionable, but rather became a reason to justify § 1409.
233
Both Justices
Stevens and Kennedy explicitly raised the enormous number of war babies, to
the tune of millions, to justify § 1409’s gender asymmetrical treatment between
men and women. As argued in more detail in Part V, both Congress’s and the
Supreme Court’s actions are not only lacking in morality, they are not in keeping
with the fundamental values of liberty, equality, and democracy. Moreover, as
argued in Part V, to the extent that the Court is poised to overturn Roe v. Wade
234
and wax eloquent about the sanctity of life, the morality of sexually responsible
behavior, and the responsibilities of parenthood, the attitudes adopted by the
230. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698, 198 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2017).
231. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
232. Mariella, supra note 36, at 222 (arguing that there is “substantively diluted scrutiny of § 1409’s
gender classification, even though such sex-based classifications are typically reviewed under heightened
scrutiny”).
233. See Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1494 (stating “it is not at all clear that a majority
of the sitting justices would consider it a problem, as a constitutional matter, that our citizenship laws
insulate male soldiers and the United States from citizenship claims by or on behalf of nonmarital foreign-
born children, regardless of the racial dimension of the phenomenon”).
234. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Court in cases involving § 1409 reveal a bankrupt moral hypocrisy lacking in
constitutional integrity.
The second axis along which the Supreme Court defended § 1409 is
hypermasculinity. Section 1409 shields hypermasculinity from the reach and
regulation of reproductive sanction and punishment. The Court has never
explicitly addressed the halo effect that § 1409 gives to male sexual prerogatives
outside marriage; however, it has dog-whistled this concern through empirical
evidence involving the number of men serving abroad and engaged in sexual
tourism. In dissenting opinions, both Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor have
remarked on the sexual prerogatives underlying § 1409. Justice Ginsburg noted
that “[t]here are . . . men out there who are being Johnny Appleseed,” and Justice
O’Connor articulated a similar concern, stating that our sex-based citizenship
laws are “paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility,
and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.”
235
As to the third category, “female subjugation,” § 1409 does three things.
First, it facilitates the regulation of citizened women’s bodies to ensure racial
purity in the polity by sanctioning them with automatic motherhood for birthing
nonmarital foreign-born children. As argued in more detail in Part V, this
automatic sanctioning is a form of reproductive regulation and punishment.
Second, § 1409 keeps foreign women prone to male power by dispossessing their
children, leaving both with little recourse or protection. Third, in upholding
§ 1409 against constitutional challenge, the Court regularly reaches for the snare.
In numerous passages, the Court states that the gender asymmetry in § 1409
results from “lurking” problems of paternity proof—code for untrustworthy,
loose foreign women or, more candidly, what Justice Stevens calls women who
may not know who the father is.
236
Thus, the Court has hidden the
hypermasculinity embedded in § 1409—the WHP—inside the snare—victim
blaming.
Using the Court’s three justifying principles—whiteness, hypermasculinity,












In particular, the Court’s contrasting approaches
235. See supra note 35.
236. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (stating that “[g]iven the 9-month interval between conception and birth,
it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even
the mother will be sure of the father’s identity”).
237. Flores-Villar v. United States involved a gender-based equal protection challenge to the
physical presence requirement in § 1409. 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam), aff’g 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2008). However, the Court declined to reach this issue, and, in a four-four per curiam decision, affirmed
the lower court without opinion. As a result, I have not included Flores-Villar in my analysis.
238. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
239. 523 U.S. 420, 424-26 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).
240. 533 U.S. at 56-57.
241. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
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between Fiallo, Miller, and Nguyen, on the one hand and Morales-Santana, on
the other, demonstrate the need for historical contextuality and anti-
subordination principles
242
when deciding gender-based equal protection
challenges.
A. Fiallo: Immigration Preferences and Lurking Johnny
243
Fiallo addressed immigration preferences and was decided squarely within
the ambit of immigration law. Section 1409, by contrast, is a derivative
citizenship statute that confers citizenship at birth. Nevertheless, Fiallo laid the
doctrinal groundwork for the derivative citizenship cases considered in this Part
IV.
244
Fiallo established three doctrinal principles underlying § 1409 cases: (1)
white exclusion and the evil specter of alien undesirability; (2) male prerogative
and the doctrine of absenting fathers; and (3) the disturbing narrative of the
hypersexualized snare—all to justify the WHP.
In Fiallo, decided in 1977, a group of citizen fathers and their nonmarital
foreign-born children brought a gender-based equal protection challenge against
§ 101(b)(1) of the INA. Section 101(b)(1) excluded them from immigration
preferences.
245
More specifically, it excluded unwed fathers, but not mothers,
from the definition of “parent,” and their nonmarital children from the definition
of “child.”
246
Rather than separate Congress’s ability to expel or exclude aliens,
on the one hand, and Congress’s gender discrimination on the other, the Court
conflated the issues and rejected the plaintiffs’ claims.
247
The Court tucked and
elided Congress’s gender discrimination behind Congress’s plenary power,
applied rational basis review, and stated, “Our cases ‘have long recognized the
power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial
242. In describing the need for anti-subordination principles in vulnerability theory, legal scholar
Angela P. Harris states:
Vulnerability, in policy analysis, is commonly treated as a fixed characteristic of the population
or individual in question, rather than as the outcome of social and political relations. By
obscuring the political and institutional components of vulnerability, conventional policy
analysis has the potential to portray domination as difference, and to hide the problem of
unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within a universalist framework. Recognition of
vulnerability must therefore be supplemented with an explicit commitment to the anti-
subordination principle, which requires us to look for power and injustice even in our language
and our frameworks for research and policy.
Angela P. Harris, Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY,
CLIMATE& ENV’T 96, 148-49 (2014) [hereinafter Harris, Vulnerability and Power].
243. While Fiallowas decided squarelywithin the ambit of immigration law,Miller,Nguyen,Flores-
Villar, and Morales-Santana considered the derivative citizenship statute, which transfers citizenship at
birth. Antognini, supra note 14, at 413, 428. Nevertheless, Fiallo laid the doctrinal groundwork for the
derivative citizenship cases considered in this Part IV.
244. Antognini, supra note 14, at 413, 428.
245. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791 (1977).
246. Id. at 781.
247. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 189.
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control.’”
248
The Court narrowed the role for judicial review in immigration
cases and rejected heightened scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of a
gender-based immigration statute, which Justice Thurgood Marshall, the only
person of color on the court, advanced in his dissent.
249
Instead, the Court held
that the gender explicit discriminatory selection criteria was reasonable “because
of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties as well as a concern
with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity
determinations.”
250
1. The Evil Specter of Alien Undesirability as Threat
In an interesting analogy, the Court drew a parallel between alien threats to
national security, namely the Chinese, with the plaintiffs in order to justify
Congress’s plenary power to exclude. Citing Fong Yue Ting, one of the
foundational Chinese Exclusionary Act cases,
251
Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, implicitly analogized the plaintiffs, nonmarital foreign-born children
and their fathers, to vast hordes of Chinese invading white American soil who
will not assimilate. Using racialized alien invasion as justification, Justice Powell
deferred to Congress in matters of “the admission of aliens and their right to
remain” as a necessity, “touching as it does basic aspects of national
sovereignty.”
252
In drawing the analogy between the plaintiffs and hordes of
Chinese, the Court raised the evil specter of alien undesirability to justify
exclusion. The Court created a narrative of excludability premised on racialized
undesirability, potential criminality, and national security threat. The Court’s
likening plaintiffs to racialized aliens reveals the Court’s actual concern, as
opposed to the facts before the Court, which was policing the nation’s boundaries
from undesirability—the conceptual nucleus lying at the very heart of whiteness
in the WHP.
253
It is this foundational concern that will dilute the level of scrutiny
in the gender-based equal protection cases that follow Fiallo, specificallyMiller,
248. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953)).
249. Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note
127, at 189.
250. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
251. Id. at 792 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). Fong Yue Ting was
one of the Chinese Exclusionary Act cases, as well as a foundational case on plenary power, which, along
with Chae Chan Ping, evokes the imagery of Chinese as vast hordes invading the United States. Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
252. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792-93.
253. See Antognini, supra note 14, at 426-27; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2154
(noting that well into the twentieth century, the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding, other formal
rules that governed membership in the American polity—such as immigration and naturalization laws—
were shaped in significant ways by racial nativism). It is clear that gender-based domestic relations law
principles incorporated into jus sanguinis citizenship law served a larger racially nativist nation-building
project.
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Nguyen, and Flores.
254
As explained in more detail in Section IV.E, Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion, writing for the majority inMorales-Santana, guts the use of
the plenary power doctrine to restrain constitutional oversight by the judiciary.
255
2. Absenting Fathers, a Dred ScottMove
As Albertina Antognini noted, in an exercise of judicial activism, the Court
relied on two justifications that were not actually in the record or capable of
observation: perceived absent fathers, as opposed to the actual ones that were
before the Court, and “lurking problems of proof,” as opposed to real ones.
256
Together, as Antognini argues, the “perceived absence” of close family ties and
the “serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity decisions” rendered
gender discrimination between men and women in Fiallo imperceptible.
257
The
invisible—absentee fathers and lurking problems of establishing paternity—
justified the visible gender disparity in the statute.
258
Furthermore, before the Court decided Fiallo, Collins argues that the Court
had begun to endorse nonmarital father’s rights in the domestic setting.
259
Given
the trend in doctrinal recognition of father’s rights, what accounted for the
Court’s normalizing absentee fatherism in Fiallo? The answer lies inDred Scott.
In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court understood that the white male right to discard
the child was essential to securing the sexual function of the enslaved female. In
Fiallo, therefore, absentee fatherism became, as Antognini argues, the Court’s
desired baseline
260
—the father engaged in hypermasculine conduct and yet freed
from parental responsibility—around which to construct material reality—the
WHP. Rather than honor patrilineage and fathers’ rights trending through
domestic common law, the Court set a baseline of the absentee father for
nonmarital foreign-born children.
261
The baseline assumed and normalized
absentee fatherism, making the invisible immunized from equal protection
254. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 190.
255. Id. at 221.
256. Antognini, supra note 14, at 415 (stating “the Court articulated its reasoning in terms of that
which cannot actually be observed—a perceived absence as opposed to an actual one, and lurking
problems of proof as opposed to present ones”). Despite all the “lurking” elements the Court found,
including absent fathers, fraudulent paternity claims, criminality, and untrustworthy foreign women, the
Court did not find Johnny Appleseed.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 188 (“By the time Fiallo was
decided, the Court had repudiated some of the limits on recognition of the relationship of a father and his
nonmarital child—limits that were standard in the common law and had been incorporated into modern
policies regulating the family.”)
260. Antognini, supra note 14, at 415, 417-18 (“[A] continuous theme runs through all these cases:
an unwed father, unlike an unwed mother, begins from an absence he must refute both in terms of proving
paternity and establishing the existence of a parental relationship with his child.”).
261. Id.
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challenges.
262
Drawing from Antognini, the Court endorsed the legal fiction of
an absent father because absenting fatherly responsibility for citizen men
sexually active abroad, unmarried, and with foreign women is exactly what the
Court sought to preserve:
263
what Hortense Spiller calls, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe.”
264
In creating the fiction of the absentee father, the Court created a
material reality and normalized it.
Drawing from the work of Angela Harris,
265
the Court’s reasoning in Fiallo
exemplifies the absence of anti-subordination principles in legal reasoning. The
Court’s reference to “lurking problems of proof of paternity” is a proxy for two
things: (1) the “natural” differences between men and women and (2) sexually
loose, untrustworthy foreign women, who tell lies about paternity, Jezebel the
evil snare.
266
In a classic case of “slut shaming,” the Court takes the pathological
gaze off Congress and the WHP, and instead, fixates it on foreign women. The
problem in the statute, therefore, is due to the pathology of foreign women and
not male philandering or Congress creating and perpetuating inequality. The
problem becomes one of the individual—a foreign woman—and not the
institution that has created a power imbalance based on gender—Congress. In
fixating on the foreign woman’s “bad” choices, the Court masks Congress’s role
in perpetuating inequality. The inequalities Congress created in the statute get
obfuscated behind the pathology of foreign women. Similarly, the Court tucked
the gender inequality in the statute behind the biological difference between
maternity and paternity and diverted attention away from Congress creating
different social and political outcomes based on gender.
267
As Angela Harris
helps us understand, by deflecting away from the political and institutional
components of the gender asymmetry in the statute, the Court is portraying
domination as biological difference, and obfuscating the unequal distribution of
resources (citizenship) and burdens (parenthood) within the universalist
framework of nature.
268
3. The Aristotelian Evil Snare
Another basis for the Court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim
was the classical evil snare — “a perceived absence in most cases of close family
ties as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in
262. Id.
263. Id. at 425.
264. Hortense J. Spillers, Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book, 17
DIACRITICS 65 (1987) (discussing children as the responsibilities of the mother and the prerogatives of
fathers); see also Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1706
(discussing same as enshrined in legal opinions addressing 1409).
265. Harris, Vulnerability and Power, supra note 242, at 146-47.
266. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 813 (1977) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977)).
267. Harris, Vulnerability and Power, supra note 242, at 146-47.
268. Id.
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paternity determinations,”
269
“when [paternity] depends upon events that may
have occurred in foreign countries many years earlier,”
270
far, far away. As
Antognini, however, argues “the element of the foreign was only suspect when
tied to determinations of paternity, as opposed to maternity.”
271
The government
was far more transparent, locating the “foreign,” in the promiscuity of foreign
women, stating very clearly:
Unlike the identity of the mother, which will often appear on the birth
certificate and which frequently can be corroborated by the testimony
of relatives, midwives, or medical personnel, the sole evidence that a
man has fathered a particular child is often the testimony of the
mother—and she may not know.
272
As Antognini notes, although the government portrayed the unwed foreign
mother as having numerous, even simultaneous, sexual partners such that she
may not know the biological father, these were not the foreign mothers before
the Court in Fiallo.
273
By raising the evil specter of the snare, the Court deflected
attention away from the unequal distribution of benefits and privileges in the
immigration preferences based on gender. Rather than focusing on the inequality
of the statute, the asymmetry was lost in the snare.
B. Miller: Paternal Acknowledgment and Heeeere’s Johnny
Miller set the stage for the Court’s white heteropatriarchal preoccupations,
both explicit and implicit, in the context of § 1409. In particular, Miller
reinforced three ongoing doctrinal principles underlying § 1409: whiteness,
hypermasculinity, and foreign female subordination, the three major straps in the
WHP. First,Miller reified America’s white exclusionary interests in policing its
borders: The lead plurality opinion framed and dog-whistled these issues as the
“war baby problem.”
274
Second,Miller ratified theWHP by submerging § 1409’s
gender disparity inside the physiological differences between men and women
when establishing paternity.
275
According to the lead majority opinion, men
should be required to do more when transferring citizenship than women should
because proof of paternity is subject to fraud. Again, the Court is masquerading
the WHP in concerns about the biological differences between men and women.
269. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 808 n.8.
271. Antognini, supra note 14, at 423-24.
272. Brief for Appellee, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (No. 75-6297), 1976 WL 181347, at *44-
*45.
273. Antognini, supra note 14, at 417-18.
274. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
275. Id.
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Third, when dog-whistling concerns about problems proving paternity, the Court
is solidifying the narratives that justify the WHP, namely foreign woman as
snare.
276
In Miller, the Supreme Court found just the Madame Butterfly/Miss Saigon
trope it was looking for: a military man, a white male, who conducted military
service abroad, fathered a daughter out of wedlock
277
with a racialized foreign
woman (Filipina), left the foreign woman, and—in an extra gesture of Johnny
good ole’ innocence—may not have been aware of his racialized foreign child
when he returned to America. As a result of American involvement in Asian
wars during the twentieth century, inestimable numbers of children were born to
American servicemen and Asian women.
278
Miller was just this man. Miller
served in the Philippines, in 1970, during the Vietnam War. Although the exact
figures are unknown, in the Philippines alone, American servicemen fathered
approximately 30,000 to 50,000 children.
279
Miller never legitimated his
daughter and returned back to America. In order to transfer citizenship to his
daughter, the version of § 1409 applicable to Miller required that he establish or
acknowledge paternity before his daughter turned eighteen, which he failed to
do. Miller challenged the legitimation requirement in a gender-based equal
protection claim.
280
The decision inMiller resulted in highly fractured concurring and dissenting
opinions. Writing the lead plurality opinion, Justice Stevens, himself a military
man,
281
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also a military man, rejected the equal
protection claim. Justice Stevens provided three highly dubious justifications for
the legitimation requirement: (1) it fostered ties between the child and
America;
282
(2) it encouraged “a healthy relationship between the citizen parent
276. Id.
277. Justice Stevens, one of the more liberal justices on the bench, makes much of Petitioner’s
“illegitimacy.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 424.
278. Kolby, supra note 170.
279. See id.
280. Although the petitioner in Miller raised the constitutionality of the gender asymmetry in the
derivative statute, a majority of the Court did not resolve the issue. Four Justices, in two different opinions,
rejected the challenge to the gender-based distinction, with two finding the statute to be consistent with
the Fifth Amendment. See 523 U.S. at 423 (Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
the Court could not confer citizenship as a remedy even if the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
as a separation of powers issue). Id. at 452 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). Three Justices dissented
and would have found the statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, Souter &
Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Id. at 471 (Breyer, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Finally, two Justices did
not reach the issue as to the father, having determined that the child, the only petitioner inMiller, lacked
standing to raise the equal protection rights of their father. Id. at 445 (O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring).
281. John Paul Stevens, Letter to the Editor, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2007),
https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage-9903E0DF153DF937A35752C1A9619C8
B63.html [https://perma.cc/C6YH-7X28] (Justice Stevens was a naval officer at Pearl Harbor from 1942
to 1945).
282. Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n.11; Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 10.
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and the child while the child is a minor;”
283
and (3) it ensured reliable proof of
paternity.
284
As in Fiallo, Justice Stevens’s justifications go to the heart of the
WHP: (1) whiteness, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3) foreign femaleness as snare.
1. Whiteness and the “War Baby Problem”
In grappling with questions about how to imagine and construct the
American polity, Justice Stevens emphatically voiced concerns about the war
baby threat to the nation’s borders and coffers. In both Miller and Nguyen,
military men feature prominently not only in the facts, but also the imagination,
discursive preoccupations, and reasoning employed by the Court.
285
In both
Miller and Nguyen, the military man was proxy for the inestimable numbers of
children abandoned by their fathers and threatening the government chest as well
as foreign Jezebels. Estimating the impact of § 1409 on the number of nonmarital
children abandoned by their fathers and imperiling the nation through sought-
after citizenship, Justice Stevens stated:
Given the size of the American military establishment that has been
stationed in various parts of the world for the past half century, it is
reasonable to assume that this case is not unusual. In 1970, when
petitioner was born, about 683,000 service personnel were stationed in
the Far East, 24,000 of whom were in the Philippines . . . . Of all
Americans in the military at that time, only one percent were female.
These figures, coupled with the interval between conception and birth
and the fact that military personnel regularly return to the United States
when a tour of duty ends, suggest that Congress had legitimate concerns
about a class of children born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers
and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or
be known by, their children. It was surely reasonable when the INA was
enacted in 1952 and remains equally reasonable today.
286
As Collins notes, rather than being a source of moral shame, sympathy, or
legal accountability, the sheer numbers of war babies, according to Justice
Stevens, is even more reason to insulate male soldiers and the United States from
citizenship claims by or on behalf of nonmarital foreign-born children, and to
shut the nation’s door to millions of hapless wards fathered by American men.
287
In a Ninth Circuit case raising a similar issue, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld was even
more blunt in his finding that Congress was well within its constitutional
authority to pass a statute that would minimize the burdens created by “paternity
283. Miller, 523 U.S. at 438.
284. Id. at 436.
285. Antognini, supra note 14, at 433.
286. Miller, 523 U.S. at 439 (1998).
287. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1485.
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and citizenship claims” asserted by “the women the [U.S.] soldiers left behind
and their children.”
288
“This may not be pretty,” he noted, “but it is a rational
basis for a sex distinction.”
289
Interestingly, the significant number of war babies undermined any claim
that the legitimation requirement encouraged ties. In fact, just the opposite, it
was one in a myriad of laws and administrative regulations intended to dissuade
American fathers from transferring citizenship.
290
Furthermore, it was intended
to protect not just the nation’s welfare coffers, but individual men from
inheritance and property claims from “illegitimate children” or the unexpected
nonmarital foreign-born visitor that might appear years later at the family
gathering, looking for “Daddy.”
2. Mama’s Baby, Johnny’s Maybe
Justice Stevens maintained that § 1409 would have survived intermediate
scrutiny because it did not involve sex discrimination; instead, the legitimate
biological differences between mothers and fathers and the legitimation
requirement for fathers equalized a mother’s right to abort.
291
In a series of
conflations, Justice Stevens reasoned that mothers and fathers did not engage in
legally relevant conduct before birth and that after birth, there remained no
legally relevant joint conduct unless the parties married, which would confer
citizenship.
292
In the case of an unwed mother and father, however, Justice
Stevens appeared to suggest that the legitimation requirement equalized a
mother’s right to abort with a father’s right to also decline parenthood.
293
In other
words, men should receive a right to decline fatherhood in exchange for a
woman’s right to abortion.
In many ways, Miller is a case study in the WHP. By grounding his
justification in biological determinism, Justice Stevens doctrinally enshrined the
baseline and hid it from constitutional scrutiny. Under Justice Stevens’s
obfuscating reasoning, the difference in citizenship transmission based on sex
was biological, and therefore, did not trigger gender discrimination. In
submerging disparity in nature, Congress as an institutional actor (1) engaging




291. Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n.11, 444-45 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion); Collins, Note, When
Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1708. The distorted application of the Equal
Protection Clause should be noted: Abortion allows women to have sex without consequences (though
the burden is never shifted onto the man, whereas in the case of § 1409, the burden is shifted to the foreign
woman after the child is born).
292. Antognini, supra note 14, at 444.
293. Miller, 523 U.S. at 433 (“If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry
the pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion—an alternative that is available by law to
many, and in reality, to most, women around the world.”).
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in an inequitable distribution of resources based on sex and (2) facilitating
hypermasculinity by limiting the legal consequences of these activities, is hidden
from view, constitutional or otherwise. When Justice Stevens argued that
because women have greater legal rights (the right to conceive or abort), women
should receive greater parental rights,
294
his reasoning reinforced the allocation
of full legal responsibility for nonmarital children to women, while preserving a
man’s sexual prerogatives and liberty, as well as a property right in
hypermasculinity.
295
Justice Stevens’s reasoning did what it was intended to do:
It perpetuated a regime that protects men’s ability to engage in sexual activity
outside marriage with mitigated responsibilities of parenthood.
296
As Collins
notes, by arguing the only legally relevant conduct happens after birth, when a
woman chooses to have a child, Justice Stevens sublimates the pre-birth joint
conduct of both men and women, rendering the pre-birth conduct irrelevant for
purposes of allocating parental rights and responsibilities.
297
Born or unborn, the
burden and responsibility of a nonmarital foreign-born child never shifts to the
father or his home country. Justice Stevens’s grounding of the gender asymmetry
in the physiology of women obfuscates § 1409’s true functions, which is to
maintain in men the right to regulate legitimate lines of inheritance and to be




Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, the two military men on the
court, made several dog-whistles to the suspicious circumstances in which
Miller, and most military men, fathered children abroad. As Justice Stevens
noted, “[D]espite recent scientific advances, it still remains preferable to require
some formal legal act to establish paternity, coupled with the clear-and-
convincing evidence standard to deter fraud.”
299
In another passage, Justice
Stevens famously stated that the foreign women who birth nonmarital foreign-
born children may not know who the father is.
300
In each of these passages, and
as elaborated more fully in the next section, the Court is submerging the
constitutional validity of § 1409, and by extension the use of the WHP, in the
victim blaming problems of loose women fraudulently claiming paternity on
poor innocent Johnny, the unwitting dupe, in desperate need of protection and
liberation by the Supreme Court.
294. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1674.
295. Id. at 1673.
296. Id. at 1684.
297. Id. at 1700.
298. Id.
299. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 437 (1998).
300. Id. at 438.
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C. Nguyen: Paternal Acknowledgement and Johnny by Proxy
In 2001, the Supreme Court revisited § 1409’s legitimation requirement in
Nguyen v. INS.
301
In a five-four decision, the Court held that § 1409 withstood
another equal protection challenge. Like Charlie Miller, the Court seized upon
another military man. This time the Court found a military man by proxy.
302
Nguyen’s citizen father was not a serviceman, but a military contractor.
303
Nevertheless, the Court continued to rely on the military man, citing even more
empirical data about the vastness of servicemen stationed overseas during the
year Nguyen was born.
304
Although Nguyen’s father had raised his son, he had
not completed the legitimation process in § 1409(a)(4).
Justice Kennedy, sometimes the critical swing vote in matters of equality,
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, who often sides with the
more liberal end of the Court except in matters concerning the sexual privileges
of his fellow servicemen, namely philandering while abroad. The more
conservative flank of the Court, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, joined
the majority opinion. Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which the
liberal arm of the Court joined: Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter. Engaging
an ahistorical formalistic approach, the majority grounded its rejection of
Nguyen’s challenge in the physiological differences betweenmen andwomen.
305
According to the majority, Congress had two legitimate interests in the gender
asymmetry of the statute: (1) men, unlike women, required additional biological
proof of paternity to guard against fraudulent conveyances of citizenship
306
and
(2) the legitimation requirement fostered ties between a child, father, and
nation.
307
In reaching its conclusion, the majority made several arguments, all of which
bear heavily on the WHP. First, the Court stated that citizen women abroad can
decide to have their child in America by traveling home, thus, conferring jus soli
citizenship. As a result, § 1409 automatically confers citizenship to citizen
women.
308
Men, on the other hand, have no control over where the child is born.
Second, in amplifying the narrative of foreign woman as snare and raising the
301. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).
302. Antognini, supra note 14, at 434.
303. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1700.
304. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65-66; Antognini, supra note 14, at 434.
305. Justice Kennedy shelved the separation of power question that had plagued constitutional
challenges to the derivative citizenship statute: whether the plenary power doctrine usurped the field of
judicial inquiry. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61 (2001) (“Given [the determination that the statute survives
heightened scrutiny], we need not decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the
statute implicates Congress’ immigration and naturalization power.”). Instead, he concluded that the
statute survived even under heightened scrutiny. Id.
306. Id. at 62.
307. Id. at 64-65.
308. Id. at 61.
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evil specter of the “war baby” problem, Justice Kennedy laid bare his true
concerns:
Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not
always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is
it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s identity.
This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a child born
overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context has always
been with young people, men for the most part, who are on duty with the
Armed Forces in foreign countries . . . . [I]n 1969, the year in which
Nguyen was born, there were 3,458,072 active duty military personnel,
39,506 of whom were female.
309
Extending the Court’s concerns beyond the sexual practices of the American
military, the Court went on to express a preoccupation with citizen men who go
abroad and participate in sexual tourism, stating:
The ease of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign
countries have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that must be of real
concern when we contemplate the prospect of accepting petitioners’
argument, which would mandate, contrary to Congress’ wishes,
citizenship by male parentage subject to no condition save the father’s
previous length of residence in this country. In 1999 alone, Americans
made almost 25 million trips abroad, excluding trips to Canada and
Mexico. . . . Visits to Canada and Mexico add to this figure almost 34
million additional visits. . . . And the average American overseas
traveler spent 15.1 nights out of the United States in 1999. Especially in
light of the number of Americans who take short sojourns abroad, the
prospect that a father might not even know of the conception is a
realistic possibility.
310
Leaving aside the Court’s preoccupation with citizen men’s
hypermasculinity practices outside marriage in the military and in the sexual
tourism industry, the majority opinion is a case study in failing to use historical
context and anti-subordination principles when deciding equal protection cases.
The failure to historicize § 1409 allowed the Court to draw false symmetries in
power between men and women. Moreover, the failure to adopt anti-
subordination principles enabled the Court to perfect the scapegoating narrative
of the snare. In doing so, the Court obfuscated three backbone principles of the
WHP: (1) exclusion, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3) protecting innocent unwitting
male dupes from the hazards of foreign female conniving and trickery.
309. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
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1. The Excludability Principle and Criminal “Half Castes”
The Court did not explicitly decide Nguyen on the grounds of Congress’s
plenary power to exclude aliens.
311
However, as in Fiallo and Miller, the Court
raised the specters of evil to reinforce the need to maintain exclusionary power.
As Collins notes, in Nguyen, the specter of evil took the form of Nguyen himself.
In the second paragraph of the body of the opinion, Justice Kennedy dog-
whistled the procedural posture of Nguyen’s case: Nguyen had been convicted
of two counts of child sexual assault and was, therefore, subject to deportation
proceedings.
312
Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy noted again that Nguyen’s
exclusion from citizenship by any route, derivative citizenship or naturalization,
was “due to the serious nature of his criminal offenses, not to an equal protection
denial or to any supposed rigidity or harshness in the citizenship laws.”
313
In
Nguyen, the Court found its idealized facts: (1) an American military serviceman
by proxy, who had fathered a nonmarital child while abroad with a foreign
woman and (2) an exponentially undesirable racialized offspring, much better
than vast hordes of Chinese—not only foreign, but also criminal.
As Collins argues, the centrality of the petitioner’s criminality in a § 1409
case is not unique to Nguyen. Indeed, many of the § 1409 cases come before
courts in the procedural posture of deportation proceedings due to the petitioner’s
criminal conviction.
314
Part of the resiliency of § 1409 in the face of gender-
based equal protection challenges, therefore, is the perceived need to fortify the
nation’s borders against “illegitimates” who are not just racialized, but also
criminalized with an added dose of snared mothers.
315
Within the first two
paragraphs of Nguyen, Justice Kennedy mentions Nguyen’s association with
Vietnam or Vietnamese origin five times.
316
Here again, what is at stake in
§ 1409 cases is as much about race as it is about gender—policing the nation’s
white borders from racialized criminal aliens whose mothers are “loose.”
317
311. Although the Court did not explicitly decide Nguyen on plenary power grounds, many scholars
have suggested that, in fact, the plenary power was lurking in the background and also explained the
Court’s diluted version of equal protection scrutiny. See Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family,
supra note 127, at 221.
312. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
313. Id.; see Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1700.
314. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 196.
315. Id. at 170 (stating “the line between citizen and noncitizen was being determined not in the
abstract but in the context of the enforcement of deportation laws that were, at their different moments in
time, politically salient and legally contested.”).
316. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
317. Centralizing criminality to restrict immigration policies is common practice. See Dan Cadman,
Birthright Citizenship Policy Creates Downstream Problems, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://cis.org/Cadman/Birthright-Citizenship-Policy-Creates-Downstream-Problems,
[https://perma.cc/M56D-XW2M].
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2. The Cool WHP
The absence of historical context allowed the majority to ratify the white
heteropatriarchal interests underlying § 1409 using the obfuscating glare of
neutrality dipped in nature and physiological differences. By deploying the
natural differences between men and women, the majority normalized the
operations of the statute. By grounding disparate gender treatment in nature, the
majority opinion in Nguyen, likeMiller, adhered to a tautology: women and men
are being treated differently because they are naturally different.
318
The contrasting dissenting and majority opinions in Nguyen highlight the
inadequacy of ahistorical formalist approaches to § 1409 and equal protection
jurisprudence generally.
319
Unlike the dissenting opinion, the ahistorical
formalist approach of the majority downplayed the societal policies of
discrimination that form the underbelly of § 1409. By contrast, the dissenting
opinions in both Miller, authored by Justice Ginsburg, and Nguyen, authored by
Justice O’Connor—the only two women on the Court at the time—placed the
statute in the proper historical context of supremacy, domination, and
denigration.
320
By placing the statute in the proper context of its discriminatory
past, the dissenting opinion eliminated many claims of innocence or hegemonic
goodness, like fostering relationships between the child, father, and the nation.
Rather, the dissenting opinion artfully pointed out that the history of § 1409
actively negates any claim of developing a relationship between the child, father,
and nation. In fact, it fosters the exact opposite, the prerogative of males to
discard their nonmarital offspring and to block them from inheritance and
themselves from parental accountability.
Similarly, decontextualization also allowed the majority in Nguyen to draw
false symmetries of power between men and women. According to the majority,
women, unlike men, should have the power to confer automatic citizenship
because they have the power to determine where a child is born: a pregnant
citizen mother, living abroad, can travel back to the United States and give birth
to her child in order to confer citizenship to her child.
321
Men, on the other hand,
should not be saddled with automatic citizenship because they have no
equivalent power to decide where the child is born. However, a historically
contextualized assessment of § 1409 suggests that derivative citizenship has
nothing to do with the power of women to decide the place of birth. Rather, the
need to preserve the male prerogative to confer citizenship and retain autonomy
318. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1705.
319. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 75, at 1341 (highlighting the
problems with ahistorical, decontextualized approaches to antidiscrimination law).
320. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (stating “[s]ex-based statutes, even when accurately reflecting
the way most men or women behave, deny individuals opportunity. Such generalizations must be viewed
not in isolation, but in the context of our Nation’s ‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’”).
321. Id. at 61.
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from parenthood drives the difference in the law. It ensures, among other things,
that men can continue their hypermasculinity and sexual exploitation of foreign
women.
Despite all its obfuscating, circularity in reasoning, and immunizing, the
majority reveals its true preoccupation in two ways. First, it recognizes that
paternity tests can, in fact, eliminate fraudulent citizenship claims with scientific
accuracy, thereby defeating problems of proof. Yet, according to the Court, DNA
samples can be taken against the father’s will and “scientific proof of biological
paternity does nothing, by itself, to ensure contact between father and child.”
322
Conceding the issue of proof, the Court, therefore, reveals its real concern:
protecting male prerogative, power, and privilege. The historical contextuality
of § 1409 reveals the utter falsity of the alleged congressional interest. Far from
encouraging a relationship between father and child, § 1409’s DNA is aimed at
protecting men from their offspring and the polity from racial impurity.
323
Second, without mincing words, the majority opinion acknowledges the
traditional behavior it sought to protect: millions of incidences of
hypermasculinity. The detailed recitation of empirical evidence about
servicemen and trips out of the country, and 15.1 lonely nights—all proxies for
hypermasculine performance—clearly delineate the Court’s preoccupation with
preserving the WHP, policing the borders, and protecting the government
coffers. The majority not only shelters the rights and privileges of servicemen
and sexual tourists from constitutional scrutiny, but reifies and protects their
right to engage in hypermasculinity as a matter of legal doctrine. By assuming
the WHP as baseline, the Court protects the settled expectations of
hypermasculine sexual performance.
3. Jezebel
Nguyen marked the most elaborate use of the snare yet. Like Fiallo and
Miller, the Court made several allusions to the explicit and implicit snare:
3,418,566 active duty servicemen; 54 million good-natured Americans “willing”
to travel abroad (meaning to engage in sexual tourism), spending 15.1 lonely
nights on average outside the United States; and famously, foreign women who
do not know the identities of the fathers of their children. In perfecting Jezebel
through the snare, however, the Court performed an awe-inspiring double back-
flip from the springboard of the harlot; it held that Congress had a legitimate
interest because men required “additional biological proof of paternity to ward
off fraudulent conveyances of citizenship.”
324
Here, the Court obfuscated the
underbelly of § 1409, in not only the biological differences between the sexes
322. Id. at 55.
323. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 170.
324. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
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and problems of proof, but also in characterizing the snare that commits fraud.
Here, the Court achieves the two-step process of (1) over-valorizing innocent
men, who are good-natured adventure seekers and servicemen abroad, serving
their country, and (2) pathologizing foreign women engaged in trickery against
the unwitting innocent dupes. The two-step process achieves what Zeiger calls a
concretization of the American warrior as pure and at the discretion of the foreign
woman as evil and transcended.
325
Nguyen’s majority opinion exemplifies the problems with failing to
historically contextualize and adopt anti-subordination principles when
addressing equal protection challenges. By contrast, the dissent fully
contextualized the derivative citizenship statute in its highly gender
discriminatory past. And in doing so, it made no references to the snare; instead,
the dissent applied robust scrutiny and found § 1409:
paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility,
and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children. Under this
law . . . ‘when it comes to the illegitimate child, which is a great burden,
then the mother is the only recognized parent, and the father is put safely
in the background.’
326
Rather than submerging the nefarious underbelly of § 1409 in the snare, the
dissent kept a fixed gaze on the political and institutional instigators responsible
for a disparate distribution of benefits and burdens, while avoiding the use of a
universalist framework, like the natural differences between men and women.
In bothMiller andNguyen, the Supreme Court, and in particular, the military
men Justices Stevens and Kennedy, found their legal subject of choice—the
American military man who, like the American polity, must be rescued from
foreign “whores” and war babies. In both cases, the Supreme Court participated
in the racialized politics of rescuing citizen men, particularly American military
men, from the shackles of hypersexualized foreign women and their
“illegitimate” offspring. In this way, the Supreme Court engaged in what Eithne
Luibheid calls “public discourses on sexuality,” which legitimate the exclusion
and condemnation of particular migrants.
327
Drawing from Stewart Chang, the
Supreme Court has engaged in Foucault’s Panoptican, whereby spectacle and
public visibility effectuate state power over subjects through surveillance and
supervision applied by institutional mediums of state authority.
328
In bothMiller
and Nguyen, the Supreme Court created a narrative of the idealized man who
325. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 23, 40, and 65.
326. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
327. Chang, supra note 38, at 268 (citing EITHNE LUIBHÉID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING
SEXUALITY AT THEBORDER 144 (2002)).
328. Id. (citing FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 200-02).
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must be rescued from the “lurking,” evil vixen. In both cases, the Supreme Court
situated foreign women in the normative pattern of the snare, who, because they
had multiple sex partners at the same time, “do not know the identities of the
father.” In both cases, the Supreme Court discursively shuts war babies out as
citizen subjects. And, in both cases, the American military man must be rescued
from the hypersexualized foreign woman in order to continue his hypersexual
conduct, tapping the WHP all the while and yet always so pure, wholesome, and
innocent. In another note of irony, the Supreme Court differentiates the lawful
immigrant subject from the excludable alien across the normative conceptions of
proper sexuality, meaning the looseness of foreign women is attributed to their
children as grounds for exclusion. Meanwhile, Johnny keeps the WHP.
329
The
logic of § 1409 does more than exclude the children; it keeps the foreign woman
fixated in the hypermasculine mind as a “slut,” perpetually prone, and not a
mother of proper American citizens.
D. Morales-Santana: Physical Presence Requirements and Johnny Meets His
Match
In a Herculean effort, after the Supreme Court rejected three opportunities
to bring § 1409 into gender equality compliance, Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the majority, masterfully situated § 1409 in its historically nefarious underbelly.
Rejecting any ahistorical formalist traditions that deplete § 1409 of its
heteropatriarchal content, Justice Ginsburg hit the nail squarely on the head,
stating, “History reveals what lurks behind § 1409.”
330
After historically
situating § 1409 in its heteropatriarchal past,
331
Justice Ginsburg took a scalpel
to the institutional question that had plagued constitutional challenges to § 1409
in the past: specifically, whether the plenary power doctrine immunized § 1409
from a more exacting scrutiny.
332
Distinguishing the Fiallo line of reasoning that
Congress acted within its plenary power, Justice Ginsburgmaintained that Fiallo
applied to immigration preferences whereas Morales-Santana involved a claim
of citizenship at birth.
333
Rather than take the historical freeze-frame approach
to § 1409, which facilitated obfuscation, circularity, and entrenchment, Justice
Ginsburg reached the merits of Morales-Santana’s gender disparity claim and
found § 1409 constitutionally infirm. The remedy meted out by the Court,
however, joined a long tradition of burdening women and preserving white
heteropatriarchal privilege in an effort to achieve gender symmetry.
334
Rather
329. Id. at 266.
330. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
331. Id. at 1689 (2017) (stating “[s]ections 1401 and 1409, we note, date from an era when the law
books of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are”).
332. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 194.
333. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694.
334. See Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 221.
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than extend the more lenient residency requirement to both mothers and fathers,
the Court applied the more onerous standard to both.
Like Nguyen, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana presented the problem of a
racialized criminal in the procedural posture of a deportation proceeding.
335
Morales-Santana was a nonmarital foreign born child, born in the Dominican
Republic to a Dominican mother and a citizen father.
336
The version of the
derivative citizenship statute applicable to Morales-Santana mandated that, prior
to his birth, his citizen father had to be physically present in the United States for
five years, at least five of which were after his citizen father was fourteen.
337
By
contrast, the physical presence requirement for noncitizenmothers was one year.
Morales-Santana’s citizen father missed satisfying the physical presence
requirement by a mere twenty days.
338
Morales-Santana filed an equal protection
claim challenging the gender disparity in the physical presence requirement.
339
After saturating the physical presence requirement in § 1409’s discriminatory
history, the Court applied heightened scrutiny, and summarily rejected the
government’s specious justifications that the requirement ensured a connection
between the child and citizen father and prevented statelessness for the child. By
way of remedy, however, the Court applied the more onerous standard to both
men and women.
1. Whiteness
In eliminating plenary power applicability to § 1409, Justice Ginsburg
created an opening for heightened scrutiny, specifically on issues of gender, but
perhaps also on future claims involving nationality and race. The genesis of
§ 1409’s more extensive physical presence requirement in the Nationality Act of
1940 was Congress’s effort to reduce the number of Chinese and Mexican
citizenship claims under the derivative citizenship statute.
340
Although Justice
Ginsburg did not linger on the racialized history of § 1409, arguably because the
case directly addressed gender disparity, she did note that the Roosevelt
Administration “[f]ear[ed] that a foreign-born child could turn out ‘more alien
than American in character.’”
341
More importantly, as Kristin Collins notes,
when Justice Ginsburg dismissed the plenary power line of reasoning, she
undermined the kinds of racial purity arguments that the government had
steadfastly maintained during Fiallo and all three of the equal protection cases
335. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688.
336. Id. at 1686.
337. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 601(g) (1940) (now known as § 301(g) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, current version at § 1401(g)). Currently, the requirement is five years pre-birth, two of which are
after the citizen father turns 14.
338. Id. at 1686.
339. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1409, §§ 301(a)(7), 309(a).
340. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 184.
341. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692.
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involving § 1409 prior to Morales-Santana.
342
In Morales-Santana, by way of
illustration, the Solicitor General argued that given The Chinese Exclusion Case,
the derivative citizenship was a form of naturalization and “the power to confer
or deny citizenship on individuals born abroad . . . is also an aspect of the power
to exclude aliens from the Nation”
343
—a power that “is an incident of every
independent nation” and “a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”
344
Although Justice Ginsburg did not expressly address this argument, she
distinguished Fiallo and its application to § 1409, shrewdly laying a foundation
for heightened scrutiny in the future.
345
2. The Maintenance of WHP Privilege
Throughout the opinion, Justice Ginsburg was highly critical of the sexism
animating § 1409, particularly the idea that “[i]n marriage, the husband is
dominant, wife subordinate; unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a
nonmarital child.”
346
According to the Court, “lump characterizations” that
“unwed fathers care little about, indeed are strangers to, their children” “no
longer passes equal protection inspection.”
347
Perhaps,Morales-Santana signals
the first chink in the armor of the WHP, laying the foundation for future
challenges. However, what the Court gives with one hand, it takes with the other.
Rather than disturbing the statutory scheme that sustains a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape,
the majority opinion applied the more burdensome physical presence
requirement applicable to fathers to mothers. The Court could have nullified the
more burdensome requirement and applied the more lenient requirement to both
mothers and fathers. In explaining the Court’s decision to apply the more
burdensome physical presence requirement on both fathers and mothers, the
Court cited congressional intent and stated that Congress would not have
intended application of the more lenient rule to both citizen fathers and
mothers.
348
342. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 184.
343. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (No. 15-1191), 2016
WL 4436132, at *15.
344. Id.
345. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 184.
346. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690.
347. Id. at 1695.
348. Id. at 1701.
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3. Evil Foreign Woman as Snare Finally Put to Rest (At Least
Temporarily, in the Majority Opinion inMorales-Santana)
Gratefully, the majority opinion did not engage in any of the previous dog-
whistling about evil foreign women as Aristotelian snare and hypersexualized
narratives regarding foreign women that justify the WHP. The Court’s effective
use of historical context negated the evil specter of the snare. Although the Court
was highly critical of the gender implications of the statute, it did not grapple
with the racial content of § 1409, let alone the Supreme Court’s materialized
animus against foreign women or its self-serving narratives about the
untrustworthiness of foreign women. Setting aside the issue of whether Congress
would eliminate the longer physical presence requirement, extending the less
onerous standard to both citizen men and women would rightfully undermine a
broader statutory scheme animated by white heteropatriarchal property rights in
hypermasculine sexual performance.
349
Such an approach could acknowledge
the intersectional past of § 1409 and explicitly reject its white heteropatriarchal
interests. As the Court keenly recognized, “[N]ew insights and societal




“T]he misfortune of an illegitimate birth cannot deprive a man of his
nationality . . . . He is a part of society.”
351
Section 1409 is anathema in a nation that pledges allegiance to the values of
a free and democratic society committed to treating each person with equal
concern and respect under the law. If a measure of democratic governance is to
protect individuals against wrongful discrimination and ensure that all
individuals are treated alike in the eyes of the law, § 1409 is incomprehensible.
Section 1409 allocates the precious resource of citizenship impermissibly on the
grounds of nationality, gender, and marital status. The rugged history of
§ 1409 demonstrates the entrenchment of using matrilineage coupled with the
absence of citizenship to create precarity, particularly for the purpose of
hypermasculinity. The history of § 1409 fails to suggest justifications based on
the problems of proving paternity or fostering ties between an abandoned child
and the father or this nation.
352
Rather, the history of § 1409 establishes that what
349. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 217-18.
350. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603
(2015)).
351. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2165 (citing Letter from John Russell Young,
U.S. Legation, Peking, China, to Charles Seymour, U.S. Consul, Canton, China (Feb. 23, 1885)).
352. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2138.
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is at stake is the nation’s interest in guarding its white borders and coffers
353
from
undesirable foreign others and regulating the sexuality of men and women; it
gives men autonomy, where it sanctions women.
354
Section 1409 is a deliberately
induced process for pleasure that wreaks hazards in precarity.
In this section, I propose three solutions: (1) introducing automatic
citizenship for both men and women for their nonmarital foreign-born children,
(2) bringing § 1409 into moral, legal accountability, and equality symmetry with
abortion rights cases, and (3) emphasizing the need to gather evidence to
substantiate claims for race and national origin discrimination.
A. Automatic Citizenship for Children of Citizen Men and Women
The children of both men and women should have automatic derivative
citizenship. The elimination of male prerogative in § 1409 would establish
symmetry in morality, legal accountability, and equality. Automatic citizenship
for the children of both men and women would equalize treatment between men
and women, eliminate the WHP, and establish symmetry in treatment between
foreign women and American women, as well as the children of citizen mothers
and fathers. As Isabel Medina argues, the willing citizen mother or the willing
citizen father would have the right to transmit citizenship with ease.
355
At the
same time, neither would be able to so easily escape parental
responsibilities.
356
Although some might argue that maintaining automatic
derivative citizenship for women may continue to saddle them with reproductive
burden, such arguments support the need to maintain reproductive freedom for
women, not the gender asymmetry in § 1409.
Congress should not create a system that empowers men to discard their
children, equips men to abandon their children after engaging in unprotected
hypermasculinity, or devises institutional conditions for precarity. The political
rhetoric surrounding abortion rights and reproductive punishment may have
some application here: If these fathers do not want the responsibilities of
children, they should refrain from making them. The prospect of parenthood
might also produce more responsible sexual behavior. The same solution would
also greatly reduce fraudulent paternity and citizenship claims. As argued by the
353. Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1691 (citing Miller
v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 n.9 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion)) (noting that “one explanation
for the limitations on fathers’ right to transmit citizenship is to minimize the financial burden on the
states”).
354. Id.; see alsoMariella, supra note 36, at 227 (“The effect of the distinction therefore encourages
men to conceive children outside of marriage, and compels women to bear the costs and the stigma of
non-marital sex alone when men are unwilling to do so.”).
355. Mariella, supra note 36, at 227.
356. Id. at 258.
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dissent in Nguyen, if the underlying reasoning was the difficulty of determining
paternity, increases in technology have negated that impossibility.
357
In proposing the solution of symmetry in automatic citizenship, I draw
partially from Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory to this extent: If the state
systemically excludes you from citizenship, from the means of inheriting
and owning property, from wealth, humanity, personhood, and basic resources,
then the state has a heightened duty to make you whole and to provide access to
the sanctioned mechanism of reliance and resilience.
358
Congress,
through § 1409, has created a right in citizen men that mitigates rights in their
children and the mothers of their children, while simultaneously creating the
conditions of precarity. Congress has created clear privileges and equally
distinct vulnerabilities that perpetuate inequitable institutional practices and
operations. Having created these conditions, Congress should abolish them.
359
B. Immoral Asymmetry, Legal Hypocrisy, and Foreign Lives Matter
The inconsistencies in morality, legal accountability, and equality that
§ 1409 creates are legion. Section 1409 signals to the world that the interest men
may have in hypermasculinity outweighs the value of life and that the price of a
frolic is worth the expense of mass destruction. In the context of nonmarital
foreign-born children, § 1409 suggests that a foreign woman is good enough to
sexually exploit, but not good enough to create citizens.
360
Inside America, a
357. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80.
358. Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619,
636–39 (2013).
359. As for arguments related to scarcity, lack of resources, overburdening the government coffers,
and administrative difficulty, such rebuttals conflate substance and procedure. Difficulty does not qualify
the legitimacy or the importance of symmetry between citizen men and women, citizen and foreign
women, and between the children of foreign women and citizen women, as well as eliminating a right that
functions like a property right to engage in unprotected hypermasculinity with foreign women free from
the responsibilities of parenthood. Moreover, the United States had abundant resources when a
Republican-controlled Congress and President Donald Trump exacted a nearly $1.5 trillion tax cut
package that mainly benefitted the wealthy. In 2018, the top-earning 1 percent of households—those
earning more than $607,000 a year—will pay a combined $111 billion less in 2018 in federal taxes than
they would have if the laws had remained unchanged since 2000. Steve Wamhoff & Matthew Gardner,
Federal Tax Cuts in the Bush, Obama, and Trump Years, INST. ON TAX’N&ECON. (July 11, 2018),
https://itep.org/federal-tax-cuts-in-the-bush-obama-and-trump-years [https://perma.cc/W3EQ-WUEZ]. It
is more than the tax cut received over the same period by the entire bottom60 percent of earners, according
to an analysis in the process of being published. Id. A July 2018 report tallied all the major federal tax
cuts and tax increases since 2000. Cumulatively, the top 1 percent of earners have received 22 percent of
all tax cuts during that period; the top 20 percent of earners (those earning more than $111,000) have
received 65 percent of tax cuts. Id. Similarly, at the time of writing, the Trump Administration is
considering bypassing Congress to grant another $100 billion tax cut mainly for the wealthy. Alan
Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Trump Administration Mulls a Unilateral Tax Cut for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/us/politics/trump-tax-cuts-rich.html [https://per
ma.cc/VQ55-TAXB].
360. Dorothy E. Roberts,Who May Give Birth to United States Citizens?, 17 WOMEN’SRTS. L. REP.
275 (explaining that a state referendum to deny undocumented immigrants jus soli citizenship signals that
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woman’s right to choose and to be free from reproductive punishment may be in
jeopardy. Outside America, men can discard human life freely. Inside America,
lawmakers put women in jail for giving birth to drug-dependent children, but
allow men to discard their nonmarital children abroad at their whim. Inside
America, the Fourteenth Amendment eliminates a caste system where some
persons born in the country are citizens, but some are not.
361
Outside America,
Congress has created a caste system for children based on the sex, nationality,
and marital status of their parents. Both Congress and the courts can see the
sanctity of human life and the responsibilities of parenthood when controlling
women’s bodies, but not men’s. Both the Court and Congress can see life within
the nation’s boundaries. Neither the Court nor Congress can see the value of
human life beyond its borders when mothers are unwed and foreign and fathers
are Johnny Appleseed. If we, as a society, hold mothers criminally accountable
for giving birth to drug-dependent children, we should extend the same
morality and legal accountability to American men traveling abroad and
discarding their children. Conversely, if Congress will allow American men to
travel abroad and father children and discard them, then lawmakers should
refrain from holding women accountable for birthing drug-dependent
children.
362
The history of § 1409 and its justifications bring into sharp relief the Court’s
hypocrisy as to the sanctity of human life and parenthood. There should be
uniformity, symmetry, and consistency in morality and the value of life in
abortion politics, the transferal of citizenship, and criminal prosecutions of
mothers whose children are born dependent upon illicit substances. If both
Congress and the courts can only see the value of life and the sanctity of
parenthood when exerting control over a woman’s body, and are blind to the
value of life and sanctity of parenthood when fathers are philanderers and
mothers are foreign and unwed, then perhaps Congress and the courts are not
really interested in life or parenthood, but rather controlling women’s bodies and
preserving male prerogative, power, and privilege. Life is no more or less
precious when it is made within the borders or beyond them. It is no more or less
sacred when made with two citizens or one.
C. Gathering Evidence About Disparate Impact Based on Race and Nationality
It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that, given the property interest
in citizenship, the denial of jus sanguinis birthright citizenship to nonmarital
Americans believe undocumented workers are good enough to exploit, but are not good enough to be
citizens).
361. Id.
362. The inherent ironies in morality, legal accountability, and inequality between § 1409 and the
criminal prosecutions of mothers who give birth to drug-dependent children are the subjects of another
piece of upcoming scholarship.
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foreign-born children of American fathers triggers a violation under the Due
Process Clause, subject to strict scrutiny analysis. Similarly, it is beyond the
scope of this paper to answer whether a disparate impact claim based on the race
or nationality of nonmarital foreign-born children or their mothers is an effective
vehicle for exposing the discriminatory animus underlying § 1409 or whether
disparate impact analysis has been so thoroughly gutted as to make such an effort
futile. At a minimum, as Isabel Medina argues, disaggregated data
is fundamentally necessary from federal agencies determining derivative
citizenship claims by the race, nationality, gender, and marital status of
applicants and whether the application is rejected or approved.
363
Fundamental
equality, justice, and fairness require documenting the impact of race, national
origin, gender, and marital status on the derivative citizenship decision-making
process.
364
As Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion inMorales-
Santana demonstrates, § 1409 requires a thorough vettingwithin its raced, sexed,
and classed historical context under a robust strict scrutiny to prevent spurious
justifications, hegemonic feats of replicating inequality in the baseline, and
drawing false symmetries in power between men and women, all in an effort
to perpetuate hypermasculine conduct and regimes of sexual subordination.
CONCLUSION
Congress, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, has created a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. In
doing so, Congress has given men a right that suppresses any duty owed to their
children or to the mothers of their children: They can discard them. As the
Supreme Court sits perched and ready to roll back the tide of women’s
reproductive autonomy and undermine the integrity of Roe v. Wade, let it extend
its moralizing about the responsibilities of parenthood, sexually responsible
behavior, and the sanctity of human life to the inestimable numbers of children
Americans have fathered and discarded. Congress, the courts, policymakers, and
administrators have all seen fit to give men a right, amounting to a property right,
to father children abroad and abandon them. Rather than subject this practice to
the exacting, antiseptic light of day, the Court has ratified and reified this right
over centuries of doctrine.
For some, the words of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott will appear
shocking to the conscience, antiquated, and unfathomable. The day will come,
however, when we look back on § 1409 with the same wonder. Future
generations, as well as the current generation, must fundamentally
363. Medina, Derivative Citizenship, supra note 149, at 444.
364. Id.
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understand: “Power concedes nothing without a demand.”
365
Power is neither
natural nor inevitable. It is made. And it can be unmade.
365. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Speech Before the West Indian Emancipation Society, in TWO
SPEECHES BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS 22 (Rochester, N.Y., C.P. Dewey 1857).
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ABSTRACT: Inquiries about a prospective applicant’s salary history are
controversial because of the role such inequities play in the broader gender pay
equity debate. The use of prior salary to determine compensation can perpetuate
pay discrimination for women, especially women of color, and lock them into
cycles of underpayment when these inequities are carried over from job to job.
Reliance on salary history perpetuates historical discrimination and is
antithetical to the language and purpose of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The
purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the legal reasoning relied upon to
interpret these laws, especially in light of the new cases emerging in this field,
and to assess the potential impacts of these differing interpretations across the
circuit courts. This paper offers a nuanced analysis of the courts’ reasoning,
including an analysis of the text and context of the legislation and how this
influences appellate courts’ divergent interpretation and reasoning. Given that
this circuit split primes the issue for Supreme Court consideration, this Article
considers the implications of the various interpretations.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE EQUAL PAYACT AND THECIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE
USE OF SALARY HISTORY
The Equal Pay Act (“EPA” or “Act”) was originally passed in 1963 to
eliminate disparities in pay based on sex.
1
However, more than fifty years after
its passage, the wage gap persists.
2
Women confront a pervasive “gender-based
wage gap across industries, occupations, and education levels.”
3
This Article
assesses the differing interpretations of the EPA in the current circuit split,
analyzing whether prior salary history is a factor other than sex that can be
considered by employers whenmaking salary determinations, as well as the legal
and social impacts of these different approaches.
Currently, there is a robust national debate about the extent to which
employers can rely on prior salary history in the context of the EPA. The debate
in the courts has significant consequences for countless workers: if prior salary
history is a factor other than sex, employers may permissibly consider a female
employee’s previous wages to make salary determinations, despite the fact that
women’s wages are often impacted by sex and that such a policy would
perpetuate existing cycles of under-payment. Against the backdrop of a broad
1. Although gender and sex have distinct meanings, the terms are used interchangeably in this paper
to describe the pay gap, which is based on both an individual’s biological or physiological traits as well a
person’s gender identity in the context of society’s perception and treatment of the individual (biases,
expectations, tropes, roles, etc.). This understanding is meant to be inclusive of transgender, gender-queer,
gender-fluid, and gender non-conforming individuals.
2. Yuki Noguchi, 50 Years After The Equal Pay Act, Gender Wage Gap Endures, NPR (June 10,
2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/06/10/189280329/50-years-after-the-equal-pay-act-gender-wage-gap-
endures [https://perma.cc/6TQB-BH7H].
3. JEANNE H. BALLANTINE, KEITH A. ROBERTS & KATHLEEN ODELL KORGEN, OUR SOCIAL
WORLD: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 276 (7th ed. 2016).
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national debate on the issue of gender pay equity, much of the recent emphasis
on salary history stemmed from a Ninth Circuit opinion that deepened an existing
split between the federal courts of appeal on the question of whether prior salary
is a “factor other than sex” under the EPA.
4
Aileen Rizo was hired as a math consultant by the Fresno County Office of
Education in 2009. Pursuant to the office’s established policy, Rizo’s salary as a
new employee was “based exclusively on [her] most recent prior pay, regardless
of qualifications, education, or even the kind of work the individual had been
doing”; thus, Rizo began on step one of the salary scale.
5
But in 2012, she
discovered that a newly hired male math consultant had started on step nine of
the salary scale, with an initial salary $13,000 more than Rizo’s fourth year
salary, despite being less educated and less experienced than Rizo.
6
The County
conceded Rizo’s prima facie case: “Rizo is paid less than her male colleagues
for performing the exact same job.”
7
However, despite acknowledging that Rizo
was paid less than her male counterpart for the same work, the County asserted
that the discrepancy was permissible because it was based on Rizo’s prior
salary—a “factor other than sex.”
8
The district court sided with Rizo, determining that her prior salary history
was not a valid factor under the EPA.
9
On an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court based on the circuit’s prevailing precedent in
Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Company, before ordering rehearing of the case en
banc.
10
A six-judge majority of the Ninth Circuit held that “[p]rior salary,
whether considered alone or with other factors, is not job related and thus does
not fall within an exception to the Act that allows employers to pay disparate
wages.”
11
In overruling Kouba, the majority “conclude[s], unhesitatingly, that
‘any other factor other than sex’ is limited to legitimate, job-related factors such
as a prospective employee’s experience, educational background, ability, or prior
job performance.”
12
The majority opinion received attention not only because it overturned
Kouba to set new precedent in the Ninth Circuit and deepened the existing circuit
4. Danielle Paquette, Court: Employers Can’t Pay Women Less Because of Their Salary History,
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/09/court-
employers-cant-pay-women-less-because-of-their-salary-history/?utm_term=.3c4569fa4a29
[https://perma.cc/3EK4-2HLS].
5. Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee,
Rizo v. Yovino, 2016 WL 5869872 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2016) (No. 14-cv-4932) at 4.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Brief for Appellee at 21, Rizo v. Yovino, 2016 WL 5846093 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
8. Id.
9. Rizo v. Yovino, 2015 WL 9260587, at 9 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
10. Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2017), and on reh’g en banc, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691
F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
11. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d at 460 (9th Cir. 2018).
12. Id.
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split by determining that salary history could never be used, but also because it
was one of the final opinions authored by the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt.
13
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion noted that “[p]rior to his death, Judge Reinhardt fully
participated in this case and authored this opinion. The majority opinion and all
concurrences were final, and voting was completed by the en banc court prior to
his death.”
14
Counsel for the Fresno County School District appealed the Ninth Circuit’s
en banc decision to the United States Supreme Court, providing the Court an
immediate opportunity to serve as a final arbiter to this question on the use of
salary history.
15
However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth
Circuit’s decision on other grounds, which may ultimately permit employers to
consider workers’ prior salaries. The Court instead addressed the issue of
whether the circuit court erred when it counted Judge Reinhardt as a member of
the majority since he died before the court’s opinion in this case was issued on
April 9, 2018, eleven days after he passed away on March 29.
16
The Court
determined that “the Ninth Circuit erred in counting [Judge Reinhardt] as a
member of the majority” by allowing “a deceased judge to exercise the judicial
power . . . after his death,” noting that “federal judges are appointed for life, not
for eternity.”
17
The Supreme Court’s decision, though it did not directly address the
question of salary history, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s precedent on this question.
With Judge Reinhardt’s vote, the majority of six of eleven judges would have
“constitute[d] a precedent that all future Ninth Circuit panels must follow.”
18
As
the Supreme Court observed, “[w]ithout Judge Reinhardt’s vote, the opinion
attributed to him would have been approved by only five of the ten members of
the en banc panel who were still living when the decision was filed. Although
the other five living judges concurred in the judgment, they did so for different
reasons.”
19
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision has the potential to revive case law that
allows employers to consider workers’ prior salaries, at least in certain
circumstances, in Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Rizo v. Yovino, the debate over the
13. Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/obituaries/stephen-reinhardt-liberal-lion-of-federal-court
-dies-at-87.html [https://perma.cc/985J-W94L].
14. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 2018).
15. McGuire Woods, 9th Circuit: Employers May Not Use Pay History as Defense to Equal Pay Act
Claims (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2018/4/9th-Circuit-
Employers-Pay-History-Defense-Equal-Pay-Act-Claims.aspx [https://perma.cc/VM9R-JM2S].
16. Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 708 (2019).
17. Id. at 710.
18. Id. at 708.
19. Id.
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use of salary history in the courts is ongoing. Importantly, this deliberation in the
courts is occurring against a backdrop of legislative action by several state and
localities, many of which have banned employers from inquiring about an
employee’s prior salary.
20
The question of prior salary history has generated sharp division because of
the ongoing role it plays in broader gender pay equity debate. Many advocates
argue against an employer’s use of prior salary history because “reliance on that
information to determine compensation, forces women and, especially women
of color, to carry lower earnings and pay discrimination with them from job to
job.”
21
As such, reliance on salary history perpetuates historical discrimination
and is antithetical to the language and purpose of the EPA. However, others see
salary history as an essential, non-discriminatory inquiry. There are many
employers that “use salary history to evaluate and compare applicants’ job
responsibilities and achievements,” “to determine the market value of an
applicant or the position,” even though “salary is not a neutral, objective factor”
for decision making.
22
Although estimates of the wage gap vary, on average, women earn seventy-
seven cents for every dollar that men earn.
23
Ongoing research demonstrates that
pay disparities are worse for women of color
24
and can be exacerbated by
geographic differences.
25
According to one estimate, “women employed full
time in the United States lose a combined total of more than $900 billion every
year due to the wage gap.”
26
20. Ryan Golden & Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Women Who Refuse to Disclose Salary History More
Likely to Be Paid Less, HR DIVE (June 29, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/women-who-refuse-to-
disclose-salary-history-more-likely-to-be-paid-less/445993/ [https://perma.cc/A85F-5V9M].
21. Asking for Salary History Perpetuates Pay Discrimination from Job to Job, NAT’L WOMEN’S




22. Id. at 1-2.
23. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 5
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G2X-6EKE].
24. National Partnership for Women & Families, QUANTIFYINGAMERICA’SGENDERWAGEGAP BY
RACE (Sept. 2017), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/workplace/fair-pay/quant
ifying-americas-gender-wage-gap-by-race-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXJ4-6LDF].
25. National Women’s Law Center, THE LIFETIME WAGE GAP, STATE BY STATE (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://nwlc.org/resources/the-lifetime-wage-gap-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/39P3-9GBZ].
26. National Partnership for Women & Families, AMERICA’SWOMEN AND THEWAGE GAP 2 (Apr.
2018), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/americas-women
-and-the-wage-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/U28W-6LA8].
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To address issue of pay inequity, the EPA requires:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex
in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions[.]
27
This language adopts an equal pay for equal work standard, in which two
similarly situated employees who are performing the same work must be paid
the same, regardless of their sex. The EPA creates four exceptions to this general
rule, where salary differentials between the sexes can be permissible “pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex.”
28
To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, the plaintiff must show: “i)
the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; ii) the
employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility; and iii) the jobs are performed under similar working
conditions.”
29
Because the EPA does not have an intent requirement,
30
once the
plaintiff has demonstrated that workers of one sex are paid more for equal work
than are employees of the opposite sex, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer; the employer defendant must show the pay differential is justified,
such as under one of the Equal Pay Act’s four exceptions, which constitute an
affirmative defense to the claim.
31
If the defendant satisfies their burden, the
plaintiff may still rebut with evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was
a pretext for discrimination on the basis of sex.
32
The purpose of this Article is to critically analyze the legal reasoning relied
upon to interpret the EPA in the context of prior salary history cases, as well as
to assess the potential impacts of these differing interpretations across the circuit
courts. Part II will analyze the circuit split on the question of salary history as a
“factor other than sex” under the EPA, including the arguments related to the
statute’s text, legislative history, and purpose. Part III will provide a summary of
legislative action that has been taken with regard to salary history. Part IV will
evaluate some of the current and potential policy consequences resulting from
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
28. Id.
29. Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
30. Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that “[i]n contrast
to Title VII, the EPA establishes a form of ‘strict liability’”).
31. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
32. Belfi, 191 F.3d at 136.
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the ongoing salary history debate. Finally, Part V will provide a summary of the
main conclusions and recommendations of this Article.
II. THECIRCUIT SPLIT: IS PRIOR SALARY A “FACTOROTHER THAN SEX”?
The federal courts of appeal are split on the question of whether prior salary
is a “factor other than sex” under the EPA. These different methods of
interpreting the EPA in turn influence the role that prior salary history can play
in making employment compensation decisions. This Section summarizes the
circuits’ varying perspectives.
The courts’ divergent interpretations arise from the different textual
interpretations, legislative history, and purpose-based arguments they consider.
The textual interpretation of the EPA is informed by each court’s understanding
of legitimate business reasons that could permissibly constitute a “factor other
than sex.” A court’s skepticism of a company’s business decision making and its
inclination to override employers’ exercise of that judgment influence the textual
analysis. Additionally, although not every circuit considers legislative history,
the understanding of the legislative history and comparisons with other
exceptions to the EPA also inform the approach that the courts have taken.
Finally, the courts have also relied on the EPA’s remedial purpose in assessing
whether prior wages are a “factor other than sex.”
A. Summarizing the Approaches Adopted by the Circuits
One perspective is that the Equal Pay Act does not permit the consideration
of prior salary history. The Ninth Circuit explained this interpretation in its recent
en banc decision in Rizo v. Yovino, in which the court held that “prior salary
alone or in combination with other factors cannot justify a wage differential.”
33
The court reasoned that there was an attenuated relationship between prior salary
and legitimate factors other than sex that relate to qualification, skill, or
experience; as such, salary history “does not fit within the catchall exception
because it is not a legitimate measure of work experience, ability, performance,
or any other job-related quality.”
34
Accordingly, employers in the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction may not rely on salary history in their employment decisions.
Although this decision has been vacated by the Supreme Court on the grounds
that Judge Reinhardt’s vote was impermissibly counted in the six-judge majority
and does not carry precedential weight, the majority’s reasoning nonetheless
presents a unique analysis of the salary history inquiry. The term “majority” is
still used in this Article to distinguish this analysis from the three concurring
33. 887 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 2018).
34. Id. at 467.
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opinions adopted by the remaining five judges of the court; the remaining judges
concurred in the judgment, but declined to adopt the full breadth of the reasoning
set forth in Judge Reinhardt’s opinion.
The second mode of analysis, proffered by the Seventh Circuit, directly
opposes the Ninth Circuit’s position. Under the Seventh Circuit’s approach,
salary history is always a “factor other than sex.” The court has acknowledged
that “many empirical studies show that women’s wages are less than men’s on
average,” but it ultimately determined that discriminatory wage patterns are
“something to be proved rather than assumed.”
35
Since all market wages cannot
be assumed to be discriminatory, unless the plaintiff can prove that that “sex
discrimination led to lower wages in the ‘feeder’ jobs” or that the employer’s
wage scale directly violated the Equal Pay Act, there is no actionable claim.
36
As
such, employers may freely consider salary history, with only narrow exceptions.
The third approach, adopted by several circuits, stakes out a middle ground
between the positions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and allows employers
to assess prior salary history under specific circumstances. Circuit courts have
articulated this position in different ways. The Eighth Circuit permits employers
to use prior salary as an affirmative defense, but the “court carefully examines
the record to ensure that an employer does not rely on the prohibited ‘market
force theory’ to justify lower wages for female employees.”
37
Similarly, the
Second Circuit allows salary history to be used as an affirmative defense if the
employer can prove “that a bona fide business-related reason exists for using the
gender-neutral factor that results in a wage differential in order to establish the
factor-other-than-sex defense.”
38
The Eleventh Circuit has held that prior salary
history, on its own, “cannot solely carry the affirmative defense,”
39
as has the
Tenth Circuit by prohibiting “an employer from relying solely upon a prior salary
to justify pay disparity.”
40
The Ninth Circuit’s concurring opinions in Rizo v. Yovino echo this
perspective. Judge McKeown’s concurrence, joined by Judge Murguia, eschews
the majority’s bright-line test categorically banning the consideration of prior
salary history in favor of an approach that uses “prior salary along with valid job-
related factors such as education, past performance and training . . . [to] provide
a lawful benchmark for starting salary in appropriate cases.”
41
Judge Callahan,
joined by Judge Tallman, expressed that while it was impermissible to use “prior
pay” as the exclusive determinant of pay under the EPA, “prior pay is not
inherently a reflection of gender discrimination” because those differences could
35. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005).
36. Id.
37. Drum v. Leeson Elec. Corp., 565 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009).
38. Aldrich v. Randolph Ctr. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992).
39. Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995).
40. Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015).
41. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 470 (9th Cir. 2018).
2019] Salary History and Pay Parity 143
be based on other, legitimate factors “such as the cost of living in different parts
of our country.”
42
The final concurrence, by Judge Watford, reasoned that an
employer may rely on prior salary but “bears the burden of proving that its female
employees’ past pay is not tainted by sex discrimination, including
discriminatory pay differentials attributable to prevailing market forces . . .
[which] in most instances that will be exceedingly difficult to do.”
43
Under this third approach, courts allow employers to consider salary history,
but not as the sole justification for gender pay disparities. This perspective aligns
most closely with that of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC” or “Commission”), which takes the position that “prior pay alone
cannot justify a compensation disparity under the EPA because the practice
perpetuates the gender pay gap that continues to exist.”
44
Given this range of
possible interpretations, it is important to understand the reasoning upon which
the EEOC and circuit courts have based their analysis, in order to fully appreciate
how these differing statutory readings directly impact female workers.
B. Analyzing the Textual Arguments Presented in the Circuit Split
The EPA requires that:
[n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal
work . . . [that] requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . .
performed under similar working conditions[.]
45
The EPA also permits employers to assert an affirmative defense to justify
an identified pay gap based on “any other factor other than sex.”
46
Relying on this language, the circuits have differed in their understanding of
what should fall within the scope of a permissible “factor other than sex.” In
characterizing what constitutes an “acceptable business reason” for salary
differences under this catchall exception, courts’ interpretations have been
influenced by two factors. The first factor is the closeness with which courts
scrutinize the pretext behind an employer’s decisions. A court’s interpretation is
strongly influenced by its willingness to critically assess the legitimacy of an
42. Id. at 477.
43. Id. at 478-79.
44. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellee and in Favor of Affirmance, Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-
15372), 2016WL 5869872 (explaining the EEOC “is the agency charged with interpreting, administering,
and enforcing the Equal Pay Act along with other federal employment discrimination statutes”) (internal
citations omitted).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
46. Id.
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employer’s reliance on salary history and the purported connection to
experience, ability, or other job-related performance metrics. The second is the
court’s willingness to defer to the employer’s business judgment. A court’s
understanding of the statutory provision is influenced by its willingness not
merely to insert itself as an economic agent in the market, but possibly to
contradict an employer’s business judgment.
The Ninth Circuit majority interpreted “factor other than sex” as “limited to
legitimate, job-related factors such as a prospective employee’s experience,
educational background, ability, or prior job performance.”
47
In reaching this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on two canons of construction: noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis.
The canon noscitur a sociis gives related meaning to words grouped together
in a list. Applied to the text of the EPA, “factor other than sex” appears as a
catchall exception along with three specific exemptions to the pay parity
requirement: seniority, merit, and productivity systems. The court reasoned that
these three exclusions “share more in common than mere gender neutrality [as]
all three relate to job qualifications, performance, and/or experience.”
48
This
supports the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that “the more general exception [‘factor
other than sex’] should be limited to legitimate, job-related reasons as well.”
49
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the canon of ejusdem generis also
supports this reading. The canon requires that a general term, when appearing at
the end of a list of more specific terms, be “construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”
50
In reading the other exceptions as related to qualifications, performance, or
experience, the court concluded that “[a] similar factor would have to be one
similar to the other legitimate, job-related reasons” provided in the EPA.
51
Because the court found that salary history bore an attenuated relationship from
these valid metrics, it determined that prior salary “does not fit within the catchall
exception because it is not a legitimate measure of work experience, ability,
performance, or any other job-related quality.”
52
Alternatively, the exception could be interpreted as any factor besides sex,
including any business-related factor other than sex, encompassing salary
history. Prior to its most recent ruling, the Ninth Circuit had “relied upon
the express language of the EPA which says a pay differential is nonactionable
if the differential is pursuant to ‘a differential based on any other factor other
47. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
48. Id. at 461-62 (internal citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 462.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 467.
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than sex.’”
53
Although not explicitly relying on the canons of construction, this
argument identifies a more general unifying characteristic between the
exceptions: they are all business-related.
54
Given “virtually every dictionary
defines the word ‘any’ as ‘regardless of kind,’” then the appropriate reading of
“any other factor other than sex” is any factor.
55
The use of the word “any” also
supports a broad reading of the fourth exception of the EPA. A broad reading of
the exception “expressly permit[s] an employer to assert prior salary history as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a pay differential.”
56
The Seventh Circuit takes this conclusion one step further. Based on the
court’s prior decisions in Dey and Covington, the court held that a “factor [other
than sex] need not be ‘related to the requirements of the particular position in
question,’ nor must it even be business-related.”
57
The Ninth Circuit’s earlier
precedent in Kouba, characterizing the fourth exception as business-related
factors other than sex, is directly criticized by the Seventh Circuit. Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Easterbrook chastises the Ninth Circuit for originating
the acceptable business requirement without explaining its genesis, in a move
that “was [as] advanced as ukase.”
58
The rebuke extends to all circuits that have
followed the same reasoning because the acceptable business reason requirement
is not grounded in the statutory text.
59
Under this expansively interpreted
exception to the EPA, salary history is a legitimate business consideration, on
par with seniority and merit pay systems.
Pretext & Business Judgment
In its decision in Corning, the Supreme Court concluded that the company’s
ongoing disparity in base wages between night and day workers was pretext and
“operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice of
paying women less than men for equal work.”
60
Accordingly, the Court found
the wage differential discriminatory, despite being “phrased in terms of a neutral
factor other than sex.”
61
This decision supports scrutiny by courts to ensure that
when an employer asserts an affirmative defense, it is not a pretext or post-hoc
53. Brief of Appellants at 26, Rizo v. Yovino, 2016 WL 3901069 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-15372)
(emphasis added) (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 875).
54. Some courts have noted that a “factor other than sex” does not include literally any other factor,
but any factor that was adopted for a legitimate business reason. See Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712
F.2d 1024, 1029-31 (6th Cir. 1983).
55. Jeffrey K. Brown, Crossing the Line: The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’
Misapplication of the Equal Pay Act’s “Any Other Factor Other Than Sex” Defense, 13 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 181, 191 (1995).
56. Brief of Appellants, supra note 53, at 26 (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 877).
57. Wernsing, 427 F.3d 466 at 470.
58. Id. at 469.
59. Id.
60. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 209-10 (1974).
61. Id. at 209-10.
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rationalization for discrimination.
62
However, it is unclear if this decision would
permit courts to assume bias in the underlying salary history because the EPA
“permit[s] employers to defend against charges of discrimination where their pay
differentials are based on a bona fide use of ‘other factors other than sex.’”
63
Courts vary greatly in how closely they review these determinations,
particularly with regard to pretext. The Second Circuit frames the pretext inquiry
as “whether the employer has use[d] the factor reasonably in light of the
employer’s stated purpose as well as its other practices.”
64
The Second Circuit
has also held that “an employer bears the burden of proving that a bona fide
business-related reason exists for using the gender-neutral factor that results in a
wage differential.”
65
In determining whether an employer’s use of a civil service
exam and job classification system were permissible, the court held that these
systems could constitute an affirmative defense as a factor other than sex “if
defendants prove that the system is bona fide,” meaning the employer “must
prove that the exam for custodians and the practice of filling the custodian’s
position only from among the top three scorers on the exam are related to
performance of the custodian’s job.”
66
In comparison, the Sixth Circuit reviewed an employer’s “head of
household” provision, which permitted employees to extend medical and dental
coverage to a spouse, but only if the spouse earned less than the employee. The
court found the policy justified by business interests, as an employer could
legitimately conclude that “choosing a comprehensive fringe benefit package
faces the challenge of maximizing employee satisfaction while minimizing or
controlling cost.”
67
In Judge Hillman’s dissent, he notes several reasons why he
is critical of the relationship between the head of household policy and the
company’s purported justifications. These reasons include: (1) the comparatively
low percentage of female employees eligible for spousal benefits, (2) that “nearly
three-fourths of the affected employees . . . were female,” (3) that benefits
extended “to so few employees is not reasonably related to . . . [the company’s]
asserted justification of maximizing employee satisfaction,” and (4) that there
was no evidence of employee satisfaction increases.
68
In the context of prior salary history, the analysis of pretext is related to the
court’s assessment of an employer’s business judgment. In Gunther, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that “courts and administrative agencies are not
permitted to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer . . . who
62. Some courts have used clear language to hold there is no valid affirmative defense for “illusory”
and “post-event” justification for unequal pay. See e.g., Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 251-52
(6th Cir. 1981).
63. Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
64. Aldrich v. Randolph Ctr. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 527.
67. EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 255 (Hillman, J., dissenting).
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[has] established and applied a bona fide job rating system so long as it does not
discriminate on the basis of sex.”
69
The interpretation of the catchall exception
can vary based on a court’s perspective of its role in reviewing business decisions
that result in pay disparities.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit explained that “Congress has not
authorized federal judges to serve as personnel managers for America’s
employers,” which is why a broad reading of the catchall exception supports
deference to employers in exercising business judgment.
70
This interpretation
underpins the court’s general reasoning, that while “[i]t remains possible that pay
differences between men and women reflect discrimination,” such discrepancies
can also be attributed to individual “choices made about allocating time between
family and market endeavors.”
71
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is infused with far less deference to
an employer’s business judgment because “[n]ot every reason that makes
economic sense—in other words, that is business related—constitutes an
acceptable factor other than sex.”
72
In an effort to sidestep “too many improper
justifications for avoiding the strictures of the Act,” the court relies on intent and
precedent to support its interpretation, which prohibits actions by employers that
aim “to capitalize on the persistence of the wage gap and perpetuate that gap ad
infinitum.”
73
These interpretive differences are explored further in the context of
legislative history and precedent. These comparisons underscore how the court’s
perspective of its role in resolving these issues, as well as a court’s willingness
to be critical of business judgments, impact the contours of how “any other factor
other than sex” is interpreted across the various circuits.
C. Summarizing the Circuit Courts’ Legislative History Arguments
The Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history of the EPA in its
decision in Corning. In a later decision that discusses the Corning Court’s
analysis, the Supreme Court found that the “language and legislative history of
69. Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981) (internal citation omitted).
70. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
71. Id. at 471.
72. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d at 466 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Corning,
which “readily dismissed the notion that an employer may pay women less under the catchall exception
because women cost less to employ, thus saving the employer money. The Court explained that the market
forces theory—that women will be willing to accept lower salaries because they will not find higher
salaries elsewhere—did not constitute a factor other than sex even though such a method of setting salaries
could have saved the company a considerable amount and so would have constituted a good business
reason.”) (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 456-57, 466.
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the provision are not unambiguous,” adding to the complexity of the salary
history debate.
74
The Court begins its analysis of the legislative history by noting that the
original version of the EPA created only two exceptions, for seniority or merit
systems; this was met by pushback from witnesses during the House and Senate
committee hearings.
75
Those exceptions were insufficient to account for the
“formal, systematic job evaluation plans” used by many employers “to establish
equitable wage structures in their plants” by taking into account “four separate
factors in determining job value—skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions.”
76
In addition, critics of the bill expressed concerns that the EPA’s
language was “unduly vague and incomplete” and that the “Secretary of Labor
would be cast in the position of second-guessing the validity of a company’s
job evaluation system.”
77
The Court observes that “Congress acted in direct
response to these pleas” by amending the EPA to reflect that equal pay also
required “equal effort, responsibility, and similar working conditions,” which
were at the heart of job classifications, formed a “legitimate basis for differentials
in pay.”
78
In sum, the Court concludes this demonstrates Congress’ intent to keep
“well-defined and well-accepted principles of job evaluation . . . [so] that wage
differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be outside the
purview of the Act.”
79
The Court relied upon this analysis of legislative history in Corning to
conclude that the fourth affirmative defense was added to the EPA “because of
a concern that bona fide job-evaluation systems used by American businesses
would otherwise be disrupted.”
80
Circuit courts have relied upon this legislative
history analysis in interpreting the EPA, but have also added to this interpretative
context.
References to written reports provide additional insight for interpreting the
EPA. The Ninth Circuit references the House Committee’s report, which
characterizes “a bona fide job classification program” as one “that does not
discriminate on the basis of sex will serve as a valid defense to a charge of
discrimination.”
81
The court also relied upon the committee’s “illustrative list of
other factors in addition to job classification programs which would be covered
under the fourth exception” which included “shift differentials, restrictions on or
differences based on time of day worked, hours of work, lifting or moving heavy
74. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168.
75. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 199 (1974).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 200.
78. Id. at 200-01 (internal citations omitted).
79. Id. at 201.
80. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 464 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689).
81. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689).
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objects, differences based on experience, training, or ability.”
82
The Ninth
Circuit also notes the “Senate Committee Report likewise confirms that
Congress intended the catchall exception to cover factors other than sex only
insofar as they were job related.”
83
This analysis is largely echoed by the Second
Circuit, which also refers to the report, in noting that while “there are many
factors which may be used to measure the relationships between jobs and which
establish a valid basis for a difference in pay . . . a bona fide job classification
program that does not discriminate on the basis of sex will serve as a valid
defense.”
84
Gunther and Rizo both make reference to Representative Robert Griffin, but
rely on different statements by the congressman to support their analysis. In
Gunther, the Court noted that Representative Griffin’s explanation “that the
fourth affirmative defense is a ‘broad principle,’ which ‘makes clear and
explicitly states that a differential based on any factor or factors other than sex
would not violate this legislation.’”
85
The Ninth Circuit quotes Representative
Griffin’s description of the catchall exception: “Roman numeral iv is a broad
principle, and those preceding it are really examples.”
86
Both statements may be
reconciled when read in unison; however, when read independently from one
another, it is possible these two statements, though made by the same person,
could be construed in multiple ways to support various conclusions.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit dismisses reliance on legislative history by
posing this question: “But what relevance can this have now that anti-
discrimination statutes have been in force for more than two generations?”
87
D. Examining the EPA’s Purpose in the Circuits’ Rationales
Courts have also evaluated the purpose of the EPA in assessing the scope of
a “factor other than sex.” The Supreme Court, in its decision in Corning, stated,
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was
perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination”
to eliminate wage structures that reflected “an ancient but outmoded belief that
a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even
though his duties are the same.”
88
Additionally, in interpreting the EPA as a
broadly remedial statute, the Supreme Court held the Act “should be construed
82. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
85. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171 (citing 109 CONG. REC. 9203 (1963)) (also noting the statements of
several other legislators that aligned with Representative Griffin’s statements, citing remarks made by
Reps. Frelinghuysen, Thompson, Goodell, Kelly, Pucinski, and Thompson).
86. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 464.
87. Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 471.
88. Corning, 417 U.S. at 195 (citing S. REP. NO. 88-176, at 1 (1963)).
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and applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to
achieve.”
89
In its most recent decision in Rizo, the Ninth Circuit has determined that “it
is inconceivable that Congress, in an Act the primary purpose of which was to
eliminate long-existing endemic sex-based wage disparities, would create an
exception for basing new hires’ salaries on those very disparities—disparities
that Congress declared are not only related to sex but caused by sex.”
90
Relying
on the broad remedial purpose of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concludes
“Congress simply could not have intended to allow employers to rely on these
discriminatory wages as a justification for continuing to perpetuate wage
differentials.”
91
This is particularly evident when recognizing that at the time of
the EPA was passed, “an employee’s prior pay would have reflected a
discriminatory marketplace that valued the equal work of one sex over the
other.”
92
Although the Second Circuit ultimately reaches a different conclusion than
the Ninth Circuit, the court in Aldrich concludes that “job classification systems
may qualify under the factor-other-than-sex defense only when they are based
on legitimate business-related considerations also comports with the general
policy goals Congress sought to effectuate by enacting equal pay legislation.”
93
The court notes that in the absence of “a job-relatedness requirement, the factor-
other-than-sex defense would provide a gaping loophole in the statute through
which many pretexts for discrimination would be sanctioned.”
94
These perspectives of the EPA’s purpose stand in contrast to the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis. The court prioritizes the “benefit of making the job more
attractive to the best candidates—because the state’s civil service criteria call for
more attention to employees’ background and skills than to the market.”
95
Judge
Easterbrook’s opinion suggests the opposition’s analysis is “manufactured by the
judges rather than discovered by digging through legislative debates” and “lacks
any footing in enacted texts.”
96
Rather than elevating the EPA’s purpose, the
Seventh Circuit opinion eschews purpose in arriving at its decision to always
permit the use of salary history as a “factor other than sex.”
89. Id. at 208.
90. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
91. Id. at 461.
92. Id.
93. Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
94. Id.
95. Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 468.
96. Id. at 470.
2019] Salary History and Pay Parity 151
III. THE STATUS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEGISLATION
Ongoing litigation on the federal level has deepened the circuit split
regarding whether prior salary history is a permissible affirmative defense based
on “a factor other than sex.” However, the debate regarding prior salary history
is not cabined to the judicial arena. This Section briefly describes how legislative
action on the state level provides a rich backdrop against which to analyze the
circuit split, especially in the wake of federal inaction on this question.
Although the Equal Pay Act does not permit wage discrimination, it was not
understood to afford protection on the federal level to safeguard against
disclosure of past salary information—until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rizo
prohibited reliance on salary history under the EPA. State legislation regarding
prior salary history, on the other hand, has multiplied in recent years. At least
five states, including Massachusetts, Delaware, New York, California, and
Oregon, in addition to several cities, have also passed measures that ban
employers from inquiring about salary history.
97
New Jersey’s governor signed
an executive order to address this issue.
98
The scope and protections of these laws vary. The Massachusetts law, for
instance, includes an anti-retaliation provision.
99
Delaware’s provision includes
strong punitive measures, including “penalties from $1,000 to $5,000 for a first
offense, and up to $10,000 for a subsequent offense.”
100
New York City’s
provision includes even more severe fines. While “unknowing” violations can
result in penalties as high as $125,000, “knowing and continuing” violations can
be fined up to $250,000.
101
The proliferation of state legislation to ban prior salary history is ongoing.
In addition to Florida and New Hampshire, which “already have pay equity bills
drafted for consideration in their respective 2018 legislative sessions,” another
eleven states are considering “passing similar salary history ban laws” this
year.
102
Although growing in popularity, not all legislative efforts to ban prior
salary history have been successful.
For example, last August, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner vetoed a bill that
would prohibit employers from inquiring about an applicant’s salary history,
97. Ryan Golden & Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Women Who Refuse to Disclose Salary History More
Likely to Be Paid Less, HRDRIVE (June 29, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/women-who-refuse-to-
disclose-salary-history-more-likely-to-be-paid-less/445993/ [https://perma.cc/T62W-524D].
98. N.J. Exec. Order 2018-01 (Feb. 1, 2018), http://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562018/approved/
20180116a_eo.shtml [https://perma.cc/KTG4-WWE7].




101. Joseph Maddaloni Jr. & Cynthia L. Flanagan, Salary History Ban Laws Aim to Close Gender
Pay Gaps, N.J. L. J. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/03/20/salary-history-ban-
laws-aim-to-close-gender-pay-gaps [https://perma.cc/8BL7-SRLM].
102. Id.
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although the bill passed in a bipartisan manner and by a wide margin in both the
state House (91-24) and Senate (35-18).
103
In his veto message, Governor Rauner
favorably acknowledged the Massachusetts salary history law as a best-in-the-
country approach because of its benefits—for employers.
104
Governor Rauner
encouraged the Illinois legislature to adopt Massachusetts’ legislative language,
underscoring a provision that permits employers to seek pay history once they
have offered a candidate the job and salary. The exclusion of this provision from
the Illinois bill was viewed positively, as some advocates have expressed
concern that post-offer salary disclosures “could reduce an employee’s raise or
bonus down the road if it is revealed he or she was earning much less before,”
effectively undermining the purpose of the legislation.
105
Despite the bill’s
popularity, and the fact that a “veto override [would] require 71 votes in the
House and 36 in the Senate,” the state legislature has failed to override the veto—
twice—effectively rendering the legislation dead.
106
The activity on the state and local level reflects a willingness to act in the
face of federal stagnation on wage parity efforts, as Congress has not been able
to pass legislation to address pay disparities resulting from salary history.
Perhaps most notable is Congress’ failure in prior sessions to pass the Paycheck
Fairness Act, which was most recently re-introduced in 2019.
107
The proposed
Paycheck Fairness Act includes a provision banning the use of wage, salary, and
benefit history in “considering the prospective employee for employment” or in
“determining the wages for such employment . . . [unless] voluntarily provided
by a prospective employee . . . to support a wage higher than the wage offered
by the employer.”
108
The legislation would also prohibit employers from
requesting prior salary directly from a prospective employee’s past employers
and protect employees from retaliation.
109
In addition to creating a limit to the
“any other factor other than sex” catchall exception currently in the EPA, the Act
103. Illinois Governor Vetoes Ban on Salary History Inquiries, GARTNER INC. (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.cebglobal.com/talentdaily/illinois-governor-vetoes-ban-on-salary-history-inquiries/
[https://perma.cc/BV5J-G8Z2].
104. Memorandum from Bruce Rauner, Governor of Illinois, to Ill. House of Representatives,100th
General Assembly (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=10000HB
2462gms&GA=100&SessionId=91&DocTypeId=HB&LegID=103476&DocNum=2462&GAID=14&S
ession [https://perma.cc/FJ2V-YR9Z]; see also Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Rauner Vetoes Bill That Would Bar
Employers From Asking About Salary History, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.chi
cagotribune.com/business/ct-illinois-no-salary-history-bill-veto-0829-biz-20170828-story.html [https://
perma.cc/2NLE-9XQL].
105. Monique Garcia, Dems push Gov. Rauner to sign bill advocates say could bring women more
equal pay, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-rauner-
wage-bill-democrats-20180808-story.html [https://perma.cc/KD8H-N9Y6].
106. Elejalde-Ruiz, supra note 104; see also Kate Tornone, Second Attempt at Illinois Salary History
Ban Fails, HR DIVE (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/second-attempt-at-illinois-salary-
history-ban-fails/510534 [https://perma.cc/S5BP-6P5G].
107. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. § 10 (2019); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 270, 116th
Cong. § 8 (2019)
108. H.R. 7; S. 270.
109. H.R. 7; S. 270.
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would provide a specific penalty: employers would be “liable to each employee
or prospective employee who was the subject of the violation for special
damages not to exceed $10,000 plus attorneys’ fees, and shall be subject to such
injunctive relief as may be appropriate.”
110
Especially since the start of the TrumpAdministration, many advocates have
grown increasingly concerned about pay parity efforts on the federal level. Most
significantly, Trump suspended an Obama-era policy that would have required
“private employers with over 100 workers [to] have had to disclose pay data to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on top of information on
gender, race, and ethnicity already provided to the agency,” which advocates are
concerned will decrease transparency and allow the pay gap to grow.
111
The
Trump Administration also rolled back other pay equity efforts, including the
White House Equal Pay Pledge, just days after taking office. The pledge
“encouraged companies to take action to advance equal pay” and included
notable companies such “Patagonia, Estée Lauder, InterContinental Hotels,
Mastercard, Yahoo, Square and Zillow.”
112
In the absence of federal legislation and in the wake of these executive acts,
there is increasing pressure on the courts to resolve the circuit split on this
question. This would make clear whether additional federal legislation is
necessary to add protections for employees nationwide, or if existing protections
under the EPA are sufficient to ensure true pay equality for women. The current
state of affairs, with federal legislation unlikely to be forthcoming and the
question still hotly contested among the circuits, also heightens the importance
of developing state-level policies designed to combat barriers to wage parity,
including prior salary history, in order to create affirmative protections not
otherwise guaranteed through litigation or legislation.
IV. POLICY AND POLITICALCONSIDERATIONS INDETERMINING THENEXT
STEPS OF THE SALARYHISTORYDEBATE
This Section identifies central issues that are likely to influence the national
debate regarding the role of salary history in employment decisions. Situated
within the larger salary history discussion, these issues concern the efficacy of
110. H.R. 7; S. 270.
111. Clare O’Connor, Trump Halting Equal Pay Measure “‘A Blatant Attack On Women,’” Activists
Say, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2017/08/30/trump-halting-
equal-pay-measure-a-blatant-attack-on-women-activists-say/#a39aa2a395b1 [https://perma.cc/T7K7-J9
Q3].
112. Mandana Massoumi, INSIGHT: A Wave of Statewide Equal Pay Legislation Continues Despite
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salary history bans, the role of courts and legislatures, the use of prior salary in
negotiations, and the unique impact on women of color.
Prior to analyzing these considerations, consider an illustrative example to
demonstrate the significance of the wage gap: assume that a man’s starting salary
is $5,000 more than a woman’s. In addition to the immediate differential in their
earning, over time this gap is exacerbated. First, even if raises are given at the
same percent each year, because the base amount the man receives is higher, so
too is the dollar value that is represented by an equal percentage raise. What
started as a $5,000 gap per year grows into a differential that is more than
$15,000 per year over four decades; in this example, the gap has grown more
than three times.
113
In addition to an annual differential, there is a huge gap in
the cumulative earnings between these employees. By the time the two workers
are 60, extra earnings for the male total over $360,000.
114
Finally, the wage
differential is made more acute by added value of savings, which augment this
differential. Putting the salary differential into a savings account with 3 percent
interest would put the man’s total earnings at nearly $570,000 more than the
woman’s total earnings.
115
This example demonstrates the impact of the wage gap, not only in direct
earnings and day-to-day expenditures for women, but in the compounding nature
of this differential. An initial disparity creates a wealth gap that increasingly
impacts the economic security and wealth-building opportunities for women
over the long-term.
Although these figures help quantify the impact and escalation of wage
differentials, even when differences are initially minor, these numbers fail to
capture how this impacts the lived experiences of women. Betty Dukes was the
named plaintiff in a claim againstWal-Mart for gender discrimination in pay and
promotion policies and practices.
116
She described the direct and personal impact
of her lower salary by explaining: “When you subtract my living [expenses], I’m
not living — I’m existing. I have an 88-year-old mother. Economically, there’s
nothing I can do for my mom to make her life more golden in her golden years,




115. See JEANNE H. BALLANTINE, KEITH A. ROBERTS, KATHLEEN ODELL KORGEN, OUR SOCIAL
WORLD: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY (2016).
116. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
117. Dave Jamieson, Betty Dukes, Renowned Dukes v. Walmart Plaintiff, Takes Her Fight Back to
Capitol Hill, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/20/betty-
dukes-walmart-supreme-court_n_1613305.html [https://perma.cc/FBX9-PC8F] (discussing plaintiff in
Dukes v. Walmart after the Supreme Court failed to certify what would have been the largest class action
lawsuit in U.S. history, representing a proposed class of more than a million women alleging gender
discrimination in pay and promotion policies and practices).
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A. Assessing the Implementation and Efficacy of Salary History Bans
An ongoing point of contention, even among advocates who all favor pay
equity, is whether banning the use of prior salary history is an effective remedy
to resolve the pay gap. Although salary history prohibitions are meant to close
the gender wage gap, they may also have adverse consequences. Employers may
assume that women who refuse to disclose their pay have earned less or that they
are more determined to negotiate their salary aggressively, making them a less
appealing candidate. Women may also be perceived adversely for initiating
salary negotiations, even if men are not similarly penalized.
118
Other concerns have been expressed about existing legislative measures
banning the use of prior salary history. For instance, even though the
Massachusetts law provided other employment protections, some have been
critical of the bill’s salary history provision as superfluous. A main critique is
that employers have a work-around: asking prospective employees about their
salary expectations.HR Professionals Magazine provides several suggestions of
questions that employers should ask in lieu of salary history, including: “‘What
are your salary expectations?’ This gives the candidate the ability to share what
they seek to make for the role. It lets you decide if you should keep talking with
them. It also tells you whether they’ve done their homework or not.”
119
There is an additional concern that adopting a particular policy or standard
will have the effect of backing courts and legislatures into a corner, especially if
the adopted rule is not effective. The process of undoing precedent or rescinding
legislation may be even more difficult. Those persuaded by this argument might
support the adoption of the middle-ground approach taken by most circuits,
which permits the consideration of salary history in limited circumstances and
under close scrutiny by the courts. As expressed in Taylor, the Eighth Circuit
was “reluctant to establish a per se rule that might chill the legitimate use of
gender-neutral policies and practices.”
120
This moderate approach may help
build judicial consensus, while also balancing the concerns of employers and
employees.
118. Lydia Frank, Why Banning Questions About Salary History May Not Improve Pay Equity,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/why-banning-questions-about-salary-history-
may-not-improve-pay-equity [https://perma.cc/6C7D-94EX].
119. The Salary History Question: Alternatives for Recruiters and Hiring Managers, HR PROF’LS
MAG. (2017), http://hrprofessionalsmagazine.com/the-salary-history-question-alternatives-for-recruiters-
and-hiring-managers [https://perma.cc/NT38-RZQD].
120. Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
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B. Evaluating the Most Effective Actor: Courts vs. Legislatures
With both active federal litigation over the EPA’s application to prior salary
history and a marked increase in state and local legislation on the issue, many
equal pay advocates may question which approach to favor.
While it might be quicker for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split,
there are potential shortcomings to judicial interventions for equal pay. Judge
Nancy Gertner assesses employment discrimination law’s skewed evolution in
her essay entitled Losers’ Rules. She contends that judicial remedies are
inadequate to address gender-based employment discrimination, including the
gender pay gap, despite long-standing legislation that makes it illegal for
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex. As such, while litigation efforts
should continue, state legislation should be an ongoing focus for equal pay
advocates.
First, Judge Gertner asserts, judges do not see the strongest cases of
discrimination because they are settled rather than litigated.
121
Second,
defendants prevail more frequently at the summary judgment stage, likely in part
because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in employment discrimination
cases.
122
Additionally, when a court grants defendants summary judgment, it
authors an opinion in opposition to the plaintiff; however, when courts deny
summary judgment, the case proceeds to trial and no pro-plaintiff record is
established.
123
Finally, interpretive bias resolves ambiguity in favor of
defendants, creating another advantage for employers.
124
Such asymmetrical decision making has created a one-sided body of law that
undermines the plaintiffs who challenge gender-based employment
discrimination. As a result, judges follow distorted precedent that reifies and
affirms the biased judicial decision-making process. Moreover, courts are more
likely to presumptively view gender-based employment discrimination claims as
trivial, particularly in factually complex or ambiguous cases, giving defendants
the benefit of the doubt.
125
Inconsistent pay for plaintiffs’ attorneys, protracted
lawsuits, and high litigation costs complicate litigation and often create
121. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. F. 109, 115 (2012).
122. Id. (basing claim on Federal Judicial Center report, summary judgment motions, which are
overwhelmingly brought by defendants, were granted more often in employment discrimination cases
than in the aggregate).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 118 (ignoring explicitly discriminatory statements, such as in the “stray remarks” doctrine,
fundamentally distorts the outcome of discrimination cases by dismissing direct evidence of bias upon
which plaintiffs could rely).
125. Id. at 117 (noting that “one-sided heuristics—rules of thumb that oversimplify, dismiss, and
often demean proof of discrimination” not only favor the efficient dismissal of cases, but elevate the
concern of creating false positives over the concern for “false negatives that leave meritorious claims of
discrimination unredressed”).
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additional incentives to settle.
126
These aspects of the judicial system reinforce a
strong pro-defendant narrative that, when juxtaposed with an anti-plaintiff
judicial decision-making framework, makes it more difficult for claims to
succeed.
These biases in the litigation process have substantial implications for the
power dynamics between the parties and make it is easy to see why a legislative
resolutionmay be preferable. However, state policymaking is not without its own
challenges. For instance, preemption laws have been used to usurp local





Most recently, preemption laws have been a dominant instrument in state
regulation to squelch local experimentation and curtail the expansion of
employment protections. Such efforts have been successfully used to preempt
localities from setting minimum wage laws. For example, cities and counties
have been extremely effective in passing legislation to increase the minimum
wage, demonstrated by the fact that “more than 40 cities or counties in states
such as California, NewMexico, and Arizona have adopted local minimumwage
laws.”
129
As a result, at least twenty-five states currently have “laws that preempt
cities from passing their own local minimum wage laws.”
130
Efforts in some
states, like Missouri, have been in direct opposition to city expansions.
Missouri’s preemption law will effectively roll back “St. Louis’ $10-an-hour
minimum wage ordinance passed earlier this year . . . [meaning] thousands of
minimum-wage earners in the city could go back to earning the state rate of $7.70
an hour.”
131
Advancement of local and state policies has the impact of substantively
expanding employment protections within those geographic areas. While state
policymaking would require a piecemeal approach, achieve less consistent
nationwide practices, and face potential preemption challenges, these policies
can help ensure that pay gaps, particularly for women, are not compounded over
time. These laws can complement the protections of the EPA or potentially
126. Greg Ryan,What Defense Attys Should Know Before Going Plaintiff, LAW360 (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/466366/what-defense-attys-should-know-before-going-plaintiff [https://
perma.cc/V9YZ-YL7W].
127. See Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (2017),
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws/#state
[https://perma.cc/4SAS-6YYH].
128. Matthew Porter, State Preemption Law: The Battle for Local Control of Democracy, BEYOND
PESTICIDES (2017), https://www.beyondpesticides.org/assets/media/documents/lawn/activist/documents
/StatePreemption.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5FT-P384].
129. Fighting Preemption: The Movement for Higher Wages Must Oppose State Efforts to Block
Local Minimum Wage Laws, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 1 (July 2017), http://www.nelp.org/content/uplo
ads/Fighting-Preemption-Local-Minimum-Wage-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QWH-3DGR].
130. Id. at 2.
131. Yuki Noguchi, As Cities Raise Minimum Wages, Many States Are Rolling Them Back, NPR
(July 18, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/18/537901833/as-cities-raise-minimum-wages-
many-states-are-rolling-them-back [https://perma.cc/MR4C-FSKT].
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provide additional coverage, depending on the ultimate interpretation adopted by
the Supreme Court. Moreover, the laboratories of democracy theory suggests
that experimentation with various policies can also help bring to light unintended
consequences of such laws and help advocates move closer to the goal of pay
parity.
These state and local policies may also catalyze broader change. For
instance, national companies seeking to adopt a consistent practice within their
organization may change organization-wide salary-setting practices if they
operate in at least one state with a salary history ban. Several industry-leading
employers “like Amazon, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Progressive have
eliminated salary history questions from the hiring process, and other employers
are following suit.”
132
One recent survey found that nearly 40% of surveyed
employers “had implemented a policy to stop asking about a candidate’s salary
history” and that 40% of employers without an existing policy were likely to
adopt a salary history ban in the next 12 months. Thus, even in the absence of a
consistent national policy or uniform interpretation of existing legislation,
widespread discourse on the issue, or even a single state’s policy, could have
national consequences.
133
Although there are benefits to a federal approach, “the policymaking
benefits associated with devolution, including mutual learning, iterative
regulation, helpful redundancy, and healthy competition” suggest that state and
local policymaking should be more than a secondary alternative.
134
As Heather
Gerken explains in Federalism 3.0, “the fact that states are embedded in a federal
regime also allows them to play a crucial role in defending congressional
prerogatives, checking executive overreach, and safeguarding the separation of
powers.”
135
States should be viewed as robust democratic actors. Accordingly,
the development of state and local legislation is an affirmative strategy to pursue,
not in lieu of federal legislation, but as a complement to national policymaking
efforts. Ultimately, our policies benefit from the refinement that results from the
interaction between federal and state actors; this iterative process is a function of
the structure of our democracy itself, where “[c]ooperative federalism is paired
with uncooperative federalism,” to create a feedback loop within the system of
checks and balances.
136
132. Genevieve Douglas, States Begin to Block Bans on Pay History Inquiries; Will Others Follow?,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.bna.com/states-begin-block-b57982090883 [https://per
ma.cc/ABS6-D9MK].
133. Id. at 1721.
134. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695, 1720 (2017).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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C. Accounting for the Impact of Salary History in Negotiations
While experts have posited many reasons for pay discrepancies—ranging
from occupational segregation, to the impacts of maternity leave and
motherhood, to overt discrimination—gender pay inequity persists.
137
These
major and systemic workplace issues impact working women daily, as does “the
lack of adequate lactation rooms in most office buildings, antiquated office dress
codes that require women to wear high heels to work and the size of safety gear
available[, such as those used by] female astronauts [and soldiers].”
138
Salary negotiations are another possible cause of pay disparities, and
negotiations often prompt questions related to salary history. As illustrated in the
earlier example, salary differentials can result in both short-term and long-term
inequities.
139
Even an initially small pay disparity can eventually lead to
disparities of several hundred thousand dollars. Lower salaries constrain
spending, whereas a worker’s ability to save generates additional earnings. In
this way, seemingly small differences in pay result in substantial long-term
inequities.
There are other concerns about the use of salary history in the pay
negotiation and wage-setting process. The National Women’s Law Center
(“NWLC”) identifies several additional complications. First, NWLC cites recent
research that proves that women, particularly women of color, face bias in the
salary-setting process. In an experiment, researchers found that employers
offered the male applicant, John, a salary nearly $4,000 higher than the female
applicant, Jennifer, despite the fact that both candidates had identical resumés,
expect for the name.
140
Intentional or not, conscious or otherwise, this bias
increases the likelihood that women will face disparities that are magnified, not
137. See Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in
Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/22/gender-pay-
gap-facts/ [https://perma.cc/PQ3N-SHYL]; Miriam Valverde, Hillary Clinton Says Donald Trump
Doesn’t Believe in Equal Pay, POLITIFACT (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2016/nov/02/hillary-clinton/hillary-clinton-says-donald-trump-doesnt-believe-e
[https://perma.cc/AGZ2-R3L2].
138. These institutional barriers are as embedded and routine as “temperature setting, [which] in
most workplaces is calibrated to men’s metabolic rates, so women are often uncomfortably cold,” which
chills strides towards full inclusion of women in all careers. Marisa Porges, What the Failed All-Female
Spacewalks Tells Us About Office Temperature: In a For-Men, By-Men World, the Little Things Still
Really Do Matter, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/opinion/nasa-
female-spacewalk.html [https://perma.cc/4U8D-TDDU].
139. CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & LELA PORTER LOVE,
NEGOTIATION: APPROPRIATE PROCESS AND PROBLEM SOLVING (2006).
140. National Women’s LawCenter, Asking for Salary History Perpetuates Pay Discrimination from
Job to Job (June 2017), https://www.cwlc.org/download/fact-sheet-asking-for-salary-history-perpetuates-
pay-discrimination-from-job-to-job/?wpdmdl=4689&ind=18BbgOnmocYqZp4_mv06F7CjAivNg3wj3g
jP5CXH4qf-zNYNZRnH8IT0pAsVDTcnZ-L6ClTL7w3seubhA7Ca3J-0CTlNeEztBdEIP1kvbus
[https://perma.cc/E5H2-QG3V] (referencing Corrine A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle
Gender Biases Favor Male Students, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/41/16474.abstract#aff-1 [https://perma.cc/FCL5-6X6H]).
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neutralized, by the salary negotiation process. In addition, “women are more
likely to have worked in lower paid, female-dominated professions that pay low
wages simply because women are the majority of workers in the occupation.”
141
Moreover, because women carry “the majority of caregiving responsibilities,”
they are more likely “to reduce their hours or leave the workforce to care for
children and other family members.”
142
These dynamics also impact educated
women. Even though this group is “the least likely to stop working after having
children,” it is important to recognize the social and economic dynamics “that
push couples who have equal career potential to take on unequal roles,” as
women often move to less demanding jobs or reduce their hours in order to
accommodate their partner’s career and earning potential.
143
Recognizing that
“[w]omen don’t step back from work because they have rich husbands … [but
that] [t]hey have rich husbands because they step back from work” is the first
step to understanding how this phenomenon intersects with the compounding
effects of the pay gap.
144
Overrepresentation in low-wage industries,
accumulation of unpaid caregiving responsibilities, and practical limitations on
earning capacity present additional hurdles for women to overcome in salary
negotiation.
In addition to these obstacles in negotiation, other challenges that result from
the use of prior salary history information include salaries that may not reflect
current market conditions or a candidate’s current qualifications; preemptive
screening of candidates because of salaries that are too high or too low, without
an assessment of skill, knowledge, or experience; and salary disclosures that
artificially deflate wages because employers are less likely to pay an applicant
significantly more than their previous role.
145
Courts have also recognized the difficulty of overcoming sexism in pay
negotiations. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rizo notes the limits of its holding,
particularly with regard to salary negotiations:
Today we express a general rule and do not attempt to resolve its
applications under all circumstances. We do not decide, for example,
whether or under what circumstances past salary may play a role in the
course of an individualized salary negotiation. We prefer to reserve all
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146. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 461.
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Although specifically noting that the majority’s opinion “should in no way
be taken as barring or posing any obstacle to whatever resolution future panels
may reach regarding questions relating to such negotiations,” the concurrences
by Judges McKeown and Callahan express concern that this holding could upset
settled precedent.
147
While the Ninth Circuit’s ruling prohibits the reliance on salary history
generally, it is unclear if or how this holding can break a cycle that often occurs
in employment: prior salary is used to determine one’s new salary. When
employers are banned from inquiring about applicants’ previous wages,
applicants are relieved from having to disclose information that could be used
against them to artificially deflate their salary. This ban breaks the cycle of
underpayment. This rationale, which has prompted states like Massachusetts to
take action to remedy the pay gap, will likely a continuing influence ongoing
jurisprudence in about the use of prior salary history, particularly in the context
of negotiations.
148
D. Understanding the Implications for Women of Color Using the Lens of
Intersectionality
There are many employment challenges faced by women of all races,
including underrepresentation in high level, high-paying positions, and
overrepresentation in low-paying jobs.
149
Only 5 percent of CEOs at Fortune 500
companies are women.
150
Women comprise less than 30 percent of earners at the
top 10 percent and less than 20 percent of earners at the top 1 percent.
151
By
contrast, “[w]omen make up 63 percent of workers earning the federal minimum
wage, a wage rate stuck at $7.25 since 2009.”
152
Additionally, “[f]emale-
dominated occupations — such as childcare and restaurant service — continue
to occupy the lower rungs of the U.S. wage ladder.”
153
It should come as no surprise that the rates of female poverty are also
higher—with 13.4 million women (13.4%) aged 18-64 living in poverty, as
compared with 9.4 million (9.7%) of adult men.
154
This gap grows further when
comparing poverty rates for single-parent households with children, where
147. Id. at 468-78.
148. Frank, supra note 118.
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female-headed households “had a poverty rate of 35.6 percent, more than twice
the 17.3 percent rate for households led by single men with children.”
155
The gender wage gap also perpetuates the gender wealth gap, where earnings
over time result in an even wider schism between the sexes, both directly and
indirectly. Wage disparities impact pension plan payments and Social Security
payouts, both of which are partly based past earnings.
156
More tangentially,
women have smaller retirement savings but longer life expectancies than men,
which are impacted by their earnings.
157
Women “hold nearly two-thirds of
outstanding student loan debt” even though they only make up about half of
college students.
158
These are just some of the ways women’s debt and savings
are uniquely impacted by the gender wage gap.
Ongoing research shows that pay disparities are often worse for women of
color.
159
According to research compiled by the American Association of
University Women (“AAUW”), most women of color face an even greater wage
gap than white non-Hispanic women, whose earnings were 77 percent that of
white men.
160
In comparison, native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander women
earn 65 percent, black women earn 61 percent, native women earn 58 percent,
and Latina women earn 53 percent as much as white men.
161
Only Asian women
outpace white non-Hispanic women, but still only earn 85 percent as much as
white men.
162
Accordingly, women of color are typically at an even greater
disadvantage and disproportionately bear the impact of the wage gap. As the
wage gap grows, so does the impact on the poverty and wealth gaps for women
of color.
Sociologists have investigated “how racial and gender discrimination play
important roles in creating and reinforcing this particular wage gap,” including
research demonstrating that “office rules are applied more harshly to women of
color than to others, and that some predominantly white workplaces have racially
inhospitable environments that serve to push women of color out.”
163
Researchers have also investigated “how black women working in male-
155. Id.
156. Id. (“In 2017, the $15,000 average annual Social Security benefit for women lagged the benefit
for men by $4,000.”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FORWOMEN&FAMILIES, QUANTIFYINGAMERICA’SGENDERWAGEGAP




160. KEVIN MILLER & DEBORAH J. VAGINS, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP,




163. Adia Harvey Wingfield, About Those 79 Cents, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/79-cents/504386 [https://perma.cc/QP2L-ECZL].
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dominated executive ranks encounter both racial and gender stereotypes as well
as disparities in mentorship that limit their career trajectories.”
164
These studies
complement the findings of New York University researcher Deirdre Royster,
whose work shows “that social networks help white men more than black men
when it comes to looking for skilled jobs,” underscoring the importance of access
to insider networks.
165
This research is similar to the resumé study showing gender bias in salary-
setting, in which employers on average offered John a starting salary nearly
$4,000 more than Jennifer, although their resumés were otherwise identical.
166
Similar research has demonstrated that the same phenomenon occurs with
respect to race. One study of employers in Boston and Chicago found that white-
sounding names—Greg Baker and EmilyWalsh—generated a callback rate 50%
higher than that of equally qualified applicants with African-American-sounding
names—Lakisha Washington and Jamal Jones.
167
Another recent study showed
racial discrimination in the evaluation of identical writing samples. Half of the
reviewers were told the candidate was white and the other half were told the
candidate was African-American.
168
Even though the memos were identical,
“reviewers rated the memo thought to be written by a white man an average score
of 4.1 out of 5, while they rated the memo thought to be written by an African-
American man a score of 3.2 out of 5.”
169
These statistics illuminate a difficult
reality: “contemporary bias is often subtle, unconscious, and institutionally
based.”
170
Broad statistics like these contain useful insights for advocates of pay equity,
but they don’t tell the whole story. First, there is additional complexity within
the subgroups in the statistics cited. For instance, althoughAsian women are paid
more than women from other minority groups, the general group statistics do not
fully reflect the experiences of all Asian women, as there is also diversity within
this group. In the United States, Asian women “of Indian and Chinese descent
are on average paid better . . . but Burmese, Hmong, and Laotian women on
average are paid significantly less—60 percent or less of what white men are
paid.”
171
A simple comparison between ethnic groups glosses over the different
experiences of Asian women based on their country of origin.
Second, there are additional impacts on women who hold more than one
minority identity. As seen with the intersection of gender and race in
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. National Women’s Law Center, supra note 140.
167. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Accountability as a Debiasing Strategy: Testing the Effect of
Racial Diversity in Employment Committees, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1597 (2018).
168. Id. at 1598.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. MILLER, supra note 160, at 10.
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employment, “[w]omen of color . . . experience particularly high levels of
poverty, unemployment, and other economic hardships.”
172
This is further compounded for women of color who are also members of




sexual orientation, or gender identity.
175
Adopting an intersectional
lens in which “categories like gender, race, and class are best understood as
overlapping and mutually constitutive rather than isolated and distinct” can
inform solutions that account for the experiences of all women.
176
The
importance of intersectionality is that it “deliberately focus[es] on those on the
fringes” to ensure that a “focus on women” includes all women.
177
The concept of intersectionality, first introduced by legal scholar Kimberlé
Crenshaw, recognizes that race and gender are interconnected and interrelated,
rather than discrete categories of analysis.
178
Because a person “does not
experience oppressions or privileges discretely, but simultaneously . . . women
of color often have unique intersectional experiences that neither men of color
nor white women can relate to.”
179
Intersectional problems require intersectional solutions. It is critical to
address bias in salary history, as well as other gender-based forms of
discrimination, ranging from stereotyping to the motherhood penalty, that afflict
all women. However, it is not sufficient to advocate for salary parity, pregnancy
or caregiver protections, or other policies that benefit women as a monolith. A
comprehensive and multi-faceted solution that is also intersectional will better
address the broad impacts of the gender wage gap, including its implications for
women’s access to housing, education, and credit. Implementing policies that
“improve the quality of jobs held mainly by women, tackle occupational
segregation, enforce equal pay and employment opportunities, and improve
work family benefits for all workers, will help the incomes of women and their
families grow and strengthen the economy.”
180
Accordingly, “any efforts to close
the gender-pay gap should address not just the processes that perpetuate gender




175. Id. at 11.
176. Wingfield, supra note 163.
177. Jennifer Kim, Intersectionality 101: Why “We’re Focusing on Women” Doesn’t Work for
Diversity & Inclusion, MEDIUM (Apr. 10, 2018), https://medium.com/awaken-blog/intersectionality-101-
why-were-focusing-on-women-doesn-t-work-for-diversity-inclusion-8f591d196789 [https://perma.cc/
WZN7-DKQP].
178. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139.
179. Kim, supra note 177; see alsoWingfield, supra note 163.
180. Erica Williams, On Equal Pay Day, a Look at How EITCs Help Women in Every State, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/on-equal-pay-day-a-look-
at-how-eitcs-help-women-in-every-state [https://perma.cc/5FD3-HZRE].
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that the pay gaps that remain are “driven only by differences in skill, education,
and experience—not by race or gender.”
181
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether prior salary history is a “factor other than sex”
under the EPA will likely be determined by the Supreme Court, as the circuit
split on this question was not answered in the Court’s review of Ninth Circuit’s
en banc decision in Rizo. This Article summarizes the existing circuit divide on
this question, assessing arguments related to the statute’s text, legislative history,
and purpose. Additionally, state legislative efforts to address problems that arise
from the use of prior salary history provide important context for the evolution
of a national dialogue on this issue. Finally, while the policy consequences of the
ongoing salary history debate are uncertain, special attention should be paid to
the efficacy of salary history bans, the role of courts and legislatures in setting
the scope of use of salary history information, the impact of prior salary in
employment negotiations, and the unique barriers faced by women of color. In
addition to achieving the goal of pay equity through the elimination of prior
salary history, advocates should promote intersectional solutions that improve
the outcomes for all women. Such solutions include enhancing union protections,
mandating paid leave and flexible scheduling, and designing tax and economic
policies that help all workers. Ultimately, these court decisions, legislative
choices, and national discussions will help ensure that the fundamental goal of
the Equal Pay Act is realized: offering truly equal employment opportunities to
all workers, regardless of sex or salary history.
181. Wingfield, supra note 163.
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and protection agency, Oranga Tamariki, purports to protect children, but its
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intervention in pregnancy to empower pregnant women’s fully autonomous
decision making and provide the social conditions and resources to support
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INTRODUCTION
State child protection agencies have a vexed relationship with pregnancy.
The vexed relationship arises from the paradox of pregnancy raising two subjects
of State interest: a present pregnant woman and a future child. In this moment of
paradox, pregnancy can be a positive opportunity for the State to support
pregnant women to prepare for wanted, healthy pregnancies and stable parenting
relationships. Equally, pregnancy can be a site of pernicious State regulation that
restricts a pregnant woman’s ability to make decisions about her own life and
imposes a government standard for family life that excludes women who fall
outside white middle-class norms of “good” motherhood.
The promise and peril in State intervention is illustrated by the work of New
Zealand’s new government agency for children and young people, Oranga
Tamariki—Ministry for Children. In 2017, Oranga Tamariki replaced the former
government agency for child protection services, Child, Youth and Family, after
an Expert Advisory Panel found the agency was failing to meet the needs of
children and young people.
1
Oranga Tamariki aims to build a child-centered,
investment approach to working with children and young people. The Ministry
intends to replace the traditional “crisis response” model for child protection
services with a system “focused on prevention and early intervention, with the
aim of having fewer children moving through the system and into care.”
2
Critically, this investment model is built on “high aspirations” for tamariki Māori
(Māori children and young people).
3
In the new “investment model,” prevention and early intervention begin with
pregnancy. Oranga Tamariki sees pre-birth as a “unique opportunity” to work
1. Modernising Child, Youth and Family Expert Panel, Expert Panel Final Report: Investing in
New Zealand’s Children and their Families 20 (2015) [hereinafter Final Report]; see also Cabinet Social
Policy Committee Minute of Decision “Organisational Form to Support the New Operating Model for
Vulnerable Children.”
2. What We Do, ORANGA TAMARIKI, https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/NNQ8-PFL2].
3. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; and Who We Are, ORANGA TAMARIKI, https://www.orang
atamariki.govt.nz/about-us/overview/ [https://perma.cc/FRL9-JFY8].
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with families, whānau
4
and other professionals to assess parenting capacity,
determine a family’s needs and implement a plan that will secure the immediate
safety of the newborn infant and its “brightest future.”
5
The pre-birth practice
framework is supported by a line of New Zealand cases holding that the agency
is empowered to investigate reports of concern for an “unborn child” and apply
to the courts for statutory orders over that “unborn child.”
6
Oranga Tamariki is a part of New Zealand’s broader efforts to rectify a
shameful record of neglecting certain groups of children’s wellbeing and make
New Zealand “the best place in the world to be a child.”
7
In 2016, New Zealand’s
child poverty monitor found 27 percent of New Zealand children lived in
households experiencing income poverty and seven percent lived in severe
poverty.
8
Almost one in four New Zealand children have been subject to at least
one report to child protective services by age seventeen and around one in ten
have suffered abuse or neglect.
9
While Indigenous Māori are found at all levels
of socio-economic status in New Zealand,
10
Māori children experience
significantly higher rates of deprivation and disadvantage than New Zealand
European children. Māori children are twice as likely as non-Māori to live in
food insecure households and have significantly higher rates of mortality and
hospitalization for medical conditions.
11
New Zealand’s contemporary efforts to address child poverty are anchored
in its context of colonization. In New Zealand’s colonial history, the Crown
alienated Indigenous Māori land and resources and undermined the Māori
4. ”Whānau” is the Māori concept of an extended family or family group, or “a multigenerational
collective made up of many households that are supported and strengthened by a wider network of
relation” Whānau,MĀORIDICTIONARY, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb
=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=whanau [https://perma.cc/7YXJ-HEBL]; see also FIONA CRAM,
FAMILIES COMMISSION—KŌMIHANA Ā WHĀNAU, SAFETY OF SUBSEQUENT CHILDREN: MĀORI
CHILDREN ANDWHĀNAU 11 (2012).
5. ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, STRENGTHENING OUR RESPONSE TO UNBORN BABIES,
https://practice.orangatamariki.govt.nz/policy/assessment-and-decisionmaking/key-information/strength
ening-our-response-to-unborn-babies/ [https://perma.cc/C4YN-V7W5].
6. See, e.g., In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC); Re an Unborn Child
[2003] 1 NZLR 115 (HC); L v. Chief Executive Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children
[2018] NZHC 1420.
7. Jacinda Ardern, 40th Prime Minister of New Zealand, Speech to 9th Annual Social Good Summit
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/D5K5-HKNY. See also NEW ZEALANDGOVERNMENT, OURPLAN: THE
GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES FOR NEW ZEALAND, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-
09/Our%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE78-9LMC].
8. M. DUNCANSON ET. AL., NEW ZEALAND CHILD AND YOUTH EPIDEMIOLOGY SERVICE, CHILD
POVERTYMONITOR: TECHNICALREPORT 3 (2017). The 2018 report of the Child Poverty Monitor did not
include updated income poverty rates due to issues relating to sample size.
9. Bénédicte Rouland & Rhema Vaithianathan,Cumulative Prevalence of Maltreatment Among New
Zealand Children, 1998-2015, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 511, 512 (2018).
10. See EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP ON SOLUTIONS TO CHILD POVERTY, WORKING PAPER NO. 14:
REDUCING CHILD POVERTY IN MĀORI WHĀNAU 1 (2012), https://www.occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads/EAG/
Working-papers/No-14-Reducing-poverty-in-Maori-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVV7-SKXT].
11. See M. DUNCANSON ET AL., NEW ZEALAND CHILD AND YOUTH EPIDEMIOLOGY SERVICE,
UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO, DUNEDIN, CHILD POVERTY MONITOR TECHNICAL REPORT (2018),
http://www.nzchildren.co.nz/ [https://perma.cc/25M5-RVVS].
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cultural, spiritual and economic base. New Zealand’s policies, institutions and
infrastructure are steeped with notions of Māori inferiority and Pākehā (New
Zealand European) superiority.
12
The legacy of colonization is “the differential
distribution of social, political, environmental and economic resources and
wellbeing . . . with Māori bearing the brunt of disparities.”
13
This Note argues that extending the State’s discretionary child protection
powers to the fetus as an “unborn child” in New Zealand’s environment of
structural inequality and colonial oppression perversely acts to constrain the
rights and interests of the very women the State has an obligation to empower. I
contend that the State should not abandon pregnancy intervention, but
reconstruct interventions in line with an affirmative concept of the right to
privacy emphasizing the duty of the State to provide social conditions and
resources to support pregnant women’s fully autonomous decision making.
The Note begins in Part I by tracing how the New Zealand courts have found
the State’s child care and protection powers extend to protect the “unborn child”
from harm. I outline how Oranga Tamariki pursues this accepted State interest
in the “unborn child” through an intensive investment model that prioritizes
prevention and early intervention services beginning before birth. Part II argues
that framing the fetus as an “unborn child” has served to obscure pregnant
women and drive State intervention.
Part III demonstrates that applying the construct of the “unborn child” in the
context of New Zealand’s structural inequality, colonial oppression, and
dominant white middle-class notions of family and motherhood
disproportionately impacts Māori women andwomen experiencing poverty. Part
IV highlights the perversity of the State interventions constraining rather than
empowering pregnant women. At the individual level, State oversight infringes
a woman’s right to privacy. At the collective level, the unequal State oversight
imposes an invidious standard for family life and distracts the public from the
broader State supports required for all to improve children’s wellbeing.
Part V argues for a reconstruction of pregnancy intervention to empower all
pregnant women and support families. Two core features of traditional child
protection services, the paramountcy principle and the child rescue model, are
fundamentally incompatible with the autonomy of pregnant women. While this
structure endures, New Zealand will be unable to achieve positive, empowering
intervention within the child protection branch. However, the State’s vexed
relationship with pregnant women cannot be resolved by the State withdrawing
from pregnancy altogether. Reconstruction of State intervention is supported by
12. See Fiona Cram, Poverty, inMĀORI AND SOCIAL ISSUES 156, 156 (Tracey McIntosh & Malcolm
Mulholland eds., 2011.) “Pākehā” is a term used to describe New Zealanders of European descent:Pākehā
MĀORI DICTIONARY, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&hist
LoanWords=&keywords=pakeha [https://perma.cc/A6PD-CLPZ].
13. Id. at 156.
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an affirmative concept of the right to privacy, reproductive justice, the Crown’s
obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi,
14
and New Zealand’s international treaty
obligations to support family life.
15
I. NEW ZEALAND EXTENDS CHILDCARE AND PROTECTION POWERS TO THE
“UNBORNCHILD”
From 2017 to 2018, Oranga Tamariki received 1,949 separate reports of
concern that an “unborn child” in New Zealand had been, or was likely to be,
harmed, ill-treated, abused, or neglected.
16
Oranga Tamariki took further care
and protection action on 1,235 of these reports of concern and obtained custody
orders for a total of 125 unborn children in New Zealand during that year.
17
This
part traces how New Zealand came to extend its broad, discretionary child
protection powers to the fetus as the “unborn child” and how this extension has
served to obscure the interests of pregnant women in New Zealand.
A. New Zealand’s Mission to Invest in Children and Young People
Oranga Tamariki carries the flag for New Zealand’s mission to invest in its
children and young people. The 2017 establishment of Oranga Tamariki, and
associated amendments to statutory child protection powers, followed a decades-
long struggle over how to ensure the child protection system meets the needs of
all children and families in New Zealand.
18
14. In 1840, representatives of the British Crown signed Te Tiriti o Waitangi, or the Treaty of
Waitangi, with representatives of iwi/tribal groups. The Treaty is New Zealand’s founding constitutional
document and was meant to create a partnership betweenMāori and the British Crown that affirmed Māori
sovereignty and guaranteed collective rights to land and resources. Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840; see also
Claire Charters & Tracey Whare, Shaky Foundations: The Fundamental Flaw at the Heart of a “Model”
Treaty Involving New Zealand and the IndigenousMāori Community, 34WORLD POLICY J. 11, 11 (2017).
15. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. (ratified 6 April 1993).
16. Letter from Steve Groom, Gen. Manager Pub., Ministerial and Executive Services Oranga
Tamariki, to Ministry for Children (Jan. 29, 2019).
17. Id. Oranga Tamariki initiated a “partnered response” for a further 129 reports that did not meet
the statutory threshold for care and protection but required “family focused case management.” The
custody orders figure includes custody orders under ss 78, 101, 102, 110(2)(a), and 140 of the Oranga
Tamariki Act.
18. State Sector (Ministry for Vulnerable Children, Oranga Tamariki) Order 2016 (N.Z.). When first
established, the Ministry was called the “Ministry for Vulnerable Children, Oranga Tamariki.” The name
was amended to “Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Children” from January 18, 2018, following a public
debate about the stigma of the word “vulnerable.” See, e.g., Craig McCulloch, ‘Vulnerable’ dropped from
Children’s Ministry name, RADIO NEW ZEALAND (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.radionz.
co.nz/news/political/345957/vulnerable-dropped-from-children-s-ministry-name [https://perma.cc/229E-
Y5YB]. The former agency for child protection services—Child, Youth and Family—had been reviewed
almost continuously since 1988, including 14 restructures between 1998 and 2008. See MODERNISING
CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY EXPERT PANEL, MODERNISINGCHILD, YOUTHAND FAMILY EXPERT PANEL:
INTERIM REPORT 6 (2015) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-
msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/evaluation/modernising-cyf/interim-report-expert-panel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V8Z-VQ7S].
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New Zealand’s Children’s Commissioner, Judge Andrew Becroft,
diagnosed Child, Youth and Family’s core problem as a failure to understand
and seize the opportunity for radical change laid down in its governing Act, the
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989.
19
The opportunity was
to embrace the Māori worldview and pivot powers on children’s wellbeing as
members of their broader whānau, hapu, iwi, and family groups.
20
This radical
vision was an answer to the groundbreaking 1988 Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Daybreak)
report, which called out the insidious and destructive institutional racism in the
monocultural services of the Department.
21
Puao-Te-Ata-Tu underlined the
system’s “profound misunderstanding or ignorance of the place of the child in
Maori society.”
22
Despite the 1989 Act’s opening for change, a focus on
traditional Pākehā family structures has continued to permeate the practice of
social work.
Concerns about Child, Youth and Family’s performance and impact on
vulnerable children culminated in the April 2015 appointment of an independent
expert panel to lead a “complete overhaul” of the agency.
23
The Modernising
Child, Youth and Family Panel found the care and protection system focused on
managing immediate risk and containing short-term costs instead of working to
support “better lives” for children in the long-term.
24
Overall, children in contact
with the system had significantly worse health, education and incarceration
outcomes as young adults than their peers who had had no contact with Child,
19. OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S COMM’R, MAIEA TE TŪRUAPŌ, FULFILLING THE VISION:
SUPPORTING YOUNG PEOPLE WITH AT-RISK BEHAVIOUR TO LIVE SUCCESSFULLY IN THEIR
COMMUNITIES 5 (2018).
20. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (N.Z) [hereinafter the “1989 Act”].
“Family group” is defined in the 1989 Act to mean an extended family with at least one adult member
“with whom the child or young person has a biological or legal relationship” or “to whom the child or
young person has a significant psychological attachment,” or that is the child’s or young person’s whānau
or other culturally recognized family groups.” Id. at pt. 2(1). In general, “Iwi” is defined as an “extended
kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race – often refers to a large group of people descended
from a common ancestor and associated with a distinct territory.” IWI, MĀORI DICTIONARY,
https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=
iwi [https://perma.cc/4VPR-YPCL]. “Hapū” is defined as a “kinship group, clan, tribe, subtribe – section
of a large kinship group and the primary political unit in traditional Māori society.” In traditional society
a hapū “consisted of a number of whānau sharing descent from a common ancestor” and “[a] number of
related hapū usually shared adjacent territories forming a looser tribal federation (iwi).” HAPŪ, MĀORI
DICTIONARY, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords
=&keywords=hapu [https://perma.cc/WL7L-CVVT].
21. THEMAORI PERSPECTIVEADVISORYCOMM., PUAO-TE-ATA-TU (DAYBREAK): THEREPORT OF
THE MINISTERIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON A MAORI PERSPECTIVE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE 19 (1988), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resour
ces/archive/1988-puaoteatatu.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8LC-5C6U].
22. Id. at 7.
23. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 5; Independent Expert Panel to Lead Major CYF Overhaul,
NEW ZEALAND GOV’T (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/independent-expert-panel-
lead-major-cyf-overhaul [https://perma.cc/6XVA-GELC].
24. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 79.
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Youth and Family.
25
Children who had been in the care of Child, Youth and
Family experienced re-abuse and re-victimization at an appalling rate, with
anecdotal evidence of significant victimization of children while they were in the
State’s care.
26
The Panel recommended a bold overhaul to shift the system’s
focus to the child and their need for a stable and loving home.
27
The
recommended changes included establishing a new department (now Oranga
Tamariki) as a single point of accountability with an expanded mandate to
support long-term outcomes.
28
Oranga Tamariki is defined by a child-centered “investment approach” to
protective services.
29
The investment approach looks to future long-term
outcomes of public spending and services and relies increasingly on data to
measure returns on those investments.
30
The approach favors an intense delivery
of child protection services at the earliest possible opportunity with two payoffs
in mind: first, the social benefits of improved life outcomes for children in
contact with the service; and second, the fiscal benefits to the State through
avoided lifetime costs in the social welfare, justice and health systems and
productivity gain in the private sphere.
31
The shift to an investment focus is part
of a broader social investment agenda between 2011 to 2017 under New
Zealand’s National Party-led governments.
32
B. Oranga Tamariki and the State’s Broad, Discretionary Child Protection
Powers
The Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 sets out the Ministry’s care and protection
powers.
33
The Act is New Zealand’s primary care and protection statute and aims
25. Id. at 8. For children born in 1990 and 1991, administrative data showed that by age 21 the
children who were “known” to the care and protection system were twice as likely to have left school
without at least a Level 2 NCEA qualification, seven times more likely to have been subsequently referred
to Child, Youth and Family by the Police for youth offending, more than twice as likely to be in receipt
of social welfare benefit and nine times more likely to receive a custodial sentence in the adult corrections
system. Id. at 36. “NCEA,” or the “National Certificate of Educational Achievement” is the main national
qualification for secondary school students in New Zealand. How NCEA Works, NEW ZEALAND
QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY, https://www.nzqa.govt.nz/ncea/understanding-ncea/how-ncea-works/
[https://perma.cc/2PUN-PGUV].
26. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 15.
29. MINISTRY FOR VULNERABLE CHILDREN, ORANGA TAMARIKI, STRATEGIC INTENTIONS 2017-
2022, at 19 (2017), https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Documents/Strategic-Intentions-
2017-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MCA-XH9L].
30. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 31, 39.
31. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 10 and 16.
32. See Tom Baker & Simone Cooper, New Zealand’s Social Investment Experiment, 38 CRITICAL
SOC. POL’Y 428, 429 (2018). The social investment agenda has been criticized for prioritizing the easy-
to-measure fiscal outcomes and its relationship to “data-driven governance.” Id. at 434.
33. To carry out recommendations of the Expert Panel, Parliament amended the 1989 Act in two
main branches of reform: the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Advocacy, Workforce, and
Age Settings) Amendment Act 2016 and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga
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“to promote the well-being of children, young persons and their families and
family groups.”
34
To understand how New Zealand’s care and protection model
disproportionately impacts women who fall outside the dominant norms of
“good” motherhood, it is necessary to introduce three core features of the Oranga
Tamariki child protection system. First, the “paramountcy principle” guides all
decision making under the Oranga Tamariki Act; second, the trigger for Oranga
Tamariki intervention is a “report of concern” from any person in New Zealand;
third, this trigger initiates a formal Oranga Tamariki response framework
consisting of mandatory statutory duties and discretionary assessments of need.
The “paramountcy principle” guides all decision making under the Oranga
Tamariki Act. The paramountcy principle requires that in all matters relating to
the application of the Act the “welfare and interests of the child or young person
shall be the first and paramount consideration.”
35
As I will outline in Part II, this
principle is a critical move to privilege the child in the relationship between State
and family.
The trigger for Oranga Tamariki care and protection intervention is a report
of concern under Section 15 of the Act. A report of concern is a report to the
agency that a child or young person has been, or is likely to be, harmed, ill-
treated, abused, neglected or deprived.
36
The reports of concern triggering the
Ministry’s powers may be made in respect of a “child or young person,” meaning
“a person under the age of 14 years.”
37
“Any person” may make a report of
concern; the notifier may be anyone from a family member, to a neighbor, to a
police officer responding to an incident at the family home.
38
In practice, government agencies are responsible for a significant proportion
of the reports of concern: in 2017, seventy-five percent of reports of concern
gave from notifiers in the category Court, education, police, health or “other
government.”
39
A further 6.2 percent came from non-government organizations
Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017. The changes included renaming the 1989 Act with the alternative titles
“the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989” and “the Children’s and Young People’s Well-being Act of 1989.”
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, Section 5 (N.Z.).
Some changes came into force after the Legislation Act received the royal assent; others are being brought
into force by Order in Council on different dates, but no later than July 1, 2019. Id. at Section 2.
34 Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, Section 4 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Oranga Tamariki Act], http://www.legis
lation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0024/127.0/DLM147088.html [https://perma.cc/P79F-FAQ3.]
35. Id. Section 6.
36. Id. Section 15.
37. Id. Sections 2(1), 15. “Young person” has different meanings in different parts of the Act but is
essentially a person over the age of 14 and under the age of 18 years.
38. Certain organizations, including school boards, District Health Boards, and the New Zealand
Police, are required to adopt, report on and require a “child protection policy” on how to identify and
report child abuse and neglect under Section 15 of the Oranga Tamariki Act. See Children’s Act 2014
(N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0040/latest/DLM5501618.html [https://perma.cc/
5QZT-FQD4].
39. M. DUNCANSON ET. AL., supra note 11, at 29.
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and 8.9 percent from family.
40
This means that the entry point into the Oranga
Tamariki system is the judgment by a person in a government agency, family or
community that a child’s wellbeing may be at risk and a decision to bring that
judgment to the attention of Oranga Tamariki.
Once Oranga Tamariki receives a report of concern, its care and protection
powers follow a mix of discretionary assessments and mandatory actions.
Oranga Tamariki is required to arrange an investigation into a report of concern
if it appears “necessary or desirable,” but has a broad discretion to determine
what is “necessary or desirable” in a given case.
41
Oranga Tamariki must
progress the investigation if it “reasonably believes that the child or young
person is in need of care or protection,”
42
but again has the discretion to form a
reasonable belief around whether the child or young person meets the definition
of being in “need of care or protection” in Section 14 of the Act.
43
The broad definition of “need of care and protection” includes where a child
or young person is being, or is likely to be physically, emotionally or sexually
harmed, where the child’s “development or physical or mental or emotional well-
being” is being impaired or neglected in a serious and avoidable manner, and
where the child’s parents or guardians are unwilling or unable to care for them.
44
It is important to note the standards of “harm,” “ill-treatment,” “abuse,” and
“neglect” are not defined in the Act.
45
The concepts are applied on the assessment
of the notifier making a report of concern, the Oranga Tamariki staff member
determining the appropriate response to that report, and ultimately the family
group conference or Court making a decision about how to proceed to protect
the child.
46
As I will argue in Part III, these subjective assessments are vulnerable
to personal bias and racist or classist preferences.
If an Oranga Tamariki officer forms a reasonable belief that a child is in need
of care and protection, they must notify a care and protection coordinator, who
will convene a family group conference.
47
The family group conference will then
consider the needs of the child and make decisions, recommendations and plans
for their care and protection.
48
Oranga Tamariki is required to consider the
40. Id.
41. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 17.
42. Id. at Section 17(2).
43. Id. at Section 14.
44. Id. at Section 14(1)(a), (b) and (f).
45. For the agency’s general guidance to notifiers on how to identify and respond to abuse in a family,
seeORANGATAMARIKI—MINISTRY FORCHILDREN, Identify Abuse, https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/
identify-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/EKR4-9ZB4].
46. See MARK HENAGHAN ET.AL, FAMILY LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 6.558 (17th ed. 2015) for an
overview of how the New Zealand Courts interpret and apply the care and protection standard in Section
14 of the Oranga Tamariki Act.
47. Oranga Tamariki Act, at Sections 17-18.
48. Id. at Sections 28–29.
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decisions, recommendations or plan and give effect to them by providing
services and resources under the Act.
49
Following the investigation and family group conference process, Oranga
Tamariki may decide to turn to the Family Court to apply for a declaration that
the child or young person is in need of care or protection.
50
The Court will only
grant such a declaration if satisfied that it is not practicable or appropriate to
provide care or protection to the child by other means, including by the
implementation of the family group conference plan.
51
Where the Court makes
the declaration that the child is in need of care or protection, it may then make
one of the varied orders in Part 2 of the Act, including orders for services and
assistance, support, and for the custody of the child.
52
Oranga Tamariki is making these discretionary assessments of the critical
care and protection needs of children and young people in the context of a
perceived crisis of child wellbeing in New Zealand. In recent high-profile child
abuse cases, the public and news media have been quick to condemn Oranga
Tamariki and its predecessors for failing to act and letting children slip through
the net.
53
C. New Zealand Courts Extend Child Protection Powers to the Fetus as
“Unborn Child”
Though the Oranga Tamariki Act care and protection powers apply in
respect of a “child” defined as “a person under the age of 14 years,”
54
from 1995
the New Zealand courts have extended these protections to the fetus. In the first
key decisions to raise this issue the courts have accepted that the child protection
branch of government is empowered to respond to concerns about the wellbeing
of a fetus (deemed an “unborn child”) and that the court may grant protective
orders over the “unborn child,” including orders formally placing the “unborn
child” in the custody of the State.
55
The first decision to raise the question of whether care and protection powers
apply before birth is In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child).
56
The Department
of Social Welfare (a predecessor to Oranga Tamariki) brought a “novel
49. Id. at Section 34. There is an exception if the Chief Executive considers the decisions,
recommendations or plan to be impracticable, unreasonable or clearly inconsistent with the principles of
the Act. Id. at Section 34(1).
50. Id. at Section 67.
51. Id. at Section 73.
52. Id. at Section 83.
53. See, e.g., Edward Gay, Child, Youth and Family Blind to Moko Warning Signs, RADIO NEW
ZEALAND (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/346133/child-youth-and-family-
blind-to-moko-warning-signs [https://perma.cc/H7AA-N688].
54. Oranga Tamariki Act at Section 2(1).
55. Id.
56. In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC).
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application” to the Family Court for a care and protection order over the “unborn
child” of a 15-year-old girl (referred to throughout the judgment as “the
mother”)
57
who was already in the custody and guardianship of the
Department.
58
The mother had been in a violent relationship with “H,” the father
of Baby P. Judge Inglis observed that, “the relationship persisted” despite this
violence, including a reported incident of H hitting the mother’s stomach when
he knew she was pregnant.
59
Judge Inglis quoted his previous assessment of the
relationship in the care and protection proceedings for the mother: “It is quite
clear to any sensible person that there is no hope whatever for their relationship
but of course [the mother] is too immature to understand the dangers, which to
any sensible adult are totally obvious.”
60
The question before the Court was whether “Baby P” was a “child” as
defined in the Children, Young, Persons and Their Families Act 1989.
61
Judge
Inglis emphasized that whether the Court should exercise its care and protection
powers in respect of the unborn child was a matter of discretion rather than
jurisdiction.
62
The only New Zealand case with any bearing on the issue was R v
Henderson,
63
a decision on appeal fromMr. Henderson’s criminal conviction for
causing the death of an unborn child. The Court held that the fetus, which had
been estimated to be at 26 weeks maturity, had been an “unborn child” for the
purposes of the Crimes Act and there was no need to require the Crown to prove
that the child was capable of being born alive.
64
Just as the Crimes Act protected the life of the unborn child, the Children,
Young Persons, and Their Families Act could be interpreted “in light of modern
medical and physiological knowledge” to provide a different kind of protection
for that unborn child in the child protection system.
65
Judge Inglis was satisfied
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. at 583.
59. Id. at 583.
60. Id. at 583.
61. Id. at 578. At the time of the judgment the definition was “boy or girl under the age of 14 years,”
Section 2(1). On July 14, 2017 “boy or girl” was replaced with “a person.” Children, Young Persons, and
Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, supra note 33, at Section 7(2).
62. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 580.
63. R v Henderson [1990] 3 NZLR 174 (CA). In Baby P, Judge Inglis also outlined two English
decisions, In re D (A Minor) [1987] AC 317 (CA) and In re F (in utero) [1988] 2 WLR 1288 (CA), but
with the proviso that “overseas cases are of no direct help except to the extent that they indicate how
similar problems have been resolved within a different statutory or common law context.” Baby P, [1995]
NZFLR at 58.
64. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 583.
65. Id. Here the Judge was referring to a passage of the 1977 Report of the Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion (quoted in R v Henderson, [1990] 3 NZLR at 181,
and repeated in Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 582) that observed “It may now be said that it is inaccurate to
speak of the child having an independent circulation only after birth, when in fact it is firmly established
that a child has an independent circulation while still within the womb and that severing of the navel cord
separates the child from the placenta, not the body of its mother.” NEW ZEALAND ROYAL COMMISSION
ON CONTRACEPTION, STERILISATION AND ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION, STERILISATION AND ABORTION
IN NEW ZEALAND: REPORT OF THE ROYALCOMMISSION OF INQUIRY 279 (1997).
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that “child” could include “at least an unborn child which has achieved a state of
development where it could survive independently of the mother.”
66
The Judge exercised his discretion to grant the declaration and vested the
interim custody of the “unborn child” in the Director-General of Social
Welfare.
67
He suggested it would be difficult to think of “a more appropriate
case” for exercising the jurisdiction, noting that Baby P “requires protection not
only from his violent father but also from his mother’s immaturity and apparent
infatuation with the father.”
68
The orders would provide Baby P with protection
during birth as an extension of the agency’s existing protection of the mother.
Fundamentally, In the matter of Baby P sets up the unborn child question as
a moment for the Court to demonstrate its commitment to the protective
jurisdiction under the radical reforms of the 1989 Act. This commitment is clear
in Judge Inglis’s description of the particular local context of a jurisdiction
designed to provide care and protection for the powerless and his reliance on the
principle of the paramountcy of the child’s welfare and interests.
69
This commitment to the Court’s protective jurisdiction continued in a second
decision, Re an Unborn Child.
70
Here the Department of Child, Youth and
Family Services (another predecessor to Oranga Tamariki) applied to the High
Court for an order under the Guardianship Act 1968 to place the unborn child
under the guardianship of the Court.
71
Justice Heath described the facts giving
rise to the application as “truly extraordinary.”
72
The pregnant woman “Nikki”
and her producer appeared on a national television documentary to share their
plans to use footage from the birth of Nikki’s child in a pornographic film.
73
The
Department’s chief social worker met with Nikki and the producer and attempted
to reach an undertaking that they would not feature images of the baby in the
film. After the meeting was unsuccessful, the chief social worker applied to the
Court to place the “unborn child” under the guardianship of the Court.
74
Justice Heath in the High Court held that the term “child” in the
Guardianship Act could include an “unborn child.”
75
He saw two difficulties
with the reasoning of Judge Inglis in Re Baby P. First, Justice Heath held that the
issue could not be a matter of discretion rather than jurisdiction to exercise the
66. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 583.
67. Id. at 584.
68. Id. at 584.
69. Id. at 581.
70. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR 115 (HC).
71. Id. at 1. The Guardianship Act contains different powers to the care and protection functions
under the then Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (now named the Oranga Tamariki
Act 1989), but the Judge held the interpretation of “child” in the Guardianship Act would be equally
applicable to the 1989 Act. Id. at 50.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 63. As noted above the Judge explicitly stated this interpretation would be equally
applicable to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, at 50.
2019] Reconstructing New Zealand Pregnancy Intervention 179
Court’s powers in respect of the unborn child: for there to be any power to
exercise, the Court had to be satisfied that the object of jurisdiction—here, the
fetus—fell within the definition of “child” in the statute providing those
powers.
76
Second, Justice Heath was concerned that Judge Inglis had reached the
view that Baby P was a “child” within the meaning of the Act primarily on his
own judgment that Baby P was at a stage of development that should fall within
the definition.
77
Ultimately, Justice Heath arrived at the same answer as In the matter of Baby
P “by a different route.”
78
The Judge had regard to New Zealand’s obligations
under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in particular the
preamble statement that the child “by reason of his physical and mental
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth.”
79
The Judge further relied on elements
of New Zealand law that supported the interests of the “unborn child to varying
degrees,” such as the regulation of abortion and the criminal offence of “killing
unborn child.”
80
Having found that the Act’s jurisdiction extended to an “unborn child,” the
Judge considered that it would be a matter of discretion whether to exercise the
jurisdiction in an individual case.
81
Discretion would allow the Court to focus on
the “utility and need for such orders” and avoid the “otherwise impossible” task
of “endeavouring to determine the precise moment in time (for legal purposes)
that an unborn child is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.”
82
Justice Heath
recorded briefly that the decision on whether to make an order would “no doubt”
be impacted by the stage of pregnancy involved and the “(general) inability” of
the Court to compel a mother to do something against her will in respect of her
fetus.
83
On the facts before the Court, Justice Heath was satisfied that there was a
likely risk of emotional harm to the unborn child from sexual exploitation of its
image in the planned film and that it was necessary for the Court to intervene.
The Judge emphasized his concerns that Nikki was not putting her own interests
before the interests of her unborn child: he opined that her desire to be a star had
overridden her judgment, and that there was nothing to suggest she had given
76. Id. at 54.
77. Id. at 55.
78. Id. at 56, 63.
79. Id. at 61 (emphasis added); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 15 (quoting G.A.
Res. 1386 (XIV), Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1959)); see also Anjori Mitra, “We’re
Always Going to Argue about Abortion”—International Law’s Changing Attitudes Towards Abortion, 1
N.Z. WOMEN’S L.J. 142, 152 (2017) (discussing the debate and compromise regarding the references to
the “unborn” in the Convention and the ambiguity of “appropriate legal protection”).
80. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [61]; Crimes Act 1961, Section 182.
81. Id. at [63].
82. Id.
83. Id.
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more than a “passing thought” to the possibility of adverse effects on the unborn
child.
84
He doubted Nikki’s own statement that she was concerned about the
unborn child’s safety, health, and best interests, noting that she had not explained
her thought process to conclude the unborn child would not be harmed by being
associated with the pornographic film.
85
Justice Heath placed Nikki’s “unborn
child” in the guardianship of the Court and issued various injunctions prohibiting
filming of the labor.
86
Just as the mother in In the matter of Baby P could not be trusted to act like
a sensible adult in her relationship with the violent father of Baby P, Nikki could
not be trusted to prioritize the interests of her unborn child in deciding whether
and how to feature her labor in the pornographic film. In these circumstances,
the Court saw itself as obliged to step in to lift up the interests of the fetus and
protect this powerless subject from harm.
The final key decision extending care and protection powers to the “unborn
child” is the 2018 judgment of L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—
Ministry for Vulnerable Children.
87
A family member of the pregnant woman,
Ms. T, and the Oranga Tamariki social worker for Ms. T and Mr. L’s older child
made reports of concern in respect of the unborn child. The reports raised Ms.
T’s allegedly poor mental health and the fact that Ms. T’s five older children had
been removed from her care.
88
On receipt of the reports of concern, Oranga
Tamariki commenced an investigation under Section 17 of the Oranga Tamariki
Act.
89
In the High Court the applicants sought orders essentially preventing Oranga
Tamariki from“harassing” or “persecuting” them or from sending social workers
to their home.
90
Justice Muir was required to consider whether the statutory
powers of Oranga Tamariki extended to an “unborn child.” The Judge concluded
that the Oranga Tamariki care and protection powers and responsibilities to
receive and respond to reports of concern were not restricted to “children who
have been born.”
91
Justice Muir favored a focus on the “utility and need” of intervention in a
given case in the Court’s discretion.
92
The utility and need to investigate any
report of concern received before birth was “inescapable.” The Judge considered
that the contrary conclusion requiring Oranga Tamariki to wait until the birth of
84. Id. at [82].
85. Id. at [79].
86. Id. at [109].
87. L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children, [2018] NZHC.
88. Id. at [12].
89. Id. at [13].
90. Id. at [3].
91. Id. at [27].
92. Id. at [32], [35].
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the child to take action would frustrate the paramountcy principle and the Act’s
overarching purpose of promoting the wellbeing of children.
93
Overall, the New Zealand courts have framed the “unborn child” cases as
exceptional decisions to protect the welfare of the particular “unborn child”
before the Court and avoided making any general statement about when a fetus
becomes a “child.” In In the matter of Baby P, Judge Inglis suggested that the
English decision of Re F (in utero)was valuable in providing compelling reasons
why a discretion to intervene to protect an “unborn child” should be used
“cautiously, sparingly, and only in exceptional cases.”
94
Justice Heath in Re an
Unborn Child similarly emphasized that the Court would not lightly override
parental decisions, particularly in decisions over an unborn child where “nobody
but the mother has any real control.”
95
Yet the courts’ reasoning does not confine permissible State intervention
over the “unborn child” to care and protection action on formal orders approved
by the court. In practice, the State’s intervention in the “unborn child” begins
with the reports of concern and investigations that precede a family group
conference or formal application for court orders under the Act. The power (and
duty) to receive and investigate reports of concern hinges on the courts’
acceptance in these key cases that the term “child” in the Oranga Tamariki Act
can include an “unborn child.”
96
This acceptance activates the care and
protection system for all “unborn children”: once Oranga Tamariki receives any
report of concern about an unborn child, it is not only permitted, but statutorily
mandated, to follow the same investigation process that it would for any child or
young person post-birth. The courts’ emphasis on a discretionary judicial
consideration of the woman’s interests and stage of pregnancy has been at the
expense of any clear, unambiguous guidance about when and how Oranga
Tamariki should exercise these prior care and protection powers over a pregnant
woman. This prior permissible phase of State intervention is the real legacy of
the “unborn child” cases.
D. Oranga Tamariki Investment Model Doubles Down on Interventions
Before Birth
The new Oranga Tamariki investment model for early intervention doubles
down on the accepted State interest in the “unborn child” and duty to protect that
93. Id. at [34].
94. In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child), [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC) at 581 (citing Re F (in utero)
[1988] 2 WLR 128 (CA)).
95. Re an Unborn child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [61], [73], [88].
96. Interestingly, the courts have avoided explicitly stating that “child” includes “unborn child.” The
closest direct statement is in L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children,
[2018] NZHC at [36-37] where Justice Muir states that he does not accept “child” must be confined to
those who have been born.
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“unborn child” through its focus on prevention and support services that begin
before birth.
97
Pre-birth intervention is not just permitted, but encouraged and
prioritized as a central feature of the agency’s model.
Oranga Tamariki encourages early intervention services before birth to
identify families at risk of poor life outcomes and address those risk factors to
ensure that children thrive.
98
“Early” intervention can begin as early as pre-20
weeks’ gestation, although the Oranga Tamariki practice centre advises that a
formal referral to family group conference or application for court orders should
be delayed until after 20 weeks for the reason that there would then be “less
chance of something going wrong in the pregnancy.”
99
The Oranga Tamariki practice centre identifies pre-birth as a time in a
woman and future child’s life that presents a “unique opportunity” to work with
whānau and other professionals. The State has identified that its duties under the
new model include working with whānau to provide intense support
mechanisms: supporting ante-natal health and alcohol, drug and smoking
abstinence efforts, engaging with fathers, and identifying wider whānau
strengths and resources to support the newborn. The services aim to maximize
the opportunity to mobilize support systems within the family, whānau and
community, give the parents the time to demonstrate change before birth, and
support parents to meet basic needs of the child at birth.
100
The work also includes monitoring specific women and families with a view
to assessing the expectant parent or parents’ capacity to care for a child, their
willingness to address any concerns raised by Oranga Tamariki, and their ability
to make any changes that Oranga Tamariki considers necessary before birth to
provide a safe, healthy environment for the child.
101
For example, Oranga
Tamariki might visit the expectant parent or parents’ home, speak with family or
whānau about possible support systems, review any prior history with care and
protection services, and seek information about parental substance abuse or
mental health issues.
The Oranga Tamariki early intervention model presents a paradox. A good
State would indeed support women in constrained circumstances to ensure that
they have the best material and personal circumstances to decide whether to carry
their pregnancy to term. Such support furthers the State’s interest in the health
and wellbeing of both the pregnant woman and her fetus. However, as I will
argue below, delivering these interventions through the child protection branch
of government under the overarching imperative to prioritize the interests of the
97. See State Sector (Ministry for Vulnerable Children, Oranga Tamariki) Order 2016 (N.Z.), supra
note 18, at 20.
98. Id. at 28.
99. ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, supra note 5.
100. Id.
101. ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, supra note 5.
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child perversely operates to constrain the pregnant woman rather than empower
her.
II. FRAMING FETUS AS “UNBORNCHILD” OBSCURES PREGNANTWOMEN AND
DRIVES STATE INTERVENTION
Framing the fetus as an “unborn child” serves to obscure pregnant women
and drive State intervention. This Part sets out how the courts adopt the term
“unborn child” and move between two different senses of the fetus as a child:
the fetus as a child itself (albeit unborn) and the fetus as a future child. The
“unborn child” frame sets up a continuum between the unborn and born child
that drives the State to extend its well-established obligation to make the welfare
and interests of the child its first and paramount consideration. This framing
obscures the pregnant woman and leads the State to subordinate her interests to
those of the fetus.
From the first New Zealand decision to address the State’s care and
protection powers before birth, the courts and the State have favored the term
“unborn child” to describe the fetus. Judge Inglis began his judgment in In the
matter of Baby P (an unborn child) by explaining that he would speak of the
“baby” as an “unborn child” following Lord Denning, “who characteristically
avoided any attempt at euphemism” by speaking in “simple English” of the
“unborn child inside the mother’s womb.”
102
The “unborn child” term is carried
through subsequent decisions and the Oranga Tamariki practice materials refer
to “unborn babies.”
103
Recently, an amendment to the Oranga Tamariki Act to
create specific care and protection provisions for “subsequent children”
explicitly defined the new term “subsequent child” as “a child, born or
unborn.”
104
The courts move between two different senses of the term “unborn child.”
The first sense is the fetus as a child itself, albeit unborn. This sense underlies
Judge Inglis’s humanizing descriptions of “Baby P” as “a little boy in good
health” and as “a young human being at a present stage of development where
he could now live independently of the mother.”
105
The fetus is presented as an
existing child in need of protection from a present risk of harm: Judge Inglis
102. In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child), [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC) at 578 (citing Royal College
of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 801 at 802).
103. Id.; see also L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children, [2018]
NZHC; ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, supra note 5.
104. Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, Section 2(1) definition of “subsequent child” (emphasis added).
Unfortunately the regime is outside the scope of this Note, but it essentially creates a reverse onus for
parents who have had older children removed from their care by the Courts with a finding that there is
“no realistic prospect” that the children will be returned to their care: Section 18B. If the parent(s) have a
subsequent child they bear an onus to show that they are unlikely to inflict harm on their child:
Section 18A(3)-(5).
105. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 578.
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questions why such “unborn children” should be any less protected by the State
than other children.
106
The second sense is the fetus as “future child” or “the child who will be but
is not yet born.”
107
Justice Muir in L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki
focuses on the need for protection of this future child when he declares the
inescapable need for proper investigation “in advance of the birth of the child”
in order for Oranga Tamariki to be ready to protect against any harm or neglect
at birth.
108
In essence, this “future child” framing looks at pre-birth action as
necessary to promote post-birth interests.
Neither sense of the “unborn child” turns on the viability of the fetus.
Judge Inglis initially relied on viability in In the matter of Baby P (an Unborn
Child) by holding the “child” term could “at least” include an “unborn child,”
such as Baby P, at a stage of development where it could survive independently
of the mother.
109
In Re an Unborn Child Justice Heath doubted the utility of the
focus on viability and preferred an interpretation that avoided the need to
determine a precise point in time where the jurisdiction would fall on an “unborn
child.”
110
The judge contended that “endless arguments” over the stage at which
an unborn child becomes a child would serve no useful purpose and that the stage
of pregnancy should instead impact what order would be appropriate in a given
case.
Once the fetus is framed as an “unborn child,” it is a short step to accept that
Oranga Tamariki—the care and protection agency responsible for the care and
protection of children and young people—has an interest in that fetus. The
“child” description effectively sets up a continuum between the unborn and the
born child where it would be nearly impossible to draw a clear line between the
two and thus unjust to deny one the protection that the State guarantees to the
other.
111
In this light, the State’s interest in the “unborn child” is a product of
protection and pragmatism. Oranga Tamariki has a well-established
responsibility to advance the wellbeing of children and to assist children to
prevent them from suffering harm.
112
From this starting point, the courts are loath
to withhold the Act’s critical protection from the “unborn child.” Oranga
Tamariki and the courts dismiss rigid distinctions between birth and pre-birth as
cumbersome barriers to the pragmatic application of available tools to achieve
what is perceived as the best outcome for the fetus. Judge Inglis suggests that
106. Id. at 579.
107. ROSAMUND SCOTT, RIGHTS, DUTIES AND THE BODY: LAW AND ETHICS OF THE MATERNAL-
FETALCONFLICT 23 (Hart Publishing, 2002).
108. L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children, [2018] NZHC at
[27] and [34].
109. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 583.
110. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [63]–[64].
111. See id. at [66].
112. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 4.
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there is nothing to indicate that unborn children “should to any less extent be
protected from harm, be entitled to have their rights upheld, or be entitled to have
their welfare promoted.”
113
It would be “artificial and pointless” to wait until the
birth of the child.
114
Framing the fetus as an “unborn child” uplifts the interests of the fetus as
“child” and obscures the pregnant woman in a manner that reinforces the
pragmatic application of the Oranga Tamariki Act. The Oranga Tamariki Act
framework provides a clear, strong direction for the courts and Oranga Tamariki
to make the welfare and interests of a child the paramount consideration.
115
The
force of the paramountcy principle contrasts with the ambiguous, ill-defined
competing autonomy or privacy interests of the pregnant woman. The courts
have made oblique references to the “rights of the mother”
116
and the “(general)
inability of the court to make orders which compel a mother to do something
against her will.”
117
But the courts have not ventured further to unpack those
rights in any depth or to interrogate when and how the pregnant woman’s
interests deviate from those of the fetus.
The dominating focus on the “unborn child” as a separate subject of the
court’s jurisdiction overshadows the pregnant woman’s interests. The “unborn
child” becomes the primary, or even the only, subject of the court’s jurisdiction,
which stems from its powers to protect vulnerable children. The pregnant woman
is a far less salient character in this dynamic. She is a potential source of harm to
the child and therefore a potential subject of the Court’s order, but ultimately she
is peripheral to the court’s responsibility towards her fetus.
III. DISCRETIONARY “UNBORNCHILD” INTERVENTIONS DISPROPORTIONATELY
IMPACTWOMEN EXPERIENCING POVERTY AND INDIGENOUSMĀORIWOMEN
The discretionary “unborn child” interventions target a marginalized subset
of the population. In this Part, I theorize and establish that using the report of
concern triggers to apply broad discretionary child protection powers in a society
of structural inequality and dominant white middle-class norms of good
motherhood disproportionately impacts women experiencing poverty and Māori
women.
While Oranga Tamariki routinely claims an interest in the fetus when it
responds to reports of concern before birth, it is unlikely to claim this routine
interest evenly across all parts of the population. The child protection model is
neither neutral nor universal, but instead targets a marginalized subset of the
113. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 579.
114. Id. at 584.
115. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 6.
116. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 584.
117. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [64].
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population. The targeted subset is determined first by which children are subject
to the reports of concern that activate the State’s powers and later by the State’s
assessment of whether the child is in “need of care or protection” in the sense of
being (or being likely to be) “harmed,” “ill-treated,” “abused,” or “seriously
deprived.”
118
These are not objective standards. They reflect the norms of the
decision makers and are vulnerable to classist and racist preferences.
119
Oranga Tamariki applies the discretionary child protection model before
birth in a society of structural inequality and dominant white middle class norms
of good motherhood. “Good” motherhood norms center on the individual woman
as a primary caregiver, separated from the collective resources and support of
her broader family group or whānau. They include the expectation that a woman
be a chaste, responsible, protective carer who puts her child first.
120
Such norms
are peppered throughout the “unborn child cases.” In In the matter of Baby P, we
see Judge Inglis’s rigid expectations for the young pregnant woman to keep
herself and her fetus safe from her abusive partner.
121
In Re an Unborn Child,
we hear Justice Heath’s concern that the pregnant woman, Nikki, might be
failing to selflessly prioritize her fetus’s interests over her desire for fame.
122
Oranga Tamariki is more likely to oversee the pregnancies of women
experiencing poverty. The 2015 review of child protection services in New
Zealand recorded that most families of children referred to the agency had “high
levels of long-term need and disadvantage,” including long-term unemployment
and low income.
123
In the cohort of children born in New Zealand between 2005
and 2007, 46 percent had parents living in a high deprivation area at the time of
their birth.
124
The relationship between poverty and involvement with Oranga Tamariki
can in part be explained by the fact that families experiencing poverty are likely
to have greater contact with other government agencies. In the 2015 review, 39
percent of the children known to Child, Youth and Family by age five had a
mother who had been receiving a benefit for more than four of the five years
118. Oranga Tamariki Act, Sections 17(2), 14(1)(a).
119. Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 114, 158
(2011); see also Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 683, 788 (2001).
120. Simran Dhunna, Beverley Lawton & Fiona Cram, An Affront to Her Mana: Young Māori
Mothers Experiences of Intimate Partner Violence, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1, 7 (2018).
121. See FAMILY VIOLENCE DEATH REVIEW COMMITTEE, FIFTH REPORT JANUARY 2014 TO
DECEMBER 2015F 57 (2016) for a critique of how family violence policies hold mothers responsible for
“failing to protect” their children from intimate partner violence in which they are a victim.
122. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR.
123. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 32.
124. Id. at 32–33. The report does not define “high deprivation,” but since 1991 New Zealand has
run a New Zealand index of deprivation following each census, which reflects eight dimensions of
material and social deprivation: communication (access to the Internet at home), income, employment,
qualifications, home ownership, support, living space and transport). See M. DUNCANSON ET AL., CHILD
POVERTY MONITOR TECHNICAL REPORT (N.Z. Child & Youth Epidemiology Serv. ed., 2018),
http://www.nzchildren.co.nz/ [https://perma.cc/25M5-RVVS].
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prior to their birth.
125
Almost 60 percent had a primary caregiver on a benefit at
the time of birth. As noted in Part I, contact with government agencies creates
an opportunity for the agency to enter and supervise family life and may
culminate in reports of concern.
The relationship between poverty and Oranga Tamariki oversight can also
reflect a judgment that poor women are not good mothers. This judgment may
come from the notifier making a report of concern to trigger Oranga Tamariki
intervention, the Oranga Tamariki staff member deciding that a care and
protection investigation is necessary, or the Court making orders in respect of
the child. In the United States, Professor Dorothy Roberts, acclaimed scholar in
race, gender, and the law, has identified how the contemporary child welfare
system confuses poverty with neglect and maintains a fundamental division
between poor and other families.
126
Professor Khiara Bridges has further
emphasized how in public obstetrics care poverty “is presumed to indicate the
absence of a moral vigilance that might manifest in harm to [a pregnant
woman’s] child.”
127
Bridges shines a light on how poverty “is thought to index
a moral permissiveness, the magnitude of which the state has the duty to
determine and upon which the health and safety of the woman’s unborn child
hinges.”
128
Arguably, poverty is one indicator of vulnerability and need for the services
that Oranga Tamariki can provide to support families. Yet the problem with this
justification for targeted intervention is that Oranga Tamariki assessments and
statutory services are indeed premised on a series of judgments about parenting
and whether the child or young person is in need of care or protection. A need
for care and protection is not just a need for services: it hinges on the formation
of a belief that the child in question is in need of care or protection, in the sense
that they are likely to be harmed, ill-treated, abused, or seriously deprived—or
that their parents or guardians are unwilling or unable to care for them.
129
As I
suggest above, these judgments are not objective and may reflect classist
preferences for childrearing.
Oranga Tamariki interventions in pregnancy are likely to have a significant
impact on Māori women. Māori children and young people are significantly
over-represented in the care and protection system—at the time of the 2015
review of child protection services, the majority of children known to the agency
identified as Māori.
130
In general, Māori children are more likely to come into
contact with care and protection services, to be referred to care and protection
125. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 33.
126. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILDWELFARE 27 (2002).
127. Bridges, supra note 119 at 168.
128. Id. at 167.
129. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 14(a). This is not exhaustive: a child is deemed to be in need of
care or protection if they fall within any of the descriptions in Section 14(a) to (i).
130. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
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services for perceived risk of harm, and to stay in the care and protection system.
Māori children make up 56 percent of the children in contact with child
protection services by age five, yet only thirty percent of all children born in New
Zealand.
131
For a subset of reports of concern made regarding “unborn children”
and children within five days of birth, Māori children made up 47 percent of
reports of concern in 2018, 51 percent in 2017, and 55 percent in 2016.
132
The reasons for overrepresentation of Māori in child protection data are
complex. A 2015 New Zealand study Understanding Overrepresentation of
Indigenous Children in Child Welfare Data summarized how Indigenous people
explain that overrepresentation is a result of a combination of factors extending
beyond socio-economic disadvantage:
assimilationist policies of colonial governments leading to the
fragmentation of families, inequitable distribution of the goods and
resources of society (e.g., employment, housing, and wealth), systemic
racism of a child welfare protection system imposing white middle-class
notions of family and child-rearing upon indigenous families . . . , and
racial bias in reporting of maltreatment and in child welfare agency
decision making.
133
The 1988 Puao-Te-Ata-Tu report captures the historical perspective on child
protection services in New Zealand.
134
In New Zealand’s colonial history,
inappropriate Pākehā structures and Pākehā determination of Māori issues
“worked to break down traditional Maori society by weakening its base—the
whanau, the hapu, the iwi.”
135
These forces made it almost impossible for Māori
to maintain tribal responsibility for their own people.
136
Ani Mikaere, a
prominent scholar on Māori self-determination and the status of Māori women,
makes clear that the “disruption of Maori social organisation was no mere by-
131. Id. at 34.
132. Letter from Steve Groom, General Manager Public, Ministerial and Executive Services Oranga
Tamariki—Ministry for Children to author (Dec. 17, 2018) (on file with author). This data was provided
in response to a request under the Official Information Act 1982 for the proportion of reports of concern
regarding an “unborn child” where the “unborn child” was of Māori ethnicity.
133. Fiona Cram et al., Understanding Overrepresentation of Indigenous Children in Child Welfare
Data: An Application of the Drake Risk and Bias Models, 20 CHILD MALTREATMENT 171 (2015)
(citations omitted).
134. DEP’T SOCIAL WELFARE, PUAO-TE-ATA-TU (DAY BEAK): THE REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL
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product of colonization, but an integral part of the process” by which the Crown
aimed to destroy the principle of collectivism that ran through Māori society.
137
The particular impact of colonization on Māori women must be examined at
the “intersection of being Māori and female and all of the diverse and complex
things being located in this intersecting space can mean.”
138
Scholars of mana
wāhine, a type of Māori feminism, have emphasized the unique narratives and
experiences of Māori women in the ongoing history of colonization.
139
Mikaere
illustrates how the traditional Māori worldview emphasized the essential role of
women and the supremacy of their spiritual power in controlling tribal rituals.
140
Mikaere explains that this pattern “of acknowledging the worth of women was
reflected in whānau life,” where “whānau dynamics operated to ensure that
women were well-treated by their husbands and in-laws. . . and the presence of
many to assume responsibility for child rearing enabled women to perform a
wide range of roles, including leadership roles.”
141
Under colonization, the Crown and settlers minimized the spiritual and
traditional roles of Māori women and recast the role in negative terms.
142
This
represented a devaluation of women, which was reinforced by the introduction
of an English concept of “family” that limited women to narrow domestic roles
as the individual “mother of children.”
143
Urbanization and land confiscation
policies further dislocated women from their extended whānau support networks.
Naomi Simmonds notes that when “the whānau unit became progressively
smaller, the responsibilities of individual women grew.”
144
Social and economic disadvantage for Māori is one key driver of
vulnerability for whānau.
145
In June 2018, the unemployment rate for Māori was
9.4 percent, compared to 3.6 percent for New Zealand Europeans.
146
Low income
rates for Māori are consistently higher than the European group: in the period
2015 to 2016, 28 percent of Māori children lived in low income households as
compared to fourteen percent of European children.
147
A higher proportion of
Māori children are in sole-parent beneficiary families and households: 47 percent
of sole parent beneficiary recipients are Māori.
148
These high levels of
137. Annie Mikaere, Collective Rights and Gender Issues: A Maori Women’s Perspective, in
COLLECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PACIFIC PEOPLES 79, 93 (Nin Tomas ed., 1998) [hereinafter Mikaere
Collective Rights].
138. Naomi Simmonds,Mana Wahine: Decolonising Politics, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. J. 11, 11 (2011).
139. Id. at 16.
140. Ani Mikaere, Cultural Invasion Continued: The Ongoing Colonisation of Tikanga Māori, 18
Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 134, 139 (2005) [hereinafter Mikaere Cultural Invasion Continued].
141. Id. at 141.
142. Id. at 149; seeMikaere Collective Rights, supra note 137, at 92.
143. Mikaere Cultural Invasion Continued, supra note 140, at 149–50.
144. Simmonds, supra note 138, at 16.
145. CRAM, supra note 4, at 7.
146. DUNCANSON ET AL., supra note 8.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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disadvantage are “symptomatic of the unequal distribution of goods and services
within [New Zealand] society,” where Māori have inequitable access to and
outcomes from universal services such as healthcare and education.
149
Further drivers of Māori whānau vulnerability are prejudice and
discrimination within New Zealand society.
150
The increase in Māori
overrepresentation at successive decision points in the child protection system
suggests an ongoing role of bias against Māori in child protection agency
decision making.
151
Half of referrals to the agency pertain to Māori children and
young people; butMāori comprise six out of every ten children and young people
in State care.
152
The 2016 report of the Modernising Child, Youth and Family
Expert Advisory Panel explicitly acknowledged that “conscious and unconscious
bias in the system” was a possible cause of this overrepresentation.
153
The extension of care and protection powers in the “unborn child” cases is
particularly significant for pregnant women who are most likely to be targeted
by State oversight and least likely to be privileged by dominant norms of good
motherhood. In New Zealand’s context of structural inequality and colonization,
this impact is likely to fall heavily on women experiencing poverty and Māori
women. This uneven impact must be front of mind when considering how State
pregnancy interventions serve to constrain rather than empower pregnant
women.
IV. STATE PREGNANCY INTERVENTIONS PERVERSELYCONSTRAIN, RATHER
THAN EMPOWER, PREGNANTWOMEN
Perversely, New Zealand’s State pregnancy interventions constrain rather
than empower pregnant women. This Part draws out the individual and collective
constraints on pregnant women’s rights, interests and autonomy that are
obscured and ambiguous under the courts’ “unborn child” framework discussed
in Part II.
At the individual level, State oversight of pregnancy may infringe upon a
woman’s right to privacy in that it unduly restricts her ability to make decisions
about her own life. The right to privacy provides a clear framework for
evaluating what limits on a pregnant woman’s autonomy are justified and what
limits exceed the proper powers of the State. Privacy includes “the ability to
make important decisions about one’s own life” and embodies the concept of
149. CRAM, supra note 4, at 21.
150. Id. at 7, 21.
151. Emily Keddell & Gabrielle Davie, Inequalities and Child Protection System Contact in
Aotearoa New Zealand: Developing a Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda, 7 SOCIAL SCI. 89,
97 (2018).
152. Id.
153. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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autonomy.
154
Autonomy incorporates the concepts of self-determination—“a
person’s interest and right . . . in reflectively making significant personal
choices”—and bodily integrity, the ability “to decide what happens in and to
one’s body.”
155
Privacy is a promising developing tool to protect women’s reproductive
choices in New Zealand. At the international level, New Zealand has adopted a
right to privacy through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which protects against arbitrary or unlawful interference with a
person’s privacy, family and home.
156
At the domestic level there is no statutory
privacy right: the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 does not create a right to
privacy, and the Privacy Act 1993 provides protections for informational privacy
but does not create a standalone right. The editors of Privacy Law in New
Zealand suggest that the omission under the Bill of Rights Act may be attributed
to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the privacy concept and the difficulty of
defining the right.
157
Despite the absence of a standalone right, a fundamental right to privacy
may be developed through New Zealand’s common law, in light of its
international commitments under the ICCPR and through the comparative
precedents for privacy rights in the United States and Canada.
158
The Bill of
Rights is not a comprehensive statement of all the rights and freedoms in New
Zealand
159
and the New Zealand courts have acknowledged the need to develop
the common law consistently with the guidance of international treaties to which
New Zealand is a party, even where the international obligations are not
expressly incorporated in statute.
160
Notably, the 2018 Law Commission briefing
on alternative approaches to abortion law recorded the New Zealand Privacy
Commissioner’s submission that abortion engages a fundamental privacy right
inherent in bodily autonomy and self-determination.
161
Dorothy Roberts highlights the value of a privacy right in her
groundbreaking 1991 article “Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy.”
162
Roberts draws out two
154. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ABORTION LAW:
MINISTERIAL BRIEFING PAPER 53 (2018), https://lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFor
mats/Law%20Commission%20-%20ALR%20Ministerial%20Briefing%20Paper%20-%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96AH-ZZJN].
155. SCOTT, supra note 107, at 13-14.
156. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
157. Stephen Penk, Thinking About Privacy, in Privacy Law, in NEW ZEALAND 20 (Stephen Penk &
Rosemary Tobin eds., 2d ed. 2016).
158. See, e.g., R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
159. Penk, supra note 157, at 20.
160. Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [6].
161. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, supra note 154, at [3.4]; PRIVACY COMMISSIONER’S
SUBMISSION TO THE LAWCOMMISSION ON ABORTION LAW REFORM, https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/
Uploads/Abortion-Law-Reform-submission-to-Law-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/662X-JXHE].
162. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
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critical benefits of a privacy concept for advancing the reproductive rights of
women of color: the right emphasizes the value of “personhood” and protects
against the abuse of government power.
163
Personhood is particularly significant
because it affirms the role of Black women’s will and challenges the historical
devaluation of Black motherhood in the history of the United States.
164
Privacy
delineates the limits of government power in a way that is particularly valuable
for women of color who, in countries where persons of color are in minority or
marginalized groups, are most vulnerable to government control of their private
decision making.
165
Extending care and protection powers to “unborn children” compromises the
privacy right of pregnant women. Oranga Tamariki claims to address children
but its oversight regulates pregnant women’s choices about how they run their
lives and what they do with their bodies. The regulation may span what they
ingest, who they partner or live with, where they live and when or how they
travel.
166
A nebulous concern about interfering with pregnant women’s choices
in this way is acknowledged in the New Zealand “unborn child” cases but never
articulated as a real, salient competing right to privacy.
167
The right to privacy is not absolute.
168
The protection within the ICCPR
prohibits only “arbitrary” or “unlawful interference” and privacy claims are
balanced against competing public interests. One may argue that some State
engagement with pregnant women’s choices is justified because the limit on
decision making is minimal (for example, the idea of discouraging pregnant
women from smoking or consuming alcohol) and outweighed by the State’s
interest in promoting the health of the population.
Yet Oranga Tamariki oversight goes beyond minimal health interventions in
two ways. First, Oranga Tamariki oversight of pregnant women’s choices comes
with the understanding that if the State determines these choices are putting an
“unborn child” at risk of harm, the State may activate its care and protection
powers to either reach a family group conference plan for the “unborn child” or
apply to the court for formal orders. The most intrusive formal order would place
163. Id. at 1468.
164. Id. at 1469.
165. Id. at 1469-70.
166. Memorandum from Mindy Jane Roseman on the State of the Field: Fetal Personhood and
Women’s Rights 11 (on file with author).
167. For example, Justice Heath in Re an Unborn Child emphasizes that the “invasive step” of
interfering with the pregnant woman’s decisions as a mother should only be taken for very good reasons.
Re an Unborn Child, [2003] NZLR at [27]-[28]. See also Justice Heath’s discussion of the academic
criticism of In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child), [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC): “The decision was
criticised on the basis that it ran the risk of creating a conflict with the mother’s own interests; in particular,
the decision created the potential for the Court making orders which controlled the mother’s behaviour
during pregnancy, albeit, ostensibly, for the purposes of promoting the welfare of the unborn child.”
Unborn Children: ‘Persons’ and Maternal Conduct, 5 MED L. REV. 143 (1997).
168. Penk, supra note 157, at 19.
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the “unborn child” in the custody of Oranga Tamariki and allow Oranga
Tamariki to remove the child at birth.
169
Second, Oranga Tamariki is a State agency centered on the care and
protection of children. Activating the care and protection function of Oranga
Tamariki before birth fundamentally pits the rights of the pregnant woman
against her fetus. It separates the interests of the fetus (the “unborn child”) and
prioritizes those interests as the paramount consideration for the agency and the
court. As outlined above, the interests of the pregnant woman and her fetus will
often overlap and may be the same. But the controlling interest is that of the
fetus: when there is a tension between the interests of the two subjects the
pregnant woman’s interest will be secondary to the imperative of preventing
harm to the fetus, and when there is no tension the recognition of the pregnant
woman’s interest is contingent on that aligned interest of her fetus. The pregnant
woman is instrumental to the best interests of her fetus. This process obscures
the pregnant woman, even as it fails to fully support her ability to determine the
conditions of her parenthood.
The interference with pregnant women’s privacy—both their autonomy in
decision making and their bodily integrity—is a harm in itself. Interference may
also create a risk of physical and mental harm to the pregnant woman and to the
fetus. The threat of State punitive approaches to pregnancy, including the threat
of seeking custody orders to remove the child from its parent at birth, can deter
women from seeking State assistance or voluntarily engaging with social
services during pregnancy.
170
For example, the judgment in Re an Unborn Child
records that the pregnant woman, Nikki, was unable to give evidence as she had
been admitted to hospital and it was “likely that the stress of [the] proceeding
has caused her current health problems.”
171
In L v Chief Executive of Oranga
Tamariki—Ministry for Children, Justice Muir commented that the applicant
parents did not appear in the hearing because they were “in hiding” from the
State.
172
At the collective level, Oranga Tamariki oversight can impose a standard for
family life that excludes women who fall outside dominant norms of good
motherhood.
173
If the Oranga Tamariki interest in “unborn children”
disproportionately targets women experiencing poverty and some Māori women,
that interest in practice goes beyond an individual interference with lifestyle
decisions in privacy and becomes a judgment about who is entitled to become a
169. Oranga Tamariki Act at Section 78.
170. Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy: An Approach That
Undermines the Health of Women and Children 6 (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2000),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_bp_punishingwomen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3TY-YBFK].
171. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] NZLR at [73]–[74].
172. L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Children, [2018] NZHC 1420 at 9.
173. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 162, at 1463.
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mother.
174
In this sense the policies perpetuate the subordination of women in
New Zealand. The policies simultaneously claim to value life through
prioritizing interventions for the “unborn” life to meet “high aspirations” for the
long-term improvement in health, education and other social outcomes
175
while
devaluing existing life and motherhood in the pregnant woman.
Further, Oranga Tamariki oversight of individual pregnant women distracts
the public from the broader State supports that are required to improve child
wellbeing. The policies alleviate the burden on the State to address broader
deprivation and discourages society from inquiring into other non-intrusive, non-
punitive solutions to the problem of child wellbeing.
176
It is perverse that the State interventions in pregnancy serve to constrain
rather than empower pregnant women. The State is not only failing to address
the complex history of structural inequality and colonial oppression that renders
certain pregnant women vulnerable to Oranga Tamariki oversight, it is imposing
interventions that further constrain the very women it has an obligation to
empower. Fundamentally, the State does not trust women to be partners in its
interventions to protect the fetus or “unborn child” from harm and help it to thrive
at birth. While the State purports to work with a pregnant woman to support her
health and prepare for birth,
177
its efforts are hedged by a distrust of women’s
choices and an eagerness to step in to replace the woman’s judgment with that
of Oranga Tamariki and the Court.
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V. RECONSTRUCTING STATE PREGNANCY INTERVENTION TO EMPOWER
PREGNANTWOMEN
New Zealand must reconstruct State pregnancy intervention to empower all
pregnant women. I acknowledge that any reconstruction of pregnancy
intervention within the State child protection branch will face the problem of
how to overcome the structural limits of the paramountcy principle and the
rescue model. Notwithstanding these challenges, the State’s vexed relationship
with pregnant women cannot be resolved by the State withdrawing from
pregnancy altogether. The State must instead rise to the challenge of
reconstructing pregnancy interventions that promote women’s wellbeing and
autonomous decision making.
174. Id. at 1459–60.
175. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; Who We Are, ORANGA TAMARIKI, https://www.oranga
tamariki.govt.nz/about-us/overview/ [https://perma.cc/ZU8H-MYVT].
176. Roberts, supra note 162, at 1436.
177. See supra Part I.
178. See, e.g., In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC) at 583–84.
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A. Problem of Overcoming Paramountcy Principle and Rescue Model
Two core features of traditional child protection services are fundamentally
incompatible with the autonomy of pregnant women: the paramountcy principle
and the rescue model. These structural limits cast doubt on whether the State can
achieve positive, empowering pregnancy intervention within the child protection
branch of government.
The “paramountcy principle” is the principle introduced in Part I that the
child’s welfare and interests must be the first and paramount consideration in all
decision making under the primary statute for the care and protection of
children.
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When the State applies the paramountcy principle to the fetus in the
frame of an “unborn child” it sets up a contest between the woman and her fetus
and the woman and her future child. As I have outlined in Parts II and IV, the
principle elevates the fetus to the position of “child” whose welfare and interests
should be prioritized at the expense of the interests of the pregnant woman.
The second challenge arises from the “rescue model.” The “rescue model”
is the idea that the State meets its responsibilities for child wellbeing by
establishing standards for the care and protection of children and intervening to
“rescue” children when parents fail to meet those standards.
180
As I have
explained in Parts I and III, the State sets the standards for the care and protection
of children and the discretionary application of these standards in an environment
of structural inequality and colonial oppression serves to impose dominant white
middle-class norms of parenting and motherhood.
The rescue model places the primary responsibility for child wellbeing on
individual parents and ignores the social or economic conditions that constrain
the parents’ ability to meet the standards for care.
181
It works on an assumption
that families should be independent from the State and that good parents will be
able to meet all of a child’s needs.
182
This underplays the complex economic and
social constraints on parents’ everyday ability to care for their children and
reduces the State role to moments of crisis.
183
Because intervention is triggered
by reports for these crisis moments, intervention becomes a punitive response to
individual failure. The State intervenes to punish deficient parents through
intrusive oversight of their decision making and the looming threat of moving
the children from the parents’ custody to the custody of the State.
184
179. See Oranga Tamariki Act at Section 6 (demonstrating the “paramountcy principle”).
180. See ROBERTS, supra note 126, at 74.
181. Id. at 89.
182. See, e.g., EMILY KEDDELL, THE CHILD YOUTH AND FAMILY REVIEW: A COMMENTARY ON
PREVENTION 19 (2017), https://thepolicyobservatory.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/81249/Emily-
Keddell-CAN-report-June-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/59LE-GPYG]; Dorothy Roberts, The Child
Welfare System’s Racial Harm, 44 NOMOS 98, 104 (2003).
183. ROBERTS, supra note 126, at 89.
184. Id. at 90–91.
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The new investment focus of Oranga Tamariki is a partial move away from
rescue responses and towards early support of families. However, such
innovations continue to be pasted on top of the traditional crisis response
structure where reports of concern trigger discretionary Oranga Tamariki contact
and interventions are guided by the child’s paramount interests. While this
structure endures, pregnancy intervention within the child protection branch
cannot be effective to empower pregnant women.
B. Reconstructing, Not Rejecting, State Intervention
Yet the State’s vexed relationship with pregnant women cannot be resolved
by the State’s withdrawal from pregnancy altogether. In the reproductive health
information context, Professor Lynn Freedman has called for a questioning of
the traditional modes of thinking about human rights that reject State
involvement, arguing that: “Our goal is not simply to eradicate the practice or
prevent state intrusion on a basic freedom by rejecting any state involvement in
the issue. Women need and want high quality reproductive health services, and
states are key to ensuring that they get them.”
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Freedman’s call to use human rights principles to think about how, not
whether, the State should intervene in individual lives to best promote human
dignity and welfare is equally pertinent to the examination of State intervention
in pregnancy. Denying State support for pregnant women would simply impose
a different kind of limit on women’s ability to make decisions and take action to
prepare for wanted, healthy pregnancies and stable parenting relationships.
For this reason, the objective is not to do away with State intervention in
pregnancy but for the State to reconstruct it in a way that promotes women’s
wellbeing and autonomous decision making. The reconstruction of State
intervention in pregnancy is supported by an affirmative concept of the right to
privacy, the concept of reproductive autonomy, the Crown’s positive obligations
to Māori under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and New Zealand’s international treaty
obligations.
Dorothy Roberts presents an affirmative right to privacy that emphasizes a
duty of the State to provide the necessary social conditions and resources to
support fully autonomous decision making.
186
Critically, the affirmative view
recognizes the connection between privacy and equality, where “the
dehumanization of the individual” is tied to the broader “subordination of the
group.”
187
Roberts contends that the government’s “duty to guarantee
185. Lynn P. Freedman, Censorship andManipulation of Reproductive Health Information: An Issue
of Human Rights and Women’s Health, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 1, 2 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995).
186. Roberts, supra note 162, at 1479.
187. Id. at 1480.
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personhood and autonomy stems not only from the needs of the individual, but
also from the needs of the entire community.”
188
Erin Nelson has proposed an account of reproductive autonomy that:
favours State intervention to the extent that it involves positive
involvement by the State in the lives of pregnant women who need
support in order to exercise reproductive autonomy (even only to a
limited extent), and whose capacity for autonomy will be increased by
the provision of such support and assistance.
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This focus on enhancing autonomy is most pertinent for the pregnant
woman, who is carrying the fetus and thus will be the most directly affected of
any State intervention. It also extends to the other parent or involved family
members: the autonomy constraint is both in avoiding constraining the ability of
the family to make choices, and in promoting the ability to make choices.
The objective of building positive State intervention is further supported by
the New Zealand Crown’s positive obligations to Māori under Te Tiriti o
Waitangi. The Oranga Tamariki Act, and any statute dealing with the control of
children, is colored by the key Treaty principles of partnership, protection and
participation.
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In the context of child protection services, the Treaty preserves
and protects the familial organization of Māori.
191
By July 1, 2019, Oranga
Tamariki will carry new statutory duties to recognize and provide a practical
commitment to the Treaty principles.
192
The duties include ensuring that the
policies, practices and services of Oranga Tamariki “have regard to mana tamaiti
(tamariki) and the whakapapa of Māori children and young persons and the
whanaungatanga responsibilities of their whanau, hapū, and iwi.”
193
In the
context of health services, the Treaty principles further require the State to work
together with Māori communities to improve strategies forMāori health, involve
188. Id.
189. ERIN NELSON, LAW, POLICY AND REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY 204 (2013).
190. Barton Prescott v. Director-General of Social Welfare [1997] 3 NZLR 179 (HC); New Zealand
Māori Council v. Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA). This Note does not address the ongoing
critique of the Treaty principles. See, e.g., ANI MIKAERE, COLONISING MYTHS MĀORI REALITIES HE
RUKURUKUWHAKAARO 139 (2011).
191. Barton Prescott v. Director-General of Social Welfare [1997] 3 NZLR 179 (HC).
192. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, Section
14.
193. “Mana tamaiti (tamariki)” is defined in the Act as “the intrinsic value and inherent dignity
derived from a child’s or young person’s whakapapa (genealogy) and their belonging to a whānau, hapū,
iwi, or family group, in accordance with tikangaMāori or its equivalent in the culture of the child or young
person.” Id. at Section 1(7). “Whakapapa” is defined as “the multi-generational kinship relationships that
help to describe who the person is in terms of their mātua (parents), and tūpuna (ancestors), from whom
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obligations to whakapapa,” “the kinship that provides the foundations for reciprocal obligations and
responsibilities to be met” and “the wider kinship ties that need to be protected and maintained to ensure
the maintenance and protection of their sense of belonging, identity, and connection.” Id.
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Māori in all levels of decision making and delivery of services, and ensure that
Māori have at least the same level of health as non-Māori.
194
State support of pregnancy is consistent with New Zealand’s international
treaty obligations to support family life. The ICCPR describes the family as “the
natural and fundamental group of unit of society,” which is “entitled to protection
by society and the State” under Article 23 of the Convention. Article 12 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
requires State parties to “ensure to women appropriate services in connection
with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services
where necessary.”
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While the Convention on the Rights of the Child’s protections before birth
must be limited and are subject to a debate around whether the definition of
“child” includes “the unborn,”
196
the Convention clearly emphasizes the positive
obligation for the State to provide the conditions for a healthy family life. In
particular, Article 19(2) of the Convention directs States to provide “protective
measures” against abuse and neglect, including “effective procedures for the
establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child
and for those who have the care of the child.”
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Article 24(2)(d) requires States
to ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal healthcare.
198
Article 27(3) places
the primary responsibility for a child’s living conditions on their parents but also
points States to “provide material assistance and support programmes,
particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”
199
These positive
obligations to support families do not hinge on the fetus itself being a child, but
should extend to support in preparation for birth.
C. Steps Towards Reconstruction
I propose two initial steps toward reconstruction of State pregnancy
intervention to empower New Zealand women.
The first step is to move away from narrowly targeted crisis interventions
and towards broad universal support. One piece of this shift is to address the
disjunction between motherhood norms and motherhood realities that leads
discretionary Oranga Tamariki interventions to target a marginalized subset of
194. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE GUIDE TO HE KOROWAI ORANGA: MĀORI HEALTH STRATEGY 12
(2014), https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/publications/guide-to-he-korowai-oranga-ma
ori-health-strategy-jun14-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CS-TN33].
195. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 12, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
196. See Mitra, supra note 79, for a discussion of the debate and compromise regarding how to
approach the “unborn” in the Convention in the context of disagreement on State approaches to abortion
and the ambiguity of the preamble reference to “appropriate legal protection” before birth.
197. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 15, art. 19(2).
198. Id. art. 24(2)(d).
199. Id. art. 27(3) makes clear this is subject to the State’s “national conditions” and “means.”
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pregnant women. Oranga Tamariki must work to embrace understandings of
parenting that effectively disrupt the place of white, middle-class norms of good
motherhood as the center of care and protection standards. A further piece is to
prioritize universalized support services that aim to provide the social and
economic conditions necessary for parents to meet the expected standards of care
and enhance the existing capacities of the whānau to engage in
self-determination and autonomous decision making.
200
Such services would
provide critical support for families to prepare for birth without the looming
threat of punitive interventions to override the judgment of the pregnant women
or place the fetus into the formal custody of the State.
The second step is to abandon the State’s claimed interest in the fetus as an
unborn child separate from the pregnant woman and replace this with an interest
in the health and wellbeing of the family or whānau. The interest in the family
or whānau may mean the pregnant woman alone, the pregnant woman and her
wanted future child, the pregnant woman and partner, or the pregnant woman
and a broader family group. Instead of shoehorning pregnancy interventions into
the traditional care and protection model and thereby sacrificing the rights-
bearing pregnant woman to the paramount interests of her fetus, the model would
situate the woman within her chosen family and community and provide
conditions for her empowerment.
CONCLUSION
State intervention in pregnancy must be reconstructed to maximize its
promise and guard against its perils. On the promise side, a reconstructed
intervention must recognize that pregnancy is indeed a unique opportunity for
the State to put a family in the best possible position to prepare for a wanted,
healthy pregnancy and a stable parenting relationship. On the peril side, State
intervention must recognize that the fetus is not a child and that traditional child
protection tools are inappropriate. This does not mean that the State does not
have any duties toward a wanted child, but these duties are tied to the woman’s
desire to produce a healthy child and her rights to the conditions that make this
desired result possible.
There are no easy solutions to the State’s vexed relationship with pregnancy.
Going forward, it will be necessary to examine whether positive, empowering,
affirmative intervention can be achieved within the child protection branch or
whether the child protection branch is inevitably a site of constraint for pregnant
women. The inquiry must interrogate how the State can bring its duty to grapple
200. L. Ruwhiu, Indigenous Issues in Aotearoa New Zealand, in M. CONNOLLY, M. & L. HARMS,
EDS., SOCIALWORK: CONTEXT AND PRACTICE 107, 118 (2009).
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with the deeper structural conditions limiting children’s wellbeing in
New Zealand into its immediate relationship with individual families.
